Deprecated: The each() function is deprecated. This message will be suppressed on further calls in /home/zhenxiangba/zhenxiangba.com/public_html/phproxy-improved-master/index.php on line 456
TF Lunch meetings
[go: Go Back, main page]

TF Lunch meetings

Lunch meetings 2006



Saeed Salehi Thursday April 13
Joost Joosten Tuesday April 18
Tatiana Yavorskaya Friday April 21
Andreas Weiermann Tuesday April 25
Rostislav Yavorskiy Friday April 28



Location: Bestuursgebouw 036
Date: Thursday April 13
Time: 12:00-13:00
Title: Weak Modal Logics of Cut-Free Provability
Speaker: Saeed Salehi


Abstract
Normal propositional modal logics are usually formalized by some set of modal axioms containing the axiom
(K)   ¤(A → B) → (¤A → ¤B)
plus the rule of necessitation
(RN)   A / ¤A
over the classical propositional calculus. The Gödel-Löb logic, which is known to be the provability logic of sufficiently strong arithmetical theories such as Peano's arithmetic or primitive recursive arithmetic, is then obtained by adding Löb's axiom
(L)   ¤(¤A → A) → ¤A
to K. When the modal operator ¤ is interpreted as cut-free provability in weak arithmetics (where the exponentiation function is not total) then the axiom (K) does not hold. For considering these provability logics (with weaker provability predicates over weaker theories) one is inclined to study non-normal modal logics.
In this talk, we review the theory of minimal modal logic E which is axiomatized by the single rule of inference
(RE)   (A ↔ B) / (¤A ↔ ¤B)
over classical propositional calculus. Then we will see that the normal modal logic K is obtained from E by adding the axioms
(M)   ¤(A & B) → ¤A & ¤B  
and
(C)   ¤A & ¤B → ¤(A & B)  
and the necessitation rule (RN).
While (M) and (RN) are still valid for cut-free provability of weak arithmetics, we observe that (C) is not: for getting a cut-free proof of A&B out of a cut-free proof p of A and a cut-free proof q of B, we should merge p and q together and perform some arithmetical operations which could be too costly to be handled in our weak arithmetic. Loosely speaking, the axiom (K) is a kind of formalized cut rule, which should not hold is those arithmetics that cannot prove the equivalence of cut-free provability with the usual Hilbert-style provability. We note that the cost of cut-elimination is of (super-)exponential in proof theory.
We also introduce another axiom (S) valid for Herbrand provability in IΔ0, and derive Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem for Herbrand Consistency of IΔ0; that is the unprovability of the Herbrand Consistency of IΔ0 in itself.


Location: Bestuursgebouw 150
Date: Tuesday April 18
Time: 12:00-13:00
Title: Computational complexity and short proofs of consistency statements
Speaker: Joost Joosten


Abstract:
In this talk I shall discuss connections between various fields of logic. First, I shall make some comments on links between computational complexity and arithmetics. Next I shall dwell on the relation between propositional logic and computational complexity. This shall culminate in a beautiful theorem by Pudlák and Krajicek relating optimal propositional proof systems to poly-time axiomatized theories that prove in a short way all consistency statements of all poly-time axiomatized theories. I shall sketch a proof of this theorem and talk about new results that I obtained in this direction. Although this abstract uses many difficult words, I think I can present parts of the talk on a pretty elementary level. I even wrote a popular mathematical text (in Dutch) on the above mentioned theorem of Pudlák and Krajicek which can be found in this report list or here


Location: Bestuursgebouw 150
Date: Friday April 21
Time: 12:00-13:00
Title: First order logic of proofs
Speaker: Tatiana Yavorskaya
Moscow State University, Department of mathematical logic and algorithm theory


Abstract:
This talk will be about the ongoing research in first order logic of proofs. Propositional logic of proofs LP introduced by S. Artemov is formulated in terms of the relation ``t is a proof of A'' where proofs are represented by means of special proof terms. LP is decidable and arithmetically complete. Also it suffices to emulate modal logic S4 and thus provides it with the exact provability semantics. If we turn to first order logic of proofs, so far, most results were negative. As in case with provability logic, first order logics of proofs are not recursively enumerable. A recursively enumerable arithmetically complete fragment was found by R. Yavorsky, but this fragment admits only boundeed formulas in the scope of the proof operator, and thus it is not sufficient for the realization of any modal logic. In this talk we present the most recent results, namely, an arithmetically sound first order logic of proofs which emulates first order modal logic S4, and, therefore, first order intuitionistic logic. The most relevant papers which can be downloaded are
  1. for negative results in first order logic of proofs see
    S.Artemov and T.Sidon-Yavorskaya. `On the first order logic of proofs,' Moscow Mathematical Journal, vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 475-490, 2001.
  2. for brief introduction to propositional logic of proofs see
    S. Artemov. ``Explicit Modal Logic,' Workshop Proceedings Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 2, Uppsala, 1998, Technical Report CFIS 98-17, Cornell University, 1998.
  3. for enumerable fragment of first order logic of proofs see
    R.E. Yavorsky. `On arithmetical completeness of first-order logics of provability'. Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 3, F. Wolter, H. Wansing, M. de Rijke, and M. Zakharyaschev, eds. 2002, pp. 1-16.
Joint work with Sergei Artemov Graduate Center, CUNY, New York


Location: Bestuursgebouw 150
Date: Tuesday April 25
Time: 12:00-13:00
Title: What makes an Ackermannian function non primitive recursive?
Speaker: Andreas Weiermann


Abstract:
It is well known that the Ackermann function arises naturally from a given simple start function by iteration and diagonalization. In this talk we classify exactly for a large class of start functions the speed of iteration which is needed to produce a non primitive recursive function. Among other things we prove that if the successor function is the start function then logarithmic iteration does not lead beyond primitive recursion. (This is joint work with Eran Omri.)


