JP5220669B2 - Electronic device, game machine, main control board, peripheral board, authentication method and authentication program - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to an electronic device, a gaming machine, a main control board, a peripheral board, an authentication method, and an authentication program that include a plurality of boards and authenticate communication between these boards.

  Conventionally, in an electronic apparatus having a plurality of substrates, various techniques have been proposed for preventing fraud on these substrates. As an electronic device provided with a plurality of substrates, for example, there is a pachinko gaming machine. The pachinko gaming machine includes a main control board that controls the operation of the entire electronic device, and a controlled board (peripheral part) that operates each part of the electronic device. The main control board outputs a control signal including a control command to the peripheral part, and the other peripheral parts have a function of executing an operation according to the control signal transmitted from the main control board.

  Examples of frauds with respect to the main control board include a method of replacing a regular main control board with an illegal control board, or altering program data that defines processing performed by the main control board. In order to prevent such fraud, for example, a technique has been proposed in which program data recorded in a ROM mounted on the main control board is checked by a ROM checker to prevent illegal exchange of the ROM ( For example, see the following Patent Document 1.)

  As another method, the ROM mounted in the peripheral board such as the display control unit holds in advance an expected value for collating other boards, and this expected value is compared with the main control board and When the sum of IDs (unique values) of other peripheral boards matches, a technique for detecting that an illegal board has been inserted by authenticating other boards has been proposed (for example, (See Patent Document 2 below.)

JP 11-333108 A JP-A-2005-21330

  However, according to the technique disclosed in Patent Document 1 described above, although falsification of program data can be detected, it is possible to prevent an unauthorized control board from being connected between a regular main control board and a controlled board. Can not. For this reason, there is a problem that the controlled substrate performs unauthorized control by the control signal output from the unauthorized control substrate.

  Here, a fraud prevention technique according to the prior art will be described with reference to FIGS. 15 and 16. FIG. 15 is an explanatory diagram showing an outline of a fraud prevention technique according to the prior art. FIG. 16 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of inserting an unauthorized control board. As shown in FIG. 15, the regular main control board 1501 outputs a regular control signal RS to the peripheral board 1502 to control the operation of the peripheral board 1502. A regular main control board 1501 is provided with an inspection port 1503. The program data recorded in the ROM or the like provided inside the regular main control board 1501 is inspected from the inspection port 1503 to inspect whether the regular main control board 1501 is fraudulent.

  However, as shown in FIG. 16, an unauthorized control board 1601 may be inserted between the regular main control board 1501 and the peripheral board 1502. The unauthorized control board 1601 discards or ignores the authorized control signal RS output from the authorized main control board 1501 and outputs an unauthorized control signal FS to the peripheral board 1502 instead. Here, the peripheral board 1502 cannot determine whether the input signal is the normal control signal RS or the illegal control signal FS. For this reason, there is a problem that the peripheral board 1502 operates according to an unauthorized control signal FS.

  In addition, since the inspection port 1503 is provided only on the regular main control board 1501, even if the inspection using the inspection port 1503 is performed, the inspection result for the process in the regular main control board 1501 is returned. . For this reason, there is a problem that even if the inspection using the inspection port 1503 is performed, the unauthorized control by the unauthorized control board 1601 cannot be detected.

  Further, with the technique of Patent Document 2 described above, it can be detected that an unauthorized control board has been inserted. However, since the ID changes when the substrate is changed, there is a problem that the expected value must be rewritten every time another substrate is changed. Therefore, there is a problem that the setting of the board for performing authentication of the main control board and other peripheral boards must be changed every time the main control board and other peripheral boards are changed, which is troublesome.

  Further, in the technique of Patent Document 2, when any of the boards is changed, an abnormality canceling switch is provided that automatically updates the expected value with the sum of the IDs of the changed main control board and other peripheral boards. . However, for example, if the abnormality release switch is operated while an unauthorized substrate is inserted, there is a problem that the unauthorized substrate is authenticated as a regular substrate.

