JP4819017B2 - Game machine - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a fraud countermeasure device for a gaming machine such as a pachinko gaming machine, and more particularly to a fraud countermeasure device for a gaming machine that notifies that a fraudulent act has been performed on the gaming machine.

  As shown in FIG. 5, the pachinko gaming machine includes a power supply board 2, a main board 1, and an effect control board 5 that is a sub board, and the main board 1 is connected to a start winning opening (start opening) on the game board. When a game ball wins, that is, when the start switch 3 is turned on, one random number is obtained from a predetermined number, for example, 256 random numbers that change periodically in sequence. When the acquired random number is a jackpot random value, the jackpot command is transmitted to the sub-board 5, and the sub-board 5 that has received the jackpot command starts the change of the symbol, the reach effect, and the jackpot symbol display in the symbol display device. After the stop or the like is performed, the main board 1 performs a control to release the large winning opening on the game board a predetermined number of times, and a large amount of gaming balls can be paid out based on the winning of the gaming balls to the large winning opening.

  By the way, recently, there has been a case where a fraudulent act is performed on a pachinko gaming machine using a fraudulent board and a large number of game balls are illegally paid out.

  The outline of this fraud will be described in order with reference to FIG.

  (1) First, the illegal substrate 10 is connected between the main substrate 1 and the power supply substrate 2 and between the main substrate 1 and the sub substrate 5, and the power supply of the main substrate 1 is suddenly lowered by the illegal substrate 10. In the main board 1, the CPU is stopped due to the sudden drop of the power, and the backup process by the CPU is not normally performed.

  (2) Thereafter, the unauthorized substrate 10 normalizes the power supply line. When the power supply line is normalized, the CPU of the main board 10 performs a reset process, the RAM of the main board 1 is cleared because it is not backed up, and the initial random number starts from “0”. Here, the initial value random number is used for determining the initial random number, that is, the initial random number when the random number consisting of a predetermined number, for example 256, sequentially changes in a predetermined cycle and completes a round. It is a random number. For example, in the first round after resetting, the random number changes in order from “0” to “255”, and in the next round, if the initial random number is “1”, “1”... “255” , The random number changes in the order of “0”.

  (3) The main board 1 transmits a command to the effect that the RAM has been cleared to the sub board 5. However, the illegal substrate 10 eliminates this command, and the sub-board 5 cannot receive this command. For this reason, the sub-board 5 performs notification based on this command, that is, notification that fraud has occurred. It is not possible.

  (4) Since the illegal board 10 is known to have an initial value random number “0”, the pseudo game ball passing signal is synchronized with the main board 1 in accordance with the timing when the acquired random number becomes the big hit random value. That is, a false signal corresponding to the signal when the start port switch 3 is turned on is transmitted. When the main board 1 receives this signal, it acquires a random number. Since the acquired random number is a jackpot random number value, the main board 1 transmits a jackpot command to the sub board. After the sub-board 5 receives the jackpot command, the various effects described above and the opening of the big prize opening are performed, and a large amount of game balls are unreasonably paid out to the fraudster.

The present invention is considered to be fraudulent using the illegal substrate 10 as described above, and an object thereof is to provide a gaming machine capable of notifying fraudulent acts with high probability.

A gaming machine according to the present invention includes a main board, a sub board, and fraud notification means, and the main board includes a main board side counter that counts the number of occurrences of a predetermined event, and when the predetermined event occurs, the main board includes A count value command indicating a count value of a substrate-side counter is transmitted to the sub-board, and the sub-board includes a sub-board-side counter that counts the number of receptions of the count value command transmitted from the main board, and When a count value command is transmitted from the main board, the count value indicated by the count value command is compared with the count value of the counter board side counter, and the count value indicated by the count value command and the counter board side counter when the count value of the do not match, a game machine that operates the fraud notification unit, the main board, based on the result of matching As information relating to the operation of the fraud notification means, only the count value command is transmitted to the sub-board, and the sub-board is transmitted from the main board as information relating to the operation of the fraud notification means based on the result of the verification. Only the count value command to be transmitted is received.

According to the gaming machine of the present invention, when the power of the main board suddenly drops due to an illegal board, and then the power line is normalized normally, the count value of the main board counter is reset by the CPU resetting of the main board. The counter value is reset to “0”, and thereafter, when the illegal board generates a false event equivalent to the predetermined event, a count value command indicating a count value of “0” is transmitted to the sub board. It becomes like this.