Location: Bestuursgebouw 036
Date: Friday April 28
Time: 12:00-13:00
Title: On provability logic with quantifiers on proofs
Speaker: Rostislav Yavorskiy
Steklov Mathematical Institute, Moscow, Russia


Abstract:

We consider first order extensions of the logic of proofs, in which we do not change the set of atomic formulas, but allow for quantification over proof variables. In this language the modal provability operator Box is expressed by the formula ∃ x(x : A), so provability logic with quantifiers on proofs is also an extension of propositional modal provability logic.

Some non-axiomatizability results for different versions of provability logic with quantifiers on proofs are found in [1]. However, there is a hope that the logic corresponding to the standard Gödel proof predicate is decidable. Some partial positive results in this direction are presented in [2, 3]. The solution of this problem is closely related to the task of finding adequate Kripke-style semantics for this kind of logics.

References:

  1. Rostislav Yavorskiy. ` Provability logic with quantifiers on proofs.' Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 113 (2002), pp. 373-387.
  2. Rostislav Yavorskiy. ` On Prenex Fragment of Provability Logic with Quantifiers on Proofs.' Proceedings of the Steklov Institute of Mathematics. Vol. 242 (2003), pp. 112-124.
  3. Rostislav Yavorskiy. `On Kripke-style Semantics for the Provability Logic of Goedel's Proof Predicate with Quantifiers on Proofs.' Journal of Logic and Computation. Vol. 15, No. 4 (2005), pp. 539-549.




Lunch meetings 2005

We meet on a weekly basis, on thursdays, 12:00 - 13:00 in room 195 of the bestuursgebouw of Utrecht University (except when there is the F-lunch instead). Normally we work in an informal setting (some speak while others eat).

Thomas Dohmen Tuesday January 4
Cory Wright Tuesday January 11
Joost J. Joosten Dinsdag 18 januari
Tanja Yavorski (Guest from Moscow) Tuesday January 25
Rostik Yavorski (Guest from Moscow) Tuesday February 1
Joel Anderson Dinsdag 8 februari
Siewert van Otterloo Tuesday February 15
Vincent van Oostrom Tuesday February 22
Vincent van Oostrom Tuesday March 8
Albert Visser Tuesday March 15
No seminar Tuesday March 29
Emil Jerabek Tuesday April 12
Emil Jerabek Tuesday April 19
Janneke van Lith Tuesday April 26
Lev Beklemishev Tuesday May 17
Albert Visser Tuesday May 24
Vincent van Oostrom Tuesday June 14
Joop Leo Tuesday June 21
Fabian Battaglini and Jan van Eijck Tuesday June 28
Rosja Mastop Friday July 8
Vincent van Oostrom Thursday September 29
Lev Beklemishev Thursday October 13
Rosja Mastop Thursday November 10






Speaker: Thomas Dohmen
Title: Context and Error in the Epistemology of Scientific Experiment
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday January 4, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Within traditional epistemology, so-called skeptical scenarios challenge the idea of having knowledge. These scenarios demand a level of justification which has to be delivered in order to call something knowledge that is impossible to reach. A way to deal with these skeptical scenarios is offered by an approach called contextualism, in which it seems reasonable to disregard skeptical scenarios in certain contexts, thereby justifying the attribution of knowledge in those constrained contexts.

The project of Generating Experimental Knowledge investigates the critical role of error in experimental science. Scientists use experiments to generate knowledge. They rely on various standard methods to insure that the experiment provides them with correct data. By relying on these methods, scientists seem to be justified in attributing knowledge to the theories that have been confirmed by experiments or to theories that follow the outcome of experiments, although possible errors have not been (individually) accounted for.

The claim of this part of the project is that, by referring to such standard methods, scientists create a context of justification which enables them to attribute knowledge in the same way that the epistemic contextualists create a context of justification. This is done by creating a context in which knowledge can be justifiably attributed without regarding the factors that threaten this attribution of knowledge to the full extent. In contextual epistemology, there is no full defense against skeptical scenarios (these scenarios are just properly ignored in most contexts), and in scientific experiment not every possible error is individually accounted for (because there is a reference to a context of similar and related experiments and standard methodologies, some possible errors are ignored).

This PhD thesis suggests and presents an analogical relation between skepticism in the theory of knowledge and error in the practice of experimental science. It is an investigation into both the consequences of the concept of knowledge and epistemic skepticism for the practice of experimental science and the consequences of error in experimental science for the theory of knowledge. The main focus is on the role of context in both fields of study, since it is supposed that context determines when knowledge can be correctly attributed in both fields.

This thesis will offer not only an evaluating overview of the debates of the last two decades of contextual epistemology, but will also contribute a specific perspective on the practice of experimental science from epistemic theory, thereby offering a practical case to matters that traditionally have always remained highly theoretical. Conversely, it will offer a deeply philosophical background of the concept of scientific knowledge to the practice of scientific experimentation (which is generally thought to generate knowledge). Furthermore, the thesis will include an extensive account of the semantic issues arising through a contextual approach to science and its related conceptual terminology. It is hoped that, together, these analyses will lead to a better understanding of the relationship between the theory of knowledge (epistemology) and the attribution of knowledge in experimental science.