  The present invention corrects the expected value used for authenticating the main control board by a simple method in order to solve the above-mentioned problems caused by the prior art, and also performs illegal control from the main control board to the peripheral board, the expected value and It is an object of the present invention to provide an electronic device, a gaming machine, a main control board, a peripheral board, an authentication method, and an authentication program that can prevent the use of information related to authentication.

  In order to solve the above-described problems and achieve the object, an electronic apparatus according to the present invention includes a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit. In the electronic apparatus, the main control unit determines data storage means for storing predetermined data and a number for dividing the data stored in the data storage means (hereinafter referred to as “division number”). And determining means to divide the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions, and performing binary operation satisfying a coupling law on all data in the divided data group to perform authentication for the number of divisions An authentication value generating means for generating a value; a correction value generating means for generating a correction value for correcting an expected value that is held in the peripheral portion and used for collation of the authentication value transmitted from the main control section; , Transmitting means for transmitting the correction value and the authentication value for the number of divisions to the peripheral part, wherein the peripheral part receives the correction value and the authentication value for the number of divisions. A correction unit that corrects the expected value using the correction value received by the receiving unit, and the binary operation is performed on the authentication values for the number of divisions received by the receiving unit. Whether or not the calculation result and the expected value before correction or the expected value after correction match is determined using the expected value before the correction before the correction by the correction value. An authentication unit that determines after the correction using the expected value after the correction and authenticates the main control unit, and the expected value is calculated for all the data in the data storage unit. This is the value obtained by performing binary operation, After transmitting the authentication value for the number of divisions, the means transmits the correction value when transmitting the authentication value for the number of times based on the number of divisions used for authentication of the main control unit, After the authentication of the main control unit based on the authentication values for the number of divisions is established, the correction unit performs the authentication of the main control unit a number of times based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary operation at the time of the authentication. When performed, the expected value is corrected.

  According to this invention, the main control unit transmits the correction value so as to satisfy the correction timing determined based on the number of divisions of the data in the data storage means, and the peripheral unit is authenticated with respect to the main control unit. The expected value is corrected at a timing determined based on the number of authentication values (number of connections) that is the target of the binary operation. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values that only the main control unit and the peripheral unit know, the unauthorized analyst cannot know the transmission timing of the correction value used for correcting the expected value. As a result, the expected value held by the peripheral portion can be corrected without the unauthorized analyst knowing it. Further, when an unauthorized control unit is inserted between the main control unit and the peripheral unit, the unauthorized control unit cannot correct the expected value without knowing the transmission timing of the correction value. For this reason, it can be detected that an unauthorized control unit is inserted in the authentication process, and unauthorized processing by the unauthorized control unit can be prevented.

  In the electronic device according to the present invention, the transmission unit adds the authentication value and the correction value to the control command and transmits the control command to the peripheral portion.

  According to the present invention, an increase in communication load between the main control unit and the peripheral unit can be suppressed as compared with the case where the authentication value and the correction value are transmitted alone. Moreover, according to this invention, compared with the case where an authentication value is transmitted alone, the possibility that an authentication value is extracted from communication data and analyzed can be reduced.

  The electronic device according to the present invention is characterized in that the authentication value generation means generates the authentication value using the control command to which the authentication value is added.

  According to the present invention, the authentication value is generated using the control command to which the authentication value is added and transmitted. Generally, an unauthorized control unit attempts to perform an unauthorized operation on a peripheral board by transmitting a control command different from that of a regular main control unit. Like this invention, if the authentication value is generated using the control command transmitted this time, even if the authentication value is reused by an unauthorized control unit, the authentication value and the control command cannot be matched, It can detect fraud.

  The electronic device according to the present invention further includes an encryption unit in which the main control unit encrypts the authentication value and the correction value with a predetermined encryption method, and the transmission unit is encrypted by the encryption unit. The authentication value and the correction value are transmitted to the peripheral unit, and the peripheral unit includes a decryption unit that decrypts the authentication value and the correction value with a decryption method corresponding to the predetermined encryption method. The authentication means and the correction means perform the authentication and the correction using the authentication value and the correction value decrypted by the decryption means.

  According to the present invention, it is possible to reduce the possibility that an authentication value generation method is analyzed or an authentication value or a correction value is reused.