  On the other hand, in the sub-board, the counter counter on the sub-board counts the number of times the counter value command has been received until just before the fraudulent act on the illegal board is performed. It is not cleared by the start of. For this reason, when the sub board collates the count value indicated by the count value command transmitted from the main board after normalization of the power supply line with the count value of the sub board counter, the count value indicated by the count value command is “ On the other hand, since the count value of the counter on the sub-board side is a value other than “0” except immediately after reset, it is determined that the two do not match. Will be activated and fraudulent acts will be notified.

Therefore, according to the gaming machine of the present invention, it is possible to notify fraudulent acts with high probability.

Here, the predetermined event includes a plurality of events, and the main board side counter and the sub board side counter are provided in one-to-one correspondence with each of the plurality of events, and the sub board includes: The collation corresponding to each event is performed, and when the count value indicated by the count value command does not match the count value of the sub-board side counter by the collation corresponding to at least one event, If the fraud notification means is configured to operate, the result of the above collation is “matched” due to the occurrence of fraud after the sub-board counter corresponding to any one of the events is reset to “0”. Therefore, even if this event is such that fraudulent notification is not performed, the sub-board counter corresponding to the other event is often not reset to “0”. Because, the matching results for the other events is "mismatch", and the probability that the notification of fraud is carried out is higher. Therefore, it becomes possible to notify the illegal act with a higher probability.

  Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an electric control system of a pachinko gaming machine in which a fraud countermeasure device according to an embodiment of the present invention is incorporated, FIG. 2 is a flowchart of processing performed by a main board, and FIG. 3 is performed by a sub board. FIG. 4 is a timing chart for explaining the operation of the fraud countermeasure device.

  In FIG. 1, the pachinko gaming machine includes a main board (also referred to as a main control board) 1 that plays a central role in controlling the gaming state, and the main board 1 is configured by a CPU, ROM, RAM, and the like. .

  The main board 1 receives power from the power board 2 and executes processing. In the main board 1, the CPU can perform the backup process normally when the power supply decrease rate is less than a predetermined level. However, the backup process by the CPU is not normally performed when the power supply drop rate is suddenly lower than a predetermined level, such as when the power is turned off.

  The main board 1 is connected to a start port switch 3, a big prize opening solenoid 4 and a sub board 5. The sub board 5 is composed of, for example, an effect control board, and the symbol display device 6 and the fraud notification means 7 are connected to the sub board 5.

  The start opening switch 3 is a switch that is turned on when a game ball wins a start winning opening (start opening) on the game board. There are one or a plurality of start ports, and the start port switches 3 are provided in one-to-one correspondence with the respective start ports.

  The big prize opening solenoid 4 drives the big prize opening on the game board to be opened a predetermined number of times when a big hit occurs, enabling a predetermined number of game balls to be awarded to the opened big prize opening, The game ball can be paid out.

  The main board 1 acquires a random number when the start port switch 3 is turned on, and transmits a jackpot command to the sub board 5 when the acquired random number is a jackpot random value. The random number is composed of a plurality of numerical values, for example, 256 numerical values that change in order from “0” to “255”, and changes in order from the initial value determined by the initial value random number every round. For example, when the initial value random number is “3”, the random number sequentially changes from “3” to “255”, and then sequentially changes from “0”, “1”, and “2”. Immediately after the CPU performs the reset process, the initial value random number is reset to “0”, so that the random number changes in order from “0” to “255” in the first round.

  The sub-board 5 that has received the jackpot command from the main board 1 performs a predetermined symbol variation and effect (reach effect, etc.) on the symbol display device 6 and then displays an image showing the occurrence of the jackpot (normally all three rows of symbols are displayed) A set of images) is displayed, and during the big hit, a big hit effect is performed in accordance with the opening / closing operation of the big prize opening.

  Further, when the acquired random number is a jackpot random number value, the main board 1 displays the image indicating the occurrence of the jackpot as described above on the symbol display device 6, and then the above described for the winning prize solenoid 4. Such a big hit operation, that is, an operation for driving the big prize opening to open a predetermined number of times is performed.