Speaker: Cory Wright
Title: Minimalist explanations do not explain very much
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday January 11, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00



Abstract:
Minimalist explanations of truth dont explain very much---and thats fine, so long as theres little in need of explanation in the first place; but that itself cannot be a reason for thinking that truth is not a robust alethic phenomenon. So minimalists need a second-order explanation as to why minimal explanations are adequate. Over the last 15 years, Paul Horwich has provided and defended just such an explanation, and, in doing so, has provided one of the most serious challenges to the legitimacy of substantive theoriesone which is all the more powerful given that it does not discriminate amongst them. Consequently, Horwichs alethic minimalism is one of the bigger obstacles to the plausibility of substantive alethic theories. In this talk, I consider reasons for looking askance at Horwichs explanation as to the adequacy of minimal explanations should be rejected, which---if gripping---would suggest that minimalism is not the threat to substantivism that it is so often held to be.


Plaats: Ruppert Rood (let op: afwijkende plaats!)
Datum: Dinsdag 18 januari, 2005
Tijd: 12:00-13:00 (let op: afwijkende afwijkende tijd = normale tijd)
Titel: Logica 1
Spreker: Joost J. Joosten


Aflevering drie van de F-lunch. Het is de bedoeling om zelf lunch mee te brengen.


Speaker: Tanja Yavorski
Title: Operations on proofs and labels.
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday January 25, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:
This talk is about the logic of proofs (S.Artemov, 1997), the ongoing research in this field and, in particularly, about logic of proofs as a framework for specification of operations on proofs. Logic of proofs is formulated in the propositional language enriched by the proof predicate "t is a proof of F". We add a new labelling predicate "x is a label for F" to the language. This enables one to specify a wide class of operations which produce codes of proofs being given codes of some other proofs and possibly codes of formulas. We describe logics which specify different opertions on proofs and labels. The main result is the uniform completeness theorem for these logics.


Speaker: Rostik Yavorski
Title: On the first order logic of the standard proof predicate
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday February 1, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:
There are two ways to consider first order extensions of the logic of proofs LP. First, we can extend the set of atomic formulas by adding predicate letters, individual variables etc. The second way is to extend the language of LP with quantifiers on proofs. In my talk I will report recent results in this field. In particular, I will focus on the properties of the first order logics corresponding to the standard (single conclusion) Goedel proof predicate and its multiple conclusion modification.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 036
Datum: Dinsdag 8 februari 2005
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Filosofie van de Geest
Spreker: Joel Anderson


Aflevering vier van de F-lunch. Het is de bedoeling om zelf lunch mee te brengen.


Speaker: Siewert van Otterloo
Title: Game and Preference Logics
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday February 15, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

Several attempts have been made to develop logical languages for reasoning about games. Many of these logics are variants of propositional modal logic, with extra operators that address game theoretic issues, such as time, actions, preferences and outcomes. In my talk I will compare several of these logics, and explain what properties make these logics useful or interesting to look at. I will do this from both a philosophical and a computer science perspective.


Speaker: Vincent van Oostrom
Title: Delimiting Diagrams
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday February 22, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

We introduce the unifying notion of delimiting diagram. In the first part of our talk, hitherto unrelated results such as: Minimality of the internal needed strategy for orthogonal first-order term rewriting systems, maximality of the limit strategy for orthogonal higher-order pattern rewrite systems (with maximality of the strategy F-infinity for the lambda-calculus as a special case), and uniform normalisation of balanced weak Church-Rosser abstract rewriting systems, all are seen to follow from the property that any pair of diverging steps can be completed into a delimiting diagram. In the second part we relativise our results to deal with non-confluent systems as well.


Speaker: Vincent van Oostrom
Title: Vicious Circles in Orthogonal Rewriting
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday March 8, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

In rewriting, (head) normal forms model `results' and objects which may be rewritten to a result are considered meaningful. We show that for orthogonal rewrite systems, an object which may be rewritten to itself is meaningless; it cannot be rewritten to a result. In other words, a circle in a reduction graph is vicious. The proof is based on an analogy between taking residuals of cycles and computing decimal expansions of fractions; both are repetitive and compressible, in a technical sense to be explained.


Speaker: Albert Visser
Title: Dynamic Semantics on Indexed Complete Boole Algebras
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday March 8, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

Groenendijk & Stokhof's Dynamic Predicate Logic or DPL was a one dimensional system: there was no clear separation of context and content. For various reasons it is better to set things up using a two dimensional approach in which information growth has two components. Such an approach involves an Indexed Complete Boole Algebra. We will show how a seemingly negative result of van Benthem saying that a dynamic predicate logic with certain good properties is impossible, turns into a positive result in the two dimensional setting. We will also discuss the notions of satsfaction and negation in the framework of an Indexed Boole Algebra.


Speaker: Emil Jerabek
Title: Admissible rules of modal logics
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday April 12, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

Building on the work of S. Ghilardi and R. Iemhoff, we present explicit bases of admissible rules for several normal modal systems, including K4, GL, S4, or GL.3.


Speaker: Emil Jerabek
Title: Admissible rules of modal logics
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday April 19, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

See the announcement of April 12.


Speaker: Janneke van Lith
Title: A paradox from statistical physics
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday April 26, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

The Gibbs paradox, named after the founding father of statistical mechanics J.W. Gibbs, is concerned with the entropy of mixing of ideal gases. I will explain the paradox, explain it away, and discuss in passing several more-or-less-philosophical issues: indistinguishability of particles, theory reduction, and subjectivity in physics.


