JP2831685B2 - Encryption communication method - Google Patents
Encryption communication methodInfo
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- JP2831685B2 JP2831685B2 JP1069557A JP6955789A JP2831685B2 JP 2831685 B2 JP2831685 B2 JP 2831685B2 JP 1069557 A JP1069557 A JP 1069557A JP 6955789 A JP6955789 A JP 6955789A JP 2831685 B2 JP2831685 B2 JP 2831685B2
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Description
【発明の詳細な説明】 〔産業上の利用分野〕 この発明は，通信局間で秘密鍵を共有して秘密通信を
行う際の暗号通信方式に関するものである。Description: BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an encryption communication system for performing secret communication by sharing a secret key between communication stations.
第２図は例えばDH方式（（W.Diffie and M.E.Hellma
n.“New Directions in Cryptography,"IEEE Trans.Inf
orm.Therory.vol.IT−22,No.6,pp.644−654,Nov.（197
6））と呼ばれる従来の暗号通信方式を示す図であり，
図において，（101）は通信局A,（102）は通信局B,（10
3）は上記通信局Ａ（101）内の秘密情報格納メモリ，
（104）は上記通信局Ｂ（102）内の秘密情報格納メモ
リ，（105）は通信路である。FIG. 2 shows, for example, the DH method ((W. Diffie and MEHellma
n. “New Directions in Cryptography,” IEEE Trans.Inf
orm.Therory.vol.IT-22, No.6, pp.644-654, Nov. (197
6) is a diagram showing a conventional cryptographic communication system called
In the figure, (101) is communication station A, (102) is communication station B, (10
3) is a secret information storage memory in the communication station A (101),
(104) is a secret information storage memory in the communication station B (102), and (105) is a communication path.
次に動作について説明する。 Next, the operation will be described.
秘密通信を行うネツトワークあるいはシステムの構築
時に，素数ｐとGF（ｐ）の原始元ｇを公開しておく。局
Ａ（101）と局Ｂ（102）との間で共通の鍵を持ちたい場
合，まず局Ａ（101）は〔0,p−１〕の間の整数XAをラン
ダムに選び，局内の秘密情報格納メモリ（103）に秘密
に保持しておく。局Ｂ（102）も〔0,p−１〕の間の整数
XBをランダムに選び，局内の秘密情報格納メモリ（10
4）に秘密に保持しておく。When constructing a network or system for performing secret communication, the prime number p and the primitive element g of GF (p) are made public. If you want to have a common key between a station A (101) and a station B (102), first station A (101) is chosen at random integer X A between [0, p-1], station of It is kept secret in the secret information storage memory (103). Station B (102) is also an integer between [0, p-1]
The X B selected at random, secret information stored in the memory (10 of station
4) Keep it secret.
そして，局Ａ（101）は秘密情報格納メモリ（103）の
情報より を計算し，通信路（105）を介して局Ｂ（102）へ送る。
同様に，局Ｂ（102）も秘密情報格納メモリ（104）の情
報により を計算し，通信路（105）を介して局Ａ（101）へ送る。
このようにYAとYBを交換してから，局Ａ（101）は鍵 を次のように計算する。Then, the station A (101) obtains information from the secret information storage memory (103). Is calculated and sent to the station B (102) via the communication path (105).
Similarly, the station B (102) also uses the information in the secret information storage memory (104). Is calculated and sent to the station A (101) via the communication path (105).
After exchanging Y A and Y B in this way, station A (101) Is calculated as follows.
局Ｂ（102）も鍵 を次のように計算する。 Station B (102) is also a key Is calculated as follows.
以上の方法で局Ａ（101）と局Ｂ（102）は鍵 を秘密に共有でき，この鍵で暗号化／復合化を行うこと
ができる。 Station A (101) and station B (102) are key Can be secretly shared, and encryption / decryption can be performed with this key.
従来の暗号通信方式は以上のように構成されているの
で，秘密通信を行う時の鍵を共有する場合相手局との通
信が必要で，また，第三の局がなりすまして不正に鍵を
共有できてしまうなどの問題点があつた。Since the conventional cryptographic communication system is configured as described above, it is necessary to communicate with the partner station when sharing the key for performing secret communication, and the third station impersonates and shares the key illegally. There were problems such as being able to do it.