  The main board 1 includes a counter, that is, a main board side counter 1a. The main board counter 1a counts the number of occurrences of a predetermined event. As the predetermined event, for example, it can be mentioned that an ON signal from the start port switch 3 which is a condition for acquiring a random number is received. Other examples of the predetermined event include that a random number has been acquired, that a symbol variation command has been transmitted, that a game ball has been won at a gate on the game board or a normal winning opening, and that a jackpot has occurred ( And the fact that the winning prize opening was closed during the jackpot, and the customer waiting demonstration display was performed on the symbol display device. When the predetermined event occurs, the main board 1 transmits a count value command indicating the count value of the main board side counter 1a (referred to as a main count value) to the sub board 5 and the main board side counter 1a. The count value (main count value) is updated by adding “1”.

  Similar to the main board 1, the sub board 5 is constituted by a CPU, a ROM, a RAM, and the like. The sub board 5 includes a counter, that is, a sub board side counter 5a. The sub-board-side counter 5a counts the number of times the count value command transmitted from the main board 1 is received. Further, when the sub board 5 receives the count value command from the main board 1, the count value indicated by the count value command (main count value) and the count value of the sub board side counter 5a (referred to as sub count value). After that, the count value (sub count value) of the sub board side counter 5a is incremented by "1" and updated. If the result of the collation is “mismatch”, the sub-board 5 determines that fraud has occurred and transmits a fraud detection signal to the fraud notification means 7.

  The fraud notification means 7 is configured to notify a hall employee that fraud has occurred by hearing or vision when a fraud detection signal is received from the sub-board 5, for example, a buzzer, a lamp, a game Consists of ball launch stop means. The fraud notification means 7 may be configured by means capable of recognizing that fraud has occurred in the hall computer.

Next, an example of the operation of the gaming machine configured as described above will be described.

(1) Main board 1 operation (processing)
In the main board 1, as shown in FIG. 2, it is determined whether or not a game ball has won a start opening based on an ON signal from the start opening switch 3 (step S1). Here, when the winning at the starting port corresponds to the predetermined event referred to in the present invention, and it is determined that there is a winning at the starting port, the predetermined event has occurred.

  If it is determined that there is a winning at the start port, a count value command, that is, a command indicating the count value (main count value) of the start port counter (main board side counter 1a) is transmitted to the sub board 5 (step S2) Next, the count value (main count value) of the start port counter (main board side counter 1a) is incremented by "1" and updated (step S3).

  Accordingly, the main board 1 transmits a count value command indicating the count value (main count value) of the main board side counter 1a to the sub board 5 in response to a winning at the start port, and the count of the main board side counter 1a. A process of updating the value (main count value) is performed.

(2) Operation (processing) of sub-board 5
In the sub board 5, as shown in FIG. 3, it is determined whether or not a command is received from the main board 1 (step S11).

  When a command is received from the main board 1, it is determined whether or not the received command is a count value command (step S12).

  When the received command is not a count value command but another command, other processing corresponding to the received command is executed.

  On the other hand, when the received command is a count value command, the count value (main count value) indicated by the count value command is compared with the count value (sub count value) of the sub-board-side counter 5a, and the main count value and the sub-count value are checked. It is determined whether or not the count value matches (step S13).

  If the main count value and the sub count value match, the count value (sub count value) of the sub board side counter 5a is incremented by 1 and updated (step S14).

  On the other hand, if the main count value and the sub-count value do not match, a fraud detection signal is transmitted to the fraud notification means 7 (step S15). Upon receiving the fraud detection signal, the fraud notification means 7 notifies the employee in the hall by visual or auditory sense that fraud has been performed.

(3) When a fraudulent act using a fraudulent board is performed (Figure 4)
When the power is turned on as the hall opens, the CPUs of the main board 1 and the sub board 5 perform reset processing. By this reset processing, the count values of the main board side counter 1a and the sub board side counter 5a become “0”.

  After that, when the player starts playing and a game ball is won at the starting port, a count value command indicating the count value “0” of the main board side counter 1a is transmitted from the main board 1 to the sub board 5. The count value of the main board counter 1a is incremented by “1”, and the count value of the main board counter 1a is updated from “0” to “1”. Here, the count value command is represented by, for example, “D600H” in hexadecimal.