  In the electronic device according to the present invention, the encryption unit changes the encryption method based on the number of divisions, and the decryption unit determines whether the authentication to the main control unit is successful. The decryption method is changed based on the number of the authentication values that have been subjected to the calculation.

  According to the present invention, the unauthorized analyst cannot know the switching timing of the authentication value encryption method, and the authentication value generation method may be analyzed, or the authentication value or the correction value may be reused. Can be further reduced.

  In the electronic apparatus according to the present invention, the data storage means stores program data used in the main control unit.

  According to this invention, it is possible to detect unauthorized rewriting of program data recorded in the main control unit, unauthorized replacement of storage means of the main control unit, and the like.

  The electronic device according to the present invention is characterized in that the binary operation is addition or exclusive OR operation.

  According to the present invention, addition and exclusive OR operation can be switched and used as the binary operation used for generating the authentication value.

  In the gaming machine according to the present invention, the main control board transmits the authentication value, and the peripheral board performs authentication for the main control board using the authentication value transmitted by the main control board. Features.

  According to this invention, the main control board transmits the correction value so as to satisfy the correction timing determined based on the number of divisions of the data in the data storage means, and the peripheral board is authenticated for the main control board. The expected value is corrected at a timing determined based on the number of authentication values (number of connections) that is the target of the binary operation. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values known only by the main control board and the peripheral board, the unauthorized analyst cannot know the transmission timing of the correction value used for correcting the expected value. As a result, the expected value held by the peripheral board can be corrected without the unauthorized analyst knowing it. Further, when an unauthorized control board is inserted between the main control board and the peripheral board, the unauthorized control board cannot correct the expected value without knowing the transmission timing of the correction value. For this reason, it can be detected that an unauthorized control board has been inserted in the authentication process, and unauthorized processing by the unauthorized control board can be prevented.

  A main control board according to the present invention is a main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command for performing a predetermined process on a peripheral board, and includes data storage means for storing predetermined data, and the data storage A determining means for determining the number of the data stored in the means to be divided (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”), the data in the data storage means being divided into the number of divisions, and a divided data group Authentication value generating means for generating binary authentication values corresponding to the number of divisions by performing a binary operation satisfying a coupling rule on all data in the data, and the peripheral value held by the peripheral board and transmitted from the main control board Correction value generation means for generating a correction value for correcting an expected value used for verification of authentication values, and transmission means for transmitting the authentication values and the correction values for the number of divisions to the peripheral board. The transmission means, after transmitting the authentication value for the division number, when transmitting the authentication value for the authentication of the main control board for the number of times based on the division number, It is characterized by transmitting.

  According to the present invention, the correction value is transmitted so as to satisfy the correction timing determined based on the number of divisions of the data in the data storage means. Since the number of divisions is a value known only by the main control board, the unauthorized analyst cannot know the transmission timing of the correction value used for correcting the expected value. As a result, the expected value held by the peripheral board can be corrected without the unauthorized analyst knowing it. Further, when an unauthorized control board is inserted between the main control board and the peripheral board, the unauthorized control board cannot correct the expected value without knowing the transmission timing of the correction value. For this reason, it can be detected that an unauthorized control board has been inserted in the authentication process, and unauthorized processing by the unauthorized control board can be prevented.

  The peripheral board according to the present invention determines the number (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”) for dividing the data in the data storage means related to the generation of the authentication value for authenticating the main control board, and divides the data A peripheral that performs predetermined processing based on a control command transmitted by the main control board that transmits a correction value for correcting an expected value so as to satisfy a correction timing determined based on the division number. Receiving means for receiving, from the main control board, an authentication value for authenticating the main control board and a correction value for correcting an expected value used for verification of the authentication value transmitted from the main control board A correction means for correcting the expected value using the correction value received by the receiving means, and a combination rule for the authentication values for the number of divisions received by the receiving means Before the correction by the correction value, it is determined whether or not the calculation result obtained by performing the satisfying binary calculation matches the expected value using the expected value before the correction, and after the correction by the correction value, Authentication means for authenticating the main control board by judging using the expected value after the correction, and the correction means after the authentication of the main control board with the authentication value for the number of divisions The expected value is corrected when the authentication of the main control board is performed a number of times based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary calculation at the time of the authentication.