この発明は上記のような問題点を解消するためになさ
れたもので，通信局間の相互通信を必要とせず，第三の
局がなりすまして不正に鍵を共有できない暗号通し方式
を得ることを目的とする。SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made to solve the above-mentioned problems, and it is an object of the present invention to obtain a cryptographic communication method which does not require mutual communication between communication stations and in which a third station can impersonate and share a key illegally. Aim.
この発明に係る暗号通信方式は、第１の公開情報ｎと
第２の公開情報ｇと第１の秘密情報ｕと第２の秘密情報
ｘとを有し各局を統括するセンタを設け、各局がセンタ
に自己のID情報Ｉを登録し、センタは上記センタの第１
の秘密情報ｕと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから第
１の中間値ｒを計算し、この第１の中間値ｒと上記各局
のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第２の秘密情報ｘと上記セン
タの第１の公開情報ｎとから第２の中間値ｓを計算し、
この第２の中間値ｓと上記第１の中間値ｒと上記センタ
の第２の秘密情報ｘと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと
から所定の格納値αを計算し、この格納値αを各局の秘
密情報格納メモリに送出するとともに、上記第２の中間
値ｓと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報
ｇと上記センタの第１の秘密情報ｕと第２の秘密情報ｘ
とから各局の公開値Ｇを計算し、この公開値Ｇと上記ID
情報Ｉとを各局に公開し、各局は、相手局の公開値Ｇと
相手局のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとか
ら上記公開値Ｇが正当であることを確認してから、上記
公開された相手局の公開値Ｇと上記公開された相手局の
ID情報Ｉと自局の秘密情報格納メモリに格納された格納
値αと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから互いに共通
の鍵Ｋを生成することを特徴とするものである。The cryptographic communication system according to the present invention includes a center that has first public information n, second public information g, first secret information u, and second secret information x and controls each station. The center registers its own ID information I, and the center
The first intermediate value r is calculated from the secret information u of the center and the first public information n of the center, the first intermediate value r, the ID information I of each station, and the second secret information x of the center. And a second intermediate value s is calculated from the first public information n of the center and
A predetermined stored value α is calculated from the second intermediate value s, the first intermediate value r, the second secret information x of the center, and the first public information n of the center, and the stored value α Is transmitted to the secret information storage memory of each station, and the second intermediate value s, the first public information n and the second public information g of the center, the first secret information u of the center and the second Secret information x
And the public value G of each station is calculated from the public value G and the above ID.
The information I is disclosed to each station, and each station confirms that the public value G is valid from the public value G of the partner station, the ID information I of the partner station, and the first public information n of the center. From the published value G of the disclosed partner station and the disclosed value of the partner station disclosed above.
A common key K is generated from the ID information I, the stored value α stored in the secret information storage memory of the own station, and the first public information n of the center.
各局はセンタ（１）に自局のID情報を登録すると，セ
ンタ（１）はこのID情報から一つの公開値を計算し，上
記ID情報と共に各局に公開する。When each station registers its own ID information in the center (1), the center (1) calculates one public value from this ID information and discloses it to each station together with the ID information.
またセンタ（１）は上記ID情報から一つの格納値を計
算し，局内の秘密情報格納メモリ（３），（６）に送出
する。The center (1) calculates one stored value from the ID information and sends it to the secret information storage memories (3) and (6) in the office.
各局で通信を行う場合，各局は、相手局の公開された
一つの公開値の正当性を確認してから、その公開値及び
ID情報と，自局の秘密情報格納メモリに格納された格納
値とを演算して互いに共通の鍵を生成する。When communicating at each station, each station confirms the validity of one published value of the partner station, and then confirms the published value and
The common key is generated by calculating the ID information and the stored value stored in the secret information storage memory of the own station.
以下，この発明の実施例を図について説明する。第１
図（ａ），（ｂ）は本発明の一実施例による暗号通信方
式を示す図であり，図において，（１）はセンタ，
（２）は通信局A,（３）はこの通信局Ａ（２）内の秘密
情報格納メモリ，（４）は公開リスト，（５）は通信局
B,（６）はこの通信局Ｂ（５）内の秘密情報格納メモ
リ，（７）は通信路である。Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. First
FIGS. 1A and 1B are diagrams showing an encryption communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention. In FIG.
(2) is a communication station A, (3) is a secret information storage memory in the communication station A (2), (4) is a public list, and (5) is a communication station.
B and (6) are secret information storage memories in the communication station B (5), and (7) is a communication path.
次に動作について説明する。 Next, the operation will be described.