  Upon receiving the count value command “D600H” transmitted from the main board 1, the sub board 5 receives the count value “0” indicated by the count value command “D600H” and the count value “0” of the sub board side counter 5a. Since both the count values match with “0”, it is determined that the collation result is “YES” and no fraudulent activity is performed, and a fraud detection signal is sent to the fraud notification means 7. Without transmission, the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a is incremented by “1”, and the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a is updated from “0” to “1”.

  Thereafter, when the game ball wins again at the starting port, a count value command indicating the count value “1” of the main board side counter 1a is transmitted from the main board 1 to the sub board 5, and the main board side counter 1a The count value is incremented by “1”, and the count value of the main board counter 1a is updated from “1” to “2”. Here, the count value command is represented by, for example, a hexadecimal number “D601H”.

  Upon receiving the count value command “D601H” transmitted from the main board 1, the sub board 5 receives the count value “1” indicated by the count value command “D601H” and the count value “1” of the sub board side counter 5a. Since both the count values match with “1”, it is determined that the collation result is “YES” and no fraudulent activity is performed, and a fraud detection signal is sent to the fraud notification means 7. Without transmission, the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a is incremented by “1”, and the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a is updated from “1” to “2”.

  After that, when the power supply line is normalized after the power supply is suddenly lowered using an unauthorized board, the CPU of the main board 1 performs a reset process, and the count value of the main board counter 1a is reset to “0”. However, since the CPU of the sub board 5 does not perform the reset process, the count value of the sub board side counter 5a is maintained at “2”. The initial value random number is reset to “0” by the CPU reset processing of the main board 1, and the random number changes periodically and sequentially from “0” to “255”, for example.

  Then, when a pseudo game ball passing signal is transmitted from the unauthorized board to the main board 1 in accordance with the timing at which the random number acquired with the winning at the start port becomes the jackpot random value, the main board 1 A count value command “D600H” indicating the count value “0” of the main board side counter 1a is transmitted to the sub board 5, and the count value of the main board side counter 1a is incremented by “1”. The count value is updated from “0” to “1”.

  Upon receiving the count value command “D600H” transmitted from the main board 1, the sub board 5 receives the count value “0” indicated by the count value command “D600H” and the count value “2” of the sub board side counter 5a. Since both count values do not match between “0” and “2”, it is determined that the collation result is “NO” and the fraudulent act is being performed. Send a detection signal. Upon receiving the fraud detection signal, the fraud notification means 7 notifies the employee in the hall by visual or auditory sense that fraud has been performed. Further, the sub-board 5 increments the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a by “1”, and updates the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a from “2” to “3”.

  After that, when a pseudo game ball passing signal is transmitted from the unauthorized board to the main board 1 again in accordance with the timing when the random number acquired by the winning at the starting port becomes the jackpot random value, the main board 1 Transmits the count value command “D601H” indicating the count value “1” of the main board side counter 1a to the sub board 5, and increments the count value of the main board side counter 1a by “1”. The count value of 1a is updated from “1” to “2”.

  Upon receiving the count value command “D601H” transmitted from the main board 1, the sub board 5 receives the count value “1” indicated by the count value command “D601H” and the count value “3” of the sub board side counter 5a. Since both count values do not match between “1” and “3”, it is determined that the illegal result is “NO” and the fraudulent act is being performed. Send a detection signal. Upon receiving the fraud detection signal, the fraud notification means 7 notifies the employee in the hall by visual or auditory sense that fraud has been performed. The sub-board 5 increments the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a by “1” and updates the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a from “3” to “4”.

  As described above, when an illegal act is performed using an unauthorized substrate, the unauthorized reporting means 7 continuously reports the unauthorized activity. For this reason, even if a jackpot occurs due to an illegal act, the employee can surely know that the illegal act has been performed.

As described above, the gaming machine according to the present embodiment is a gaming machine having a main board 1 and the sub-substrate 5 and fraud notification means 7, the main substrate 1, the winning of the start hole (predetermined event) The main board side counter 1a that counts the number of occurrences of the main board side counter 1a is received. When a winning at the start port occurs, a count value command indicating the count value of the main board side counter 1a is transmitted to the sub board 5, A counter board side counter 5a that counts the number of times the count value command transmitted from the main board 1 is counted is provided. When the count value command is transmitted from the main board 1, the count value indicated by the count value command and the sub board are displayed. The counter value is compared with the count value of the side counter 5a, and when the count value indicated by the count value command does not match the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a, the fraud notification means 7 is activated. Cormorant constructed.