Speaker: Lev Beklemishev (Joint work with J. Joosten and M. Vervoort)
Title: Japaridze's polymodal logic: provable and unprovable facts
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday May 17, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

We examine the question whether some of the usual modal-logical properties of Japaridze's logic GLP and its extensions by closed modal formulas can be established by finitary methods. We give examples of non-trivially provable (in the elementary arithmetic) as well as of unprovable (in ACA_0) facts about this modal logic.


Speaker: Albert Visser
Title: MuGL: Lö?b's logic meets mu-calculus
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday May 17, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

There are two major modal logics of fixed points: Löb's logic and the mu-calculus. The first corresponds to guarded fixed points and the second to minimal fixed points of positive operators. We show that these logics are connected: Löb's logic is a retract of the mu-calculus. A consequence is that e.g. uniform interpolation can be transferred from the mu-calculus to Löb's logic.


Speaker: Vincent van Oostrom (Joint work with J. Ketema and J.W. Klop)
Title: Covering clusters by chains
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday June 14, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract: A collection of redex-pattern occurrences in a term is said to be a cluster if their union is a connected part of the term. We show that in weakly orthogonal TRSs, clusters may always be covered by so-called chains, by reduction to the same property for interval algebra.


Speaker: Joop Leo
Title: Modeling relations
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday June 21, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract: We are going to consider relations "out there" in the real world. In the way we normally look at relations the relata (objects) occupy positions. This is no problem for the love relation, but for relations like the adjacency relation and cyclic relations, different assignments of objects to the positions might give exactly the same states. So, we have to conclude that the positions are not always in the states themselves. But, if positions are not in the states, what is the nature of the positions? Are they metaphysically a redundant ingredient of relations? Or are they perhaps even a consequence of a wrong conception of what a relation is? In this presentation I will discuss different models of relations that help to clarify the status and meaning of positions for "real" relations.


Speaker: Fabian Battaglini and Jan van Eijck
Title: Monotonicity in Natural Reasoning
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday June 28, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract: We will explain the connection between monotonicity reasoning and polarity marking in natural language, and present a new algorithm for polarity marking. Next, we analyse the fine structure of syllogistic reasoning in terms of applications of the rules of symmetry, monotonicity, and existential import. Finally, we will connect up to concrete examples of how monotonicity can explain various aspects of reasoning competence and performance.

See: Natural Logic for Natural Language
Syllogistic = Monotonicity + Symmetry + Existential Import



Speaker: Rosja Mastop
Title: `Self-introduction of the speaker'
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Friday July 8, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Summary of topics:

  1. Mijn achtergrond, opleiding (heel in het kort)
  2. Mijn proefschrift-onderzoek Dit betreft taalfilosofie (illocutionaire kracht, zinstypen en de relatie tussen semantiek en pragmatiek) en meer concrete taalkunde (de relatie tussen imperatief en infinitief, verledentijdsimperatieven, en meer) en enige deontische logica (disjunctie en modaliteit, zie ook de vorige tf lunch).
  3. Mijn (huidige en) toekomstige onderzoek Gebiedende zinnen bevelen handelingen, niet gebeurtenissen. Handelingen zijn niet gebeurtenissen. Causaliteit is een relatie tussen gebeurtenissen, handelen is een relatie tussen personen en handelingen. Dus: handelen is niet veroorzaken. Bij het onderzoek kijk ik naar: filosofen die zeggen dat causaliteit een projectie is van het eigen doelgericht handelen (Maine de Biran), of dat causaliteit direct wordt waargenomen (Michotte), de semantiek van de verschillende gerundium-typen (Vendler, Hyman), de manipuleerbaarheidstheorie van causaliteit (von Wright).



Speaker: Vincent van Oostrom
Title: Substitutions vs Braids
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Thursday September 29, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract: The Substitution Lemma is a fundamental lemma stating that the order in which two substitutions are applied can be interchanged. For instance, interchanging the order in which the substitutions [x:=y+3] and [y:=7] are applied to (x+y) yields:
(x+y)[x:=y+3][y:=7] = (x+y)[y:=7][x:=(y+3)[y:=7]]
which is correct since evaluating the substitutions yields that both sides are equal to (7+3)+7. In calculi which reify the notion of substitution, so-called explicit substitution calculi, the (general) equality is turned into a rewrite rule:
M[x:=P][y:=Q] -> M[y:=Q][x:=P[y:=Q]]
The question is whether this rule is confluent. As an exercise one may try to join, by means of further steps, the terms:
M[y:=Q][x:=P[y:=Q]][z:=R] and M[x:=P][z:=R][y:=Q[z:=R]]
obtained by applying the rule to M[x:=P][y:=Q][z:=R] in either way. We show there is a surprising analogy between the above confluence question and that for braids, based on the idea that both the above rule and crossing two strands in a braid correspond to `commutativity with history'.



Speaker: Lev Beklemishev
Title: Proof, evidence, belief: Artemov's logic of proofs and the notion of evidence in law
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 048
Date: Thursday October 13, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract: We shall discuss the notion(s) of evidence in law and examine the possibility of using the format of Artemov's Logic of Proofs LP to model some aspects of this notion.