  According to the present invention, the expected value is corrected at a timing determined based on the number of authentication values subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board is established. When the authentication for the main control board is established, the number of authentication values subjected to the binary calculation is a value known only by the peripheral board, so that the fraud analyst cannot know the correction timing of the expected value. As a result, the expected value held by the peripheral board can be corrected without the unauthorized analyst knowing it. Further, when an unauthorized control board is inserted between the main control board and the peripheral board, the unauthorized control board cannot correct the expected value without knowing the transmission timing of the correction value. For this reason, it can be detected that an unauthorized control board has been inserted in the authentication process, and unauthorized processing by the unauthorized control board can be prevented.

  An authentication method according to the present invention is an authentication method in an electronic device including a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit. In the control unit, a division number determining step for determining a number (hereinafter referred to as “division number”) for dividing the predetermined data stored in the main control unit, and dividing the data into the division numbers. An authentication value generating step for generating an authentication value corresponding to the number of divisions by performing a binary operation satisfying a coupling rule on all data in the data group, and being transmitted from the main control unit held in the peripheral portion A correction value generating step for generating a correction value for correcting the expected value used for the verification of the authentication value, and the main control of the number of times based on the division number after transmitting the authentication value for the division number Authentication A transmission timing determining step for determining a timing at which the authentication value for the used amount is transmitted as a timing for transmitting the correction value; and transmitting the correction value for the number of divisions to the peripheral portion, and the transmission timing. A transmission step of transmitting the correction value to the peripheral portion at a timing determined in a determination step, and receiving the authentication value and the correction value for the number of divisions in the peripheral portion; Whether the calculation result obtained by performing the two-term calculation on the authentication values for the number of divisions received in the reception step matches the expected value before correction or the expected value after correction, Before the correction by the correction value, the determination is made using the expected value before the correction, and after the correction by the correction value, the determination is made using the expected value after the correction, and the main control unit is authenticated. After the authentication process and the authentication of the main control unit with the authentication values for the number of divisions, the authentication of the main control unit is performed a number of times based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the two-term operation at the time of the authentication. A correction timing determination step for determining the performed timing as a timing for correcting the expected value; a correction step for correcting the expected value using the correction value at the timing determined in the correction timing determination step; It is characterized by including.

  According to this invention, the main control unit transmits the correction value so as to satisfy the correction timing determined based on the number of divisions of the data in the data storage means, and the peripheral unit is authenticated with respect to the main control unit. The expected value is corrected at a timing determined based on the number of authentication values (number of connections) that is the target of the binary operation. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values that only the main control unit and the peripheral unit know, the unauthorized analyst cannot know the transmission timing of the correction value used for correcting the expected value. As a result, the expected value held by the peripheral portion can be corrected without the unauthorized analyst knowing it. Further, when an unauthorized control unit is inserted between the main control unit and the peripheral unit, the unauthorized control unit cannot correct the expected value without knowing the transmission timing of the correction value. For this reason, it can be detected that an unauthorized control unit is inserted in the authentication process, and unauthorized processing by the unauthorized control unit can be prevented.