According to the gaming machine of the present embodiment, when the power supply of the main board 1 suddenly drops due to an illegal board, and then the normalization of the power supply line is illegally performed, the main board side counter 1a is reset by the CPU resetting of the main board 1 When the counter value is reset to "0", and then the illegal board generates a false event equivalent to winning the start opening, the count value command indicating the count value of "0" is 5 is transmitted.

  On the other hand, in the sub-board 5, the sub-board-side counter 5a counts the number of times the count value command is received until immediately before the illegal action by the illegal board is performed. It is not reset by the start of fraud by. For this reason, when the sub-board 5 collates the count value indicated by the count value command transmitted from the main board 1 after normalization of the power supply line with the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a, the count indicated by the count value command. While the value is “0”, the count value of the sub-board counter 5a is a value other than “0” except immediately after the reset, and therefore it is determined that the two do not match. Therefore, the fraud notification means 7 is activated to notify the fraud.

Therefore, according to the gaming machine of the present embodiment, it is possible to notify fraudulent activity with high probability.

  Here, the predetermined event is not limited to winning a single start opening as described above, and the predetermined event includes a plurality of events, for example, an upper start opening and a lower start opening on the game board. If there are two events, it is assumed that there are two events of winning at the upper starting opening and winning at the lower starting opening. The main board side counter 1a and the sub board side counter 5a are connected to the upper starting opening and the lower starting opening. The sub-board 5 is provided in a one-to-one correspondence with each of the winning prizes, and the sub-board 5 is indicated by the count value command by collation corresponding to at least one of the winning to the upper starting opening or the winning to the lower starting opening. The fraud notification means 7 may be configured to operate when the count value does not match the count value of the sub-board counter 5a. With this configuration, the result of the collation becomes “match” because an illegal act is performed after the sub-board counter 5a corresponding to one of the winnings is reset to “0” by chance. Even if no misconduct is reported, the sub-board-side counter 5a corresponding to other winnings is often not reset to “0”. The result is “mismatch”, and there is a high probability that fraudulent notification will be made. Therefore, it becomes possible to notify the illegal act with a higher probability.

  As the predetermined event, as described above, in addition to receiving the ON signal from the start port switch 3 which is a condition for acquiring a random number, acquiring a random number, transmitting a symbol variation command , A game ball won at a gate on the game board or a normal winning opening, that a jackpot has been generated (a jackpot command has been sent), that the winning slot has been closed during the jackpot, waiting for customers in the symbol display device 6 The demonstration display may be performed.

1 is a block diagram of an electric control system of a pachinko gaming machine in which a fraud countermeasure device according to an embodiment of the present invention is incorporated. It is a flowchart of the process which a main board | substrate performs. It is a flowchart of the process which a subboard | substrate performs. It is a timing chart for demonstrating operation | movement of a fraud countermeasure apparatus. It is a block diagram of an electric control system when an illegal act is not performed with respect to the pachinko gaming machine. It is a block diagram of an electric control system when an illegal act is performed with respect to a pachinko gaming machine.

Explanation of symbols

1 Main board 1a Main board side counter 2 Power supply board 5 Sub board 5a Sub board side counter 7 Fraud reporting means

Claims (2)

A main board, a sub-board, and fraud notification means;
The main board includes a main board side counter that counts the number of occurrences of a predetermined event, and when the predetermined event occurs, transmits a count value command indicating a count value of the main board side counter to the sub board,
The sub-board includes a sub-board-side counter that counts the number of receptions of the count value command transmitted from the main board, and the count value command indicates when the count value command is transmitted from the main board. A game that checks the count value and the count value of the sub-board side counter, and operates the fraud notification means when the count value indicated by the count value command does not match the count value of the sub-board side counter Machine ,
The main board transmits only the count value command to the sub board as information related to the operation of the fraud notification means based on the result of the verification,
The sub board as information related to the operation of the illegal informing means based on a result of the verification, gaming machine, characterized in that to receive only the count value command transmitted from the main board. The predetermined event includes a plurality of events, and the main board side counter and the sub board side counter are provided in a one-to-one correspondence with each event of the plurality of events . When the collation corresponding to an event is performed and the count value indicated by the count value command does not match the count value of the sub-board side counter by the collation corresponding to at least one event, the fraud notification means The gaming machine according to claim 1, wherein the game machine is operated .

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