Speaker: Rosja Mastop
Title: De wereld omgeven met mogelijkheden
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Thursday November 10, 2005
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:

Wellicht de meest fundamentele vraag in de analyse van het causaliteitsbegrip is: met welke begrippen kan dit gedaan worden? Is oorzakelijkheid een psychologisch fenomeen, te verklaren in termen van associaties, perceptuele Gestalt en subjectieve projectie? Of is het een (meta)fysische realiteit, te beschrijven in termen van behouden grootheden? In de literatuur is ook voor een derde mogelijkheid geopteerd: het analyseren van oorzakelijkheid aan de hand van praktisch filosofische begrippen. Zo heeft G. H. von Wright betoogd dat de relatie tussen oorzaak en gevolg er een is van middel tot doel. Anders gezegd, door de oorzaak te produceren kunnen wij het effect bewerkstelligen. Deze benadering heeft twee belangrijke voordelen: (i) het geeft een eenvoudige verklaring voor de asymmetrie van oorzakelijke verbanden en (ii) het verbindt het oorzakelijkheidsbegrip met de praktijk van experimentatie.

In deze presentatie wil ik op twee punten nader in gaan. Ten eerste wil ik laten zien dat deze aanpak niet circulair is, zoals wordt verondersteld door vriend en vijand van deze benadering. Ten tweede zal ik beargumenteren dat de aanpak van von Wright op twee gedachten hinkt: oorzakelijkheid is een op zich staand metafysisch verband (een nomologische afhankelijkheid), maar de enige wijze waarop wij inzicht kunnen vergaren in niet-gerealiseerde mogelijkheden is via (intentioneel) handelen. Ik zal betogen dat dit de status van mogelijke werelden in de theorie onduidelijk maakt. Een alternatief kan worden ontwaard in het werk van L. Wittgenstein.




Lunch meetings 2004



Joost J. Joosten Dinsdag 6 januari
Janneke van Lith Dinsdag 13 januari
William W. Tait Tuesday January 20
Albert Visser Dinsdag 27 januari
John Kuiper Dinsdag 3 februari
Albert Visser Dinsdag 10 februari
Jan Bergstra Dinsdag 17 februari
Lev D. Beklemishev Dinsdag 24 februari
Herman Hendriks Dinsdag 2 maart
Joop Leo Dinsdag 9 maart
Mojtaba Aghaei Tuesday March 16
Mojtaba Aghaei Tuesday March 23
Marta Bilkova Tuesday March 30
Albert Visser Tuesday April 6
Free Tuesday April 13
Vincent van Oostrom Tuesday April 20
Herman Hendriks Tuesday April 27
Menno Lievers Tuesday May 4
Menno Lievers Tuesday May 11
Joost J. Joosten Tuesday May 18
Joost J. Joosten Tuesday May 25
Marta Bilkova Tuesday June 1
Vincent van Oostrom Dinsdag 8 juni
Paul Harrenstein Dinsdag 15 juni
Albert Visser Dinsdag 22 juni
Jaap van Oosten Dinsdag 29 juni
Joost J. Joosten Dinsdag 14 september
Albert Visser Dinsdag 19 october
Menno Lievers Dinsdag 26 october
Lev Beklemishev Dinsdag 2 november
Henry Prakken Tuesday November 9
A. Bovykin and L. Carlucci Tuesday November 16
Marcus Duewell Dinsdag 23 november
Janne Willems Dinsdag 7 december
Michael Moortgat Tuesday 14 december
Teun Tieleman Dinsdag 21 december



Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 6 januari
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Modal matters in Interpretability logics; deel 2
Spreker: Joost J. Joosten


Het abstract is ongewijzigd. In deel twee zullen we iets meer op technische details ingaan.

Abstract
In deze voordracht zullen we ons concentreren op de modale semantiek van interpreteerbaarheidslogicas. We presenteren een constructiemethode waarmee van een groot aantal logicas de modale volledigheid kan worden bewezen. Tevens kunnen we deze methode aanwenden om een aantal belangwekkende arithmetische resultaten te verkrijgen.

In samenwerking met Evan Goris


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 13 januari
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: De rol van ergodentheorie in de filosofie van de statistische fysica
Spreker: Janneke van Lith



Tuesday January 20, Professor Tait from the University of Chicago, will give a talk in the Tf lunch series of the philosophy department.

Speaker: William W. Tait
Title: Are there intuitionistic counterexamples to classical mathematical logic?
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 036
Date: Tuesday January 20, 2004
Time: 11:00-13:00

Note that we start at 11:00 and not at the usual 12:00. More information on how to get at the Uithof can be found here.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 27 januari
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel:INDUCTION IN THE CATEGORY OF INTERPRETATIONS
Spreker:Albert Visser


As is well known, the principle of induction can be viewed as a consequence of the fact that the natural numbers form a free algebra. This insight is reflected in the category of interpretations. An interpretation of a weak arithmetic satisfies full induction if it is initial in a certain sense. We explain this idea in some detail and discuss some consequences.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw, 048
Datum: Dinsdag 3 februari
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Het hypothetisch oordeel bij Brouwer
Spreker:John Kuiper

De bewijsinterpretatie van de intuitionistische wiskunde en logica is niet vanaf het begin de ons nu bekende geweest. In zijn dissertatie stelde Brouwer zeer strenge eisen aan het hypothetisch oordeel, veel strenger dan Kolmogorov en Heyting dat deden (hoewel er bij de eerste ook een wijziging optrad in zijn opvattingen). Later accepteerde Brouwer impliciet Heytings interpretatie.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 038
Datum: Dinsdag 10 februari
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel:INDUCTION IN THE CATEGORY OF INTERPRETATIONS, part 2
Spreker: Albert Visser


The abstract has not been changed. In the second part we will focus more on proofs.
As is well known, the principle of induction can be viewed as a consequence of the fact that the natural numbers form a free algebra. This insight is reflected in the category of interpretations. An interpretation of a weak arithmetic satisfies full induction if it is initial in a certain sense. We explain this idea in some detail and discuss some consequences.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 038
Datum: Dinsdag 17 februari
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Procesalgebras in hybride systemen
Spreker: Jan Bergstra