  An authentication program according to the present invention is a computer-executable authentication program for a main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command for performing a predetermined process on a peripheral board, the authentication program being a computer A data storage means for storing predetermined data, a determination means for determining a number for dividing the data stored in the data storage means (hereinafter referred to as “the number of divisions”), and in the data storage means Authentication value generating means for dividing the data into the number of divisions, performing a binary operation satisfying a combining law on all data in the divided data group, and generating authentication values for the number of divisions; A correction value generator that generates a correction value for correcting an expected value that is held on the peripheral board and is used for collation of the authentication value transmitted from the main control board. And a transmission means for transmitting the authentication value and the correction value for the number of divisions to the peripheral board, and the transmission means, after transmitting the authentication values for the number of divisions, The correction value is transmitted when the authentication value corresponding to the number of times used for authentication of the main control unit is transmitted based on the number of divisions. Further, the authentication program according to the present invention determines a number (hereinafter referred to as “division number”) for dividing the data in the data storage means related to generation of an authentication value for authenticating the main control board, and A predetermined process is performed based on a control command transmitted by the main control board that divides into the number of divisions and transmits a correction value for correcting an expected value so as to satisfy a correction timing determined based on the number of divisions. A computer-executable authentication program for a peripheral board to be executed, wherein the authentication program is used to collate an authentication value for authenticating the main control board with an authentication value transmitted from the main control board. Receiving means for correcting a correction value from the main control board; and correcting the expected value using the correction value received by the receiving means. The correction means, and whether the calculation result obtained by performing a binary operation satisfying a coupling law on the authentication values for the number of divisions received by the reception means matches the expected value. An authenticating unit for authenticating the main control board by making a determination using the expected value before the correction before the correction by the value, and making a determination by using the expected value after the correction after the correction by the correction value; The correction means, after the authentication of the main control unit with the authentication value for the number of divisions is established, the number of times based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary calculation at the time of the authentication. The expected value is corrected when the main control unit is authenticated.

  According to the present invention, the above authentication method can be executed by a computer.

  According to the electronic device, the gaming machine, the main control board, the peripheral board, the authentication method, and the authentication program according to the present invention, the expected value used for authenticating the main control board is corrected by a simple method, and from the main control board There is an effect that it is possible to prevent unauthorized control of the peripheral board and diversion of expected values.

It is a front view which shows an example of the game board of the pachinko game machine of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the internal structure of the control part of a pachinko game machine. It is a block diagram which shows the functional structure of a main control board and a peripheral board | substrate. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the control process of the production | presentation control part by the main control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the control process of the production | presentation control part by the main control part. It is a time chart which shows the transmission timing of a jackpot related command. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the symbol variation process by an effect control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the process at the time of the big hit by an effect control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the lamp control process at the time of the symbol variation by a lamp control part. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the data format of the control signal which a main control part outputs. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the production | generation method of the authentication data (inspection value) in a main control part. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure of control signal transmission processing by the main control unit 201. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the reception process of the control signal by a peripheral part. It is a sequence diagram which shows an example of the flow of data between control parts. It is explanatory drawing which shows the outline | summary of the fraud prevention technique by a prior art. FIG. 16 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of inserting an unauthorized control board.

(Embodiment)
Referring to the accompanying drawings, control signals between a pachinko gaming machine having the function of an electronic device according to the present invention and a plurality of boards (main control board and peripheral board) mounted on the pachinko gaming machine will be described below. A preferred embodiment of an authentication method and an authentication program for authenticating an included control command will be described in detail.

(Basic configuration of pachinko machine)
FIG. 1 is a front view showing an example of a game board of a pachinko gaming machine according to the present invention. A game ball launched by driving a launching unit (see FIG. 2) arranged at a lower position of the game board 101 ascends between the rails 102a and 102b and reaches an upper position of the game board 101, and then the game area 103 Fall inside. A plurality of nails (not shown) are provided in the game area 103, and a game ball is dropped in various directions, and a windmill or a prize opening that changes the fall direction of the game ball is placed in the middle of the fall. Is arranged.

  A symbol display unit 104 is arranged at the center of the game area 103 of the game board 101. As the symbol display unit 104, for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD) is used. The symbol display unit 104 is not limited to the LCD, and a CRT or the like can also be used. Below the symbol display unit 104, a start winning port 105 for starting winning is arranged. Winning gates 106 are arranged on the left and right of the symbol display unit 104, respectively.

  The winning gate 106 is provided to detect the passing of the game ball and perform a lottery to open the start winning opening 105 for a predetermined time. A normal winning opening 107 is disposed on the side of the symbol display unit 104 or below. When a game ball wins the normal winning opening 107, the number of winning balls (for example, 10) at the time of the normal winning is paid out. At the bottom of the game area 103, there is provided a collection port 108 for collecting game balls that have not won any winning ports.