秘密通信を行うネツトワークあるいはシステムの構築
時に,2つの大きな素数p,qを選び，それらの積をｎ＝ｐ
・q,nのオイラー関数（ｎと互いに素なる数の個数をオ
イラー関数と呼びφ（ｎ）で表す）をφ（ｎ）＝（ｐ−
１）・（ｑ−１）とする。次にＸ｛modφ（φ
（ｎ））｝≠０を満たす任意の整数Ｘおよびｕ｛modφ
（ｎ）｝≠０を満たす整数ｕを選ぶ。さらに,GF（ｐ）
およびGF（ｑ）の原始元をｇとする。ここで,n,gをセン
タ（１）の公開情報,p,q,x,uをセンタ（１）の秘密情報
とする。When constructing a network or system that performs secret communication, two large prime numbers p and q are selected, and their product is expressed as n = p
The Euler function of q, n (the number of numbers which are mutually prime to n is called an Euler function and is represented by φ (n)) is represented by φ (n) = (p−
1) · (q-1). Next, X ｛modφ (φ
(N)) Any integer X and u ｛modφ satisfying｝ ≠ 0
(N) Choose an integer u that satisfies｝ ≠ 0. Furthermore, GF (p)
And the primitive element of GF (q) is g. Here, n and g are the public information of the center (1), and p, q, x, and u are the secret information of the center (1).
さて，局Ａ（２）がこのネツトワークあるいはシステ
ムに加入する際，局Ａ（２）はID情報IDAをセンタ
（１）へ送る。センタ（１）は， を計算し，αＡを格納値として局Ａ（２）内の秘密情報
格納メモリ（３）へ送り,GAを公開値として公開リスト
（４）にID情報IDAとともに載せる。局Ｂ（５）も加入
する際に,ID情報IDBをセンタ（１）へ送り，局Ｂ（５）
内の秘密情報格納メモリ（６）に格納値αＢを送つても
らい，公開リスト（４）にはID情報IDBとともに公開値G
Bを載せてもらう。以下同様に，加入するすべての局に
対して以上のような処理をする。ここで、秘密情報格納
メモリ（３）、（６）は、物理的に保護され、自局でさ
えも外へ読み出すことはできないとする。Now, when the station A (2) joins this network or system, the station A (2) sends the ID information ID A to the center (1). Center (1) Was calculated, alpha A sends to station as stored value A (2) the secret information storage memory (3) in, put together with the ID information ID A public list G A as a public value (4). When the station B (5) also joins, the ID information ID B is sent to the center (1), and the station B (5)
The stored value α B is sent to the secret information storage memory (6) in the server, and the public value G is stored in the public list (4) together with the ID information ID B.
Have B put on. In the same manner, the above processing is performed for all the stations to which the subscriber joins. Here, it is assumed that the secret information storage memories (3) and (6) are physically protected and cannot be read out even by the own station.
局Ａ（２）と局Ｂ（５）が鍵を共有したい場合を考え
る。局Ａ（２）は共通鍵を生成したい相手局Ｂ（５）の
ID情報IDBと公開された公開値GBを用いて， となつていることを確認してから を計算し，秘密情報格納メモリ（３）内に格納されてい
る局Ａ（２）自身の秘密情報である格納値αＡを用い
て， を生成する。ここで局Ｂ（５）が局Ａ（２）と同様の計
算をすると， が得られるから，秘密情報格納メモリ（６）内に格納さ
れている局Ｂ（５）自身の秘密情報である格納値αＢを
用いて， を生成する。Let us consider a case where the station A (2) and the station B (5) want to share a key. The station A (2) has the other station B (5) who wants to generate a common key.
Using the public value G B published as ID information ID B, After confirming that Is calculated using the stored value α A which is the secret information of the station A (2) itself stored in the secret information storage memory (3). Generate Here, when station B (5) performs the same calculation as station A (2), Is obtained using the stored value α B , which is the secret information of the station B (5) itself, stored in the secret information storage memory (6). Generate
は一致するので，共通鍵 を通信路（７）を介さずに共有でき，この鍵で暗号化／
復号化を行うことができる。 Match, so the secret key Can be shared without passing through the communication channel (7).
Decryption can be performed.