Joint work with Cees Middelburg.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 038
Datum: Dinsdag 24 februari
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Limit existence principles in arithmetic and related topics
Spreker: Lev D. Beklemishev


Abstract:
We study the principle asserting that a primitive recursive function that is eventually weakly decreasing is eventually constant and some other principles of similar flavour in PA. We discuss some applications of such principles to interpretability and conservativity logic.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 036
Datum: Dinsdag 2 maart
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Indirect Speech Acts, Politeness, and the Civilizing Process
Spreker: Herman Hendriks

Abstract:
I will argue that Levinson's (1983) conversation analysis of linguistic indirectness is superior to an account in terms of speech act theory along the lines of Searle (1979b), especially in view of the way in which it relies on Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness as an explanatory mechanism. In a critical examination of their own work, Brown and Levinson conclude that their analysis of politeness suffers from an "overdose of cognitivism", as a result of which it is not able to account for the fact that social interaction has its own emergent properties which transcend the characteristics of the individuals that jointly produce it. Most notably, the phenomenon of politeness is linked up with the concept of aggression, and, among other notions that are central to the nature of the social persona, with the concept of embarrassment. The tenet of the present paper is that this emergent character of social interaction can be accounted for if the study of its internal systematics is supplemented with the theory of the development of social structure that has been proposed within the framework of the historical sociology of Elias (1993).


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 048
Datum: Dinsdag 9 maart
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Burned chips and indianenverhalen
Spreker: Joop Leo


Abstract:
Chips can become quite hot if a lot of wires switch from 0 to 1 and visa versa in a short time. For a certain class of logical circuits I will show that they are real energy-eaters. Further, I will discuss a relation between information complexity and energy consumption in chips. This relation, which is of a rather general kind, also gives some insight in the effort needed to communicate massages with a tam-tam in a certain time.

In Dutch:
Titel: Aangebrande chips en indianenverhalen

Chips kunnen behoorlijk warm worden als veel draadjes in korte tijd vaak switchen van 0 naar 1 en omgekeerd. Van een bepaalde klasse van logische circuits zal ik laten zien dat het echte energievreters zijn. Verder wil ik een verband tussen informatiecomplexiteit en energieverbruik in chips bespreken. Dit verband is van vrij algemene aard en geeft ook inzicht in de inspanning die nodig is om berichten binnen een bepaalde tijd door te geven met de tamtam.


Speaker: Mojtaba Aghaei
Title: Basic propositional logic, its systems and its models
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 038
Date: Tuesday March 16, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00


Basic propositional logic was first introduced by A. Visser in 1981, by the intention of formalizing provability. Formal provability logic is related to the provability modal logic GL just as intuitionistic logic is related to modal logic S4. Basic logic itself is related to K4. It is sound and complete with respect to the class of transitive Kripke models. In this lecture we introduce basic propositional logic and its motivation, and review its different axiomatic systems and its Kripke and algebraic models.


Speaker: Mojtaba Aghaei
Title: Basic predicate logic, its proof theory and its arithmetic
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 036
Date: Tuesday March 23, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00

Basic Predicate Calculus, BQC, was first introduced by W. Ruitenburg in 1990. He axiomatized it in sequent notation and his motivation came from a philosophical criticism of the BHK (Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov) interpretation of the logical connectives. In this lecture we introduce the axiomatic systems of BQC, basic arithmetic BA, and its realizablity.


Speaker: Marta Bilkova
Title: On Computational Content of Intuitionistic Proofs
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 036
Date: Tuesday March 30, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00


Abstract:
I follow up work of P. Pudlak and S Buss on feasibility of the disjunction property in IPC trying to do without the cut elimination theorem. My aim is to realize intuitionistically provable sequents by (in some cases) poly-time computations that can be constructed from a given proof in time polynomial in the size of this proof. In my talk I will start with an easy fragment of IPC containing only conjunction, disjunction, and negation and outline how this can work admitting more complex implications.


Speaker: Albert Visser
Title: object-theory and meta-theory
or
Title: direct interpretations and discrete fibrations
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 038
Date: Tuesday April 6, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00



At least one of the topics will be discussed.


From April 13 on, we will have our meetings, unless mentioned otherwise, in room 195.

Speaker: No one yet
Title:
Place:
Date: Tuesday April 6, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00


(...)


Speaker: Vincent van Oostrom
Title: reduction- vs stack-based read-back
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday April 20, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00

Abstract:
The read-back problem is the problem to read back a term from a graph, in a graph implementation of term rewriting. The problem is easy to solve in the first-order case, but hard in the higher-order case. We present a simple reduction-based solution for the higher-order read-back problem. Although this yields a very simple implementation, the correctness proof of the algorithm is not easy; it is based on a complex stack-based solution to the read-back problem. We present both read-back procedures and relate them.


Speaker: Herman Hendriks
Title: Indirect Speech Acts, Politeness, and the Civilizing Process, part 2
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday April 26, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00


I will argue that Levinson's (1983) conversation analysis of linguistic indirectness is superior to an account in terms of speech act theory along the lines of Searle (1979b), especially in view of the way in which it relies on Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness as an explanatory mechanism. In a critical examination of their own work, Brown and Levinson conclude that their analysis of politeness suffers from an "overdose of cognitivism", as a result of which it is not able to account for the fact that social interaction has its own emergent properties which transcend the characteristics of the individuals that jointly produce it. Most notably, the phenomenon of politeness is linked up with the concept of aggression, and, among other notions that are central to the nature of the social persona, with the concept of embarrassment. The tenet of the present paper is that this emergent character of social interaction can be accounted for if the study of its internal systematics is supplemented with the theory of the development of social structure that has been proposed within the framework of the historical sociology of Elias (1993).