  The symbol display unit 104 described above starts a variation in the display of a plurality of symbols when a game ball is won at a specific winning opening (at the time of starting winning), and the symbol stops after a predetermined time. When the specific symbols (for example, “777”) are aligned at the time of the stop, a big hit state is obtained. In the big hit state, the big winning opening 109 located below repeats opening for a predetermined period for a predetermined round (for example, 15 rounds), and pays out the number of winning balls corresponding to the winning game balls.

  FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the internal configuration of the control unit of the pachinko gaming machine. The control unit 200 includes a plurality of control units. In the example of illustration, it has the main control part 201 and the peripheral part (The effect control part 202, the prize ball control part 203). The main control unit 201 controls basic operations related to the game of the pachinko gaming machine. The production control unit 202 controls the production operation during the game. The prize ball control unit 203 controls the number of prize balls to be paid out.

  Based on the program data stored in the ROM 212, the main control unit 201 executes a CPU 211 that performs basic processing as the game content progresses, a RAM 213 that functions as a data work area when the CPU 211 performs arithmetic processing, and each detection unit 221- An interface (I / F) 214 that receives various data from the H.224 and transmits various data to the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 is configured. The main control unit 201 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called main control board.

  On the input side of the main control unit 201, a start winning port detection unit 221 that detects a winning ball that has won a winning winning port 105, a gate detection unit 222 that detects a game ball that has passed through the winning gate 106, and a normal win An ordinary winning opening detection unit 223 that detects a game ball won in the mouth 107 and a large winning opening detection unit 224 that detects a winning ball won in the big winning opening 109 are connected via the I / F 214. These detection units can be configured using proximity switches or the like.

  A prize winning opening / closing part 231 is connected to the output side of the main control part 201, and the opening / closing of the prize winning opening / closing part 231 is controlled. The special prize opening / closing unit 231 has a function of opening the special prize opening 109 for a certain period of time when a big hit is made, and is configured using a solenoid or the like. This jackpot is programmed in advance to occur with a predetermined probability (for example, 1/300, etc.) based on the generated random number (random number for jackpot determination).

  The effect control unit 202 receives control signals including various control commands from the main control unit 201, and executes program data stored in the ROM 242 based on these commands to perform effect control during the game. The effect control unit 202 includes a CPU 241 that executes effect processing, a RAM 243 that functions as a data work area during the calculation processing of the CPU 241, a VRAM 244 that writes image data to be displayed on the symbol display unit 104, and various types from the main control unit 201. An interface (I / F) 245 for receiving data and transmitting various data to the lamp control unit 251 and the voice control unit 252 is provided. The effect control unit 202 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called effect board. In addition, the above-described symbol display unit (LCD) 104, lamp control unit 251, and voice control unit 252 are connected to the output side of the effect control unit 202 via the I / F 245.

  The winning ball control unit 203 receives control signals including various control commands from the main control unit 201, and executes program data stored in the ROM 282 based on these commands to perform winning ball control. The prize ball control unit 203 includes a CPU 281 that executes prize ball control processing, a RAM 283 that functions as a data work area when the CPU 281 performs arithmetic processing, and various data reception and emission units 292 from the main control unit 201. An interface (I / F) 284 that transmits and receives various data is provided. The prize ball control unit 203 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called prize ball substrate.

  The winning ball control unit 203 performs control for paying out the number of winning balls at the time of winning a prize to the connected paying unit 291. In addition, an operation of launching a game ball with respect to the launch unit 292 is detected, and the launch of the game ball is controlled. The payout unit 291 includes a motor for paying out a predetermined number from the game ball storage unit. The winning ball control unit 203 controls the paying unit 291 to pay out the number of winning balls corresponding to the game balls won in each winning port (start winning port 105, normal winning port 107, large winning port 109). Do it.

  The launcher 292 launches a game ball for a game, and includes a sensor that detects a game operation by the player, a solenoid that launches the game ball, and the like. When the prize ball control unit 203 detects a game operation by the sensor of the launch unit 292, the game ball 103 is intermittently fired by driving a solenoid or the like in response to the detected game operation, and the game area 103 of the game board 101 is played. A game ball is sent out.

  The main control unit 201, the effect control unit 202, and the prize ball control unit 203 configured as described above are provided on different printed circuit boards (main control board, effect board, and prize ball board). For example, the prize ball control unit 203 can be provided on the same printed circuit board as the main control unit 201.