なお，上記実施例では相互通信を必要としない鍵共有
方式を用いた暗号通信方式について説明したが，公開リ
ストの情報を各局の秘密情報とし，少量の通信を許容す
ることにより，通信相手の認証を備えたきわめて安全な
鍵共有方式，個人識別方式，デイジタル署名方式,ID情
報に基づく暗号方式なども実現できる。In the above embodiment, the encryption communication system using the key sharing system that does not require mutual communication has been described. However, the information in the public list is used as the secret information of each station, and a small amount of communication is permitted, thereby authenticating the communication partner. It is also possible to implement an extremely secure key sharing method, personal identification method, digital signature method, encryption method based on ID information, etc.
このようにこの発明によれば、第１の公開情報ｎと第
２の公開情報ｇと第１の秘密情報ｕと第２の秘密情報ｘ
とを有し各局を統括するセンタを設け、各局がセンタに
自己のID情報Ｉを登録し、センタは上記センタの第１の
秘密情報ｕと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから第１
の中間値ｒを計算し、この第１の中間値ｒと上記各局の
ID情報Ｉと上記センタの第２の秘密情報ｘと上記センタ
の第１の公開情報ｎとから第２の中間値ｓを計算し、こ
の第２の中間値ｓと上記第１の中間値ｒと上記センタの
第２の秘密情報ｘと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとか
ら所定の格納値αを計算し、この格納値αを各局の秘密
情報格納メモリに送出するとともに、上記第２の中間値
ｓと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報ｇ
と上記センタの第１の秘密情報ｕと第２の秘密情報ｘと
から各局の公開値Ｇを計算し、この公開値Ｇと上記ID情
報Ｉとを各局に公開し、各局は、相手局の公開値Ｇと相
手局のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから
上記公開値Ｇが正当であることを確認してから、上記公
開された相手局の公開値Ｇと上記公開された相手局のID
情報Ｉと自局の秘密情報格納メモリに格納された格納値
αと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから互いに共通の
鍵Ｋを生成するようにしたので、通信局間の相互通信が
不要だけでなく，不正ななりすましで第三の局が共通鍵
を得ることができない効果がある。Thus, according to the present invention, the first public information n, the second public information g, the first secret information u, and the second secret information x
Each station registers its own ID information I in the center, and the center divides the first secret information u of the center and the first public information n of the center into first information.
Is calculated, and the first intermediate value r and each of the above stations are calculated.
A second intermediate value s is calculated from the ID information I, the second secret information x of the center, and the first public information n of the center, and the second intermediate value s and the first intermediate value r are calculated. A predetermined stored value α is calculated from the second secret information x of the center and the first public information n of the center, and this stored value α is sent to the secret information storage memory of each station. S, the first public information n and the second public information g of the center.
Then, a public value G of each station is calculated from the first secret information u and the second secret information x of the center, and the public value G and the ID information I are disclosed to each station. After confirming that the public value G is valid based on the public value G, the ID information I of the partner station, and the first public information n of the center, the public value G of the partner station and the public information are disclosed. ID of partner station
Since the common key K is generated from the information I, the stored value α stored in the secret information storage memory of the own station, and the first public information n of the center, mutual communication between communication stations is unnecessary. In addition, there is an effect that the third station cannot obtain the common key due to unauthorized impersonation.
【図面の簡単な説明】 第１図（ａ），（ｂ）はこの発明の一実施例による暗号
通信方式を示す図，第２図は従来の暗号通信方式を示す
図である。 （１）はセンタ，（２）は通信局A,（３）は秘密情報格
納メモリ，（４）は公開リスト，（５）は通信局B,
（６）は秘密情報格納メモリ，（７）は通信路，（10
1）は通信局A,（102）は通信局B,（103），（104）は秘
密情報格納メモリ，（105）は通信路である。 なお，図中，同一符号は同一又は相当部分を示す。BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS FIGS. 1 (a) and 1 (b) are diagrams showing an encryption communication system according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a conventional encryption communication system. (1) is a center, (2) is a communication station A, (3) is a secret information storage memory, (4) is a public list, (5) is a communication station B,
(6) is a secret information storage memory, (7) is a communication path, (10)
1) is a communication station A, (102) is a communication station B, (103) and (104) are secret information storage memories, and (105) is a communication path. In the drawings, the same reference numerals indicate the same or corresponding parts.