Speaker: Menno Lievers
Title: Last Minute Talk
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday May 4, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00



Speaker: Menno Lievers
Title: The justification of the generality constraint
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday May 10, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00



Tuesday May 18 Speaker: Joost J. Joosten
Title: Models for GLP; Counting up to ε0
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday , 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00

Abstract:
In this talk I will present some "results/insights" obtained during my stay at Steklov institute. The work is not yet finished and many statements still are in need of rigorous proofs. The presented work is in colaboration with Lev D. Beklemishev.
It is difficult to provide GLP with a natural Kripke semantics, yet GlP is a very natural and useful logic. It contains a hierarchy of strength-increasing proof predicates. The logic has proven a fruitful tool in the study of natural ordinal notation systems and in providing independent combinatorial principles. Some tricks have been developed to surmount the impossibility of a natural Kripke semantics for GLP. We shall present a semantics invented by Ignatiev for the closed fragment and pronounce a hope that, by restricting the possible valuations, this universal model can also be used to give GLP semantics. The model turns out to be deep, rather deep. Actually very deep, namely ε0-deep. However, we would like to have properties of the model provable inside theories that can not see the well foundedness of orderings ε0. This calls for finite approximations using a Norm-function on ordinals.


Speaker: Joost J. Joosten
Title: Models for GLP; Counting up to є0, part 2: almost there
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday , 2004
Time: 12:30-13:30

Abstract: unchanged.


Speaker: Marta Bilkova
Title: A proof-theoretic proof of uniform interpolation of the modal logic K
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday , 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00

Abstract:
I'm going to present a proof theoretic proof of uniform interpolation for the modal propositional logic K based on Pitts' proof for intuitionistic propositional logic. The proof uses a simulation of quantifiers over propositional variables and a terminating sequent calculus for which structural rules are admissible.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 8 juni
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: FD a la Mellies
Spreker: Vincent van Oostrom


For a given term t, a development of a set of redexes T in t is a sequence of reduction steps from t in which only residuals of redexes in T may be contracted (so no created redexes). The Finite Developments Theorem (FD) expresses that all developments are finite. Intuitively this holds because only existing redexes may be contracted and since we only start with a finite supply (T) of them, we will eventually run out of redexes to contract. A complication is that (residuals of) redexes may replicate one another. Mellies has introduced some abstract conditions guaranteeing that replication does not get out of hand, of which we present a version in the concrete setting of second-order rewriting.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 15 juni
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Towards a Game-theoretical Notion of Consequence
Spreker: Paul Harrenstein

Von Neumann and Morgenstern presented game-theory as a branch of mathematics that deals with problems that had nowhere been dealt with before. From a mathematical point of view, the participants in a situation of conflict can be seen as each trying to maximize the same function (the outcome of the game) according to an idiosyncratic principle (their preferences). Moreover, none of the players have control over all variables of the function. The also argued that the usual notion of optimality is no longer available and new solution concepts had to be developed to take its place. Most notably among these game-theoretical solution concepts is still that of a Nash-equilibirum.

Logical notions of consequence have frequently been related to game-theoretical solution concepts. The correspondence between a formula being classically valid and the existence of a winning strategy for a player in a related two-person game, has been most prominent in this context. We propose a conservative extension of the classical notion of consequence for propositional logic based on a generalization of Nash-equilibrium. We construe propositional variables as decision variables that are possibly in the control of various agents and pursue the logical consequences of this idea. The game-theoretical concept of consequence that results opens up a line of theoretical research in which logic, game theory and social choice theory interact at the same level.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 22 juni
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Measuring Theories
Spreker: Albert Visser


One way of comparing objects is by assigning simpler objects to the given objects. The simple objects will be comparable in some familiar way. The simpler objects may be real numbers, groups, ...
We compare theories by assigning certain extensions of a weak theory to the given theories. The assigned theories are compared via the subset ordering. Our way of proceeding is a modification of the familiar notion of consistency strength. We will explain why our notion is *extensional*, where consistency strength is *intensional*.
It turns out that for a wide class of theories our notion coincides with local interpretability.


Dinsdag Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 29 juni
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Recursive sets and N-labelled graphs
Spreker: Jaap van Oosten


Abstract:
We shall present a combinatorial problem concerning these things, and explain the relevance of it.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 14 September
Tijd: 13:00-14:00
Titel: Two topics from my thesis
Spreker: Joost J. Joosten


Abstract:
This talk consists of two parts. In the first part we will study Beklemishevs approach to natural ordinal notation systems. His approach is based on graded provability algebras and makes extensively use of closed modal formulae. We shall focus on the universal model of the closed fragment of GLP; a modal semantics of depth $\epsilon_0$. The second part of the talk is devoted to relativized interpretability as a tool for proof-strength comparison. Our main interest will be in the calculation of interpretability logics.
In rough lines, I will present this talk on Saturday September 18 in Heidelberg: http://math.uni-heidelberg.de/logic/CL_2004/


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 19 october
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Realizability and Propositional Logic
Spreker: Albert Visser


This talk is a report on the project "Realizability and Propositional Logic" of Jaap van Oosten, Rosalie Iemhoff & Albert Visser. Kleene Realizability is one of the possible `metamathematifications' of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov Explanation of the logical connectives. In spirit it is closely connected to the tenets of the Markov school: ( All Mathematical Objects are Finite ) & ( Effective = Turing Computable ).