(Functional configuration of main control board and peripheral board)
FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of a main control board (main control unit) and peripheral boards (effect control unit, prize ball control unit). First, a functional configuration of the main control board 310 having a function as the main control unit 201 will be described. As illustrated in FIG. 3, the main control board 310 is a functional unit that transmits a control command for operating the peripheral board 320, and includes a data storage unit 311, a determination unit 312, an authentication data generation unit 313, and a correction data generation unit. 314, an encryption unit 315, and a transmission unit 316.

  The data storage unit 311 stores predetermined data. The predetermined data is program data used in the main control board 310, for example. As the data storage unit 311, for example, a part of the ROM 212 (see FIG. 2) of the main control unit 201 can be used.

  The determination unit 312 determines the number of data to be divided (hereinafter referred to as “division number”) stored in the data storage unit 311. For example, the determination unit 312 uses a value generated by a random number generation circuit or a random number generation program as a division number, refers to a value generated in another process of the main control board 310 at a predetermined timing, and divides the value. Or a number.

  The authentication data generation unit 313 divides the data in the data storage unit 311 into the number of divisions, performs a binary operation that satisfies the combining rule for each of the divided data, and generates authentication data for the number of divisions. The binary operation satisfying the combining rule is, for example, addition or exclusive OR operation. In this case, the authentication data generation unit 313 selects either addition or exclusive OR operation, performs the selected operation on each of the divided data, and generates authentication data for the number of divisions.

  The correction data generation unit 314 generates correction data for correcting an expected value that is held in the peripheral board 320 and used for verification of authentication data transmitted from the main control board 310. The expected value is, for example, a value held in advance (for example, at the time of manufacture) on the peripheral board 320, and is a value used for verification of authentication data transmitted from the main control board 310 in the peripheral board 320. Specifically, the expected value is a value obtained by performing the same binary operation as that of the authentication data generation unit 313 on all data in the data storage unit 311.

  For example, the correction data generation unit 314 generates a difference between the expected value before the change and the expected value after the change as correction data. In this way, the difference between the expected value before the change and the expected value before the change is used as the correction data. For example, even if the correction data is stolen by an unauthorized analyst, the expected value is not decrypted and authenticated. The strength of the treatment can be improved.

  Here, when the expected value needs to be corrected, for example, the main control board 310 is a control board that can be replaced with another control board, and the main control board 310 is replaced with another control board. This is the case where the data in the data storage unit 311 used for generating the authentication data is changed, or the case where the type of binary operation used for generating the authentication data is changed. Further, the correction data is generated in a format (data format or the like) that cannot be identified from the authentication data.

  The encryption unit 315 encrypts the authentication data and the correction data using a predetermined encryption method. The encryption method by the encryption unit 315 is arbitrary, but when a plurality of encryption methods can be used in the encryption unit 315, the encryption method may be changed based on the number of divisions. For example, when two encryption methods can be used in the encryption unit 315, the first method is changed when the division number is an even number, and the second method is changed when the division number is an odd number. The encryption unit 315 may encrypt the authentication data and the correction data using a control command in the control signal.

  The transmission unit 316 transmits authentication data and correction data for the number of divisions to the peripheral unit 320. The transmission unit 316 transmits authentication data by adding authentication data or correction data to a control signal transmitted from the main control board 310 to the peripheral board 320, for example.

  Here, the timing at which the transmission unit 316 transmits the correction data is based on the number of divisions. Specifically, for example, when the number of divisions when generating the authentication data is 2, after the authentication process using the authentication data is established, the correction data is transmitted after the second authentication process is established. To. The number of divisions is a value that only the main control board 310 knows, and is generated in a format in which authentication data and correction data cannot be identified. For this reason, persons other than the main control board 310 cannot know the timing at which the correction data is transmitted, and can prevent the correction data from being illegally stolen by an unauthorized analyst or the like.

  Next, a functional configuration of the peripheral board 320 having functions as peripheral portions such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 will be described. As illustrated in FIG. 3, the peripheral board 320 includes a reception unit 321, a decryption unit 322, an authentication unit 323, and a correction unit 324.