フロントページの続き (56)参考文献 田中初一“ＩＤ情報に基づく相互通信 なしの共通鍵生成”信学技報ＩＳＥＣ88 −15 (58)調査した分野(Int.Cl.6，ＤＢ名) G09C 1/00 - 5/00 H04K 1/00 - 3/00 H04L 9/00 - 9/38 ＪＩＣＳＴファイル（ＪＯＩＳ)Continuation of the front page (56) References Shuichi Tanaka “Generating a common key without mutual communication based on ID information” IEICE Technical Report ISEC88-15 (58) Fields studied (Int.Cl. 6 , DB name) G09C 1 / 00-5/00 H04K 1/00-3/00 H04L 9/00-9/38 JICST file (JOIS)
Claims (1)
通信を行う場合、上記秘密情報格納メモリ内に格納され
た情報から暗号化して上記通信を行うための共通の暗号
鍵を生成する暗号通信方式において、 第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報ｇと第１の秘密情報
ｕと第２の秘密情報ｘとを有し各局を統括するセンタを
設け、各局がセンタに自己のID情報Ｉを登録し、センタ
は上記センタの第１の秘密情報ｕと上記センタの第１の
公開情報ｎとから式（１）で第１の中間値ｒを計算し、
この第１の中間値ｒと上記各局のID情報Ｉと上記センタ
の第２の秘密情報ｘと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと
から式（２）で第２の中間値ｓを計算し、この第２の中
間値ｓと上記第１の中間値ｒと上記センタの第２の秘密
情報ｘと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから式（３）
で所定の格納値αを計算し、この格納値αを各局の秘密
情報格納メモリに送出するとともに、上記第２の中間値
ｓと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報ｇ
と上記センタの第１の秘密情報ｕと第２の秘密情報ｘと
から式（４）で各局の公開値Ｇを計算し、この公開値Ｇ
と上記ID情報Ｉとを各局に公開し、各局は、相手局の公
開値Ｇと相手局のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第１の公開情
報ｎとから式（５）で上記公開値Ｇが正当であることを
確認してから、上記公開された相手局の公開値Ｇと上記
公開された相手局のID情報Ｉと自局の秘密情報格納メモ
リに格納された格納値αと上記センタの第１の公開情報
ｎとから式（６）で互いに共通の鍵Ｋを生成することを
特徴とする暗号通信方式。 When each station has a secret information storage memory and communicates between stations, a common encryption key for performing the communication by encrypting the information stored in the secret information storage memory is generated. In a cryptographic communication system, a center having first public information n, second public information g, first secret information u, and second secret information x is provided, and each station has its own center. And the center calculates a first intermediate value r from the first secret information u of the center and the first public information n of the center by Expression (1),
From the first intermediate value r, the ID information I of each station, the second secret information x of the center, and the first public information n of the center, a second intermediate value s is calculated by equation (2). From the second intermediate value s, the first intermediate value r, the second secret information x of the center, and the first public information n of the center,
Calculates a predetermined stored value α, sends the stored value α to the secret information storage memory of each station, and obtains the second intermediate value s, the first public information n and the second public information g of the center.
From the first secret information u and the second secret information x of the center, the public value G of each station is calculated by equation (4).
And the above-mentioned ID information I are disclosed to each station, and each station obtains the above-mentioned public value G from equation (5) based on the public value G of the partner station, the ID information I of the partner station, and the first public information n of the center. After confirming the validity, the public value G of the disclosed partner station, the ID information I of the disclosed partner station, the stored value α stored in the secret information storage memory of the own station, and the center A cryptographic communication method characterized in that a common key K is generated from the first public information n using Expression (6).
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP1069557A JP2831685B2 (en) | 1989-03-22 | 1989-03-22 | Encryption communication method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP1069557A JP2831685B2 (en) | 1989-03-22 | 1989-03-22 | Encryption communication method |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| JPH02248131A JPH02248131A (en) | 1990-10-03 |
| JP2831685B2 true JP2831685B2 (en) | 1998-12-02 |
Family
ID=13406167
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP1069557A Expired - Lifetime JP2831685B2 (en) | 1989-03-22 | 1989-03-22 | Encryption communication method |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JP2831685B2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP2581440B2 (en) * | 1994-05-11 | 1997-02-12 | 日本電気株式会社 | Scramble communication method |
| US5559889A (en) * | 1995-03-31 | 1996-09-24 | International Business Machines Corporation | System and methods for data encryption using public key cryptography |
-
1989
- 1989-03-22 JP JP1069557A patent/JP2831685B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| 田中初一"ＩＤ情報に基づく相互通信なしの共通鍵生成"信学技報ＩＳＥＣ８８−１５ |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| JPH02248131A (en) | 1990-10-03 |
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