The question adressed in the project, is the simpe question: What is the propositional logic of realizability? Most of the talk will be devoted to getting the various possible explications of the question on the board. We will present some of the more startling results of the field concerning the explosive marriage of Church's Thesis (CT) and Markov's Principle (MP), to wit: 1) the predicate logic of suitable theories containing (CT+MP) is complete \Pi^0_2; 2) the propositional logic of suitable theories containing (CT+MP) is more than Intuitionisitic Propositional Logic (IPC)


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 26 october
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Menno over Lyn Rudder Baker
Spreker: Menno Lievers


Abstract:
Lynne Rudder Baker betoogt in haar artikel "Persons and Other Things" dat er geen essentieel onderscheid is tussen artefacten, zoals koffiekopjes en stoelen, en substanties, zoals koeien en bloemen. In beide soorten van objecten speelt volgens haar constitutie eenzelfde rol. Dit geldt ook voor mensen, maar in dat geval dient de notie van constitutie ook om een cruciaal onderscheid te maken tussen personen en hun lichaam. Mijn kritiek is tweeledig: ten eerste dat er wel degelijk een essentieel onderscheid bestaat tussen artefacten en substanties; ten tweede dat er geen essentieel onderscheid bestaat tussen personen en hun lichaam.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 2 november
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: An informal introduction to Logic in Law
Spreker:Lev Beklemishev


An informal introduction to Logic in Law


Speaker: Henry Prakken
Title: Logic and dialogue in legal reasoning: an inevitable intertwining
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday , 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00

Legal Reasoning is inherently defeasible, and it often takes place in an adversarial setting. I will argue that these two aspects of legal reasoning are inevitably intertwined, so that logical accounts of legal reasoning cannot separate inferential from dialogical aspects.


Speaker: Andrey Bovykin
Title: Independent arithmetical statements: present and future
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday November 16, 2004
Time: 12:00-12:30

Speaker: Lorenzo Carlucci
Title: U-shaped learning may be necessary
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday November 16, 2004
Time: 12:30-13:00

Abstract Lorenzo Carlucci (University of Siena, University of Delaware)

Abstract Andrey Bovykin (St.Petersburg Department of Steklov Mathematical Institute, and The University of Liverpool):
This is a "popular mathematics" talk that will introduce independence results to a general audience (and remind logicians of what they may already know). I shall sketch a very simple proof of unprovability of an adapted version of the Paris-Harrington Principle, quote some new developments and give a glimpse of the near future of the subject as I see it: what we are now able to do and what we should try to accomplish.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 048
Datum: Dinsdag 23 november
Tijd: 13:00-14:00
Titel: Wijsgerige Ethiek
Spreker: Marcus Duewell


Dit is de eerste aflevering in de serie F-lunches. Doel: kennis nemen van de inhoud van vakken uit het eerste jaar van de studie wijsbegeerte en suggesties bespreken over meer onderlinge verwijzingen en coherentie in het onderwijsaanbod.
Vorm: +-45 minuten, een spreker, de toehoorders gebruiken de lunch, dit eens per maand.


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 7 December
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Qualia overboord? Een analyse van het qualiabegrip in Dennett's "Quining Qualia.".
Spreker: Janne Willems


In zijn artikel "Quining Qualia" uit 1990 betoogt Dennett dat 'qualia' een ondefinieerbaar begrip is en dat het niets toevoegt aan bewuste ervaring. Dit begrip kan daarom het beste verdwijnen. In mijn lezing zal ik ingaan op manier waarop Dennett het begrip 'Qualia' in dit artikel hanteert. Ik beargumenteer dat Dennett verstrikt lijkt te raken in zijn eigen gebruik van het begrip 'qualia'. Zo schrijft hij eigenschappen aan het begrip 'qualia' toe die hij volgens zijn definitie niet aan dit concept mag toekennen en gebruikt hij in zijn argumentatie twee definities van het begrip 'qualia', waar hij zegt dat hij er een gebruikt.


Speaker: Michael Moortgat
Title: Arrow reversal in categorial grammar
Place: University of Utrecht, Uithof, Bestuursgebouw 195
Date: Tuesday December 14, 2004
Time: 12:00-13:00



Abstract: The aim of categorial grammar is to identify the invariant principles that govern the correspondence between form and meaning, and to obtain language diversity throught the interaction of these invariants with a restricted set of non-logical axioms, or structural postulates. Since the introduction of the framework in 1958, invariants have been discussed in terms of residuated families of logical constants/type-forming operations. This restriction of the logical vocabulary makes that core phenomena of natural language syntax and semantics require the introduction of non-logical axioms--clearly an undesirable situation. We show that by broadening the vocabulary, we can bring such phenomena within the reach of the invariant core logic. We illustrate with scope construal of generalized quantifiers and related phenomena, which we analyse in terms of *dual* residuated families (cotensor, co-implications).


Plaats: Bestuursgebouw 195
Datum: Dinsdag 21 december
Tijd: 12:00-13:00
Titel: Geschiedenis I
Spreker: Teun Tieleman


Aflevering twee van de F-lunch. Het is de bedoeling om zelf lunch mee te brengen. Indien mogelijk zullen we de bijeenkomst in BG 048 houden. In dit geval zal ik dinsdag ochtend nog een mailtje sturen.



There exists a mailing list for the lunch meetings. If you are interested in signing up, or if you have any suggestions or comments, please contact me.
Vincent van Oostrom
Last modified: Wed Apr 26 15:18:06 MET DST 2006