  The receiving unit 321 receives authentication data and correction data for the number of divisions transmitted by the main control board 310. The receiving unit 321 receives the authentication data, for example, by receiving a control signal to which authentication data or correction data is added. Note that the receiving unit 321 does not need to identify whether the received data is authentication data or correction data.

  The decryption unit 322 decrypts the authentication data and the correction data by a decryption method corresponding to the encryption method by the encryption unit 315. When the encryption method by the encryption unit 315 is changed based on the number of divisions, the decryption unit 322 is the number of authentication data that is subject to calculation by the authentication unit 323 when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established. The decoding method is changed based on the above.

  The authentication unit 323 authenticates the main control board 310 based on whether or not the operation result obtained by performing the binary operation on the authentication data for the number of divisions received by the reception unit 321 matches the expected value. The binary operation performed by the authentication unit 323 and the binary operation performed by the authentication data generation unit 314 of the main control board 310 are the same type of binary operation. Since this binary operation satisfies the combining law, the expected value generated from all data in the data storage unit 311 matches the value obtained by performing the same operation on the authentication data generated from the divided data. It should be. Accordingly, the authentication unit 323 authenticates the validity of the main control board 310.

  The correcting unit 324 corrects the expected value using the correction data received by the receiving unit 321. The correction unit 324 corrects the expected value at a timing based on the number of authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “the number of connections”) subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established. Specifically, for example, when the number of authentication data subjected to binary calculation when authentication is established is 2, after the authentication process using the authentication data is established, the second authentication process is performed. The expected value is corrected using the data received after the establishment.

  As described above, the authentication data and the correction data cannot be distinguished. However, since the number of authentication data subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established matches the number of divisions, the correction unit 324 corrects the correction data by the transmission unit 316 of the main control board 310. The expected value can be corrected according to the transmission timing. Therefore, the peripheral board 320 can continue the authentication process for the regular main control board 310 even when the expected value changes.

(Basic operation of pachinko machines)
An example of the basic operation of the pachinko gaming machine having the above configuration will be described. The main control unit 201 outputs the winning status of the game ball for each winning port to the winning ball control unit 203 as a control command. The winning ball control unit 203 pays out the number of winning balls corresponding to the winning situation in accordance with the control command output from the main control unit 201.

  The main control unit 201 outputs a corresponding control command to the effect control unit 202 every time a game ball wins the start winning opening 105, and the effect control unit 202 displays the symbols on the symbol display unit 104 in a variable manner. Repeat to stop. When the occurrence of the big hit has been determined, the corresponding control command is output to the effect control unit 202, and the effect control unit 202 stops with a predetermined pattern aligned. At the same time, control for opening the special winning opening 109 is performed. The effect control unit 202 displays various effects on the symbol display unit 104 in addition to the symbol variation display during the jackpot occurrence period, during the reach until the jackpot occurrence, or at the time of reach notice. . In addition, a specific drive is performed for various types of accessories, and effects such as changing the display state of the lamp 261 are performed.

  When a big hit occurs, the big winning opening 109 is opened a plurality of times. One release is one round, for example, 15 rounds are repeatedly executed. The period of one round is set, for example, when 10 game balls are won or for a predetermined period (for example, 30 seconds). At this time, the winning ball control unit 203 pays out with, for example, 15 winning balls per winning game ball to the big winning opening 109. After the jackpot is over, the jackpot state is canceled and the normal gaming state is restored.

(Details of processing by each control unit)
Next, details of various processes performed by each control unit will be described. First, the control process of the effect control unit 202 by the main control unit 201 will be described. 4 and 5 are flowcharts showing the procedure of the control process of the effect control unit by the main control unit. 4 to 9, the correction data, the authentication data, and the accompanying data are not considered in order to clarify the control processing procedure of the effect control unit 202. That is, in the description of FIGS. 4 to 9, “transmit a command” means “transmit a control signal including data (control command data) indicating the command”, for example, correction data or authentication. The presence or absence of data and accompanying data (see FIG. 10) is not considered.

  4 and 5, the main control unit 201 first waits until the pachinko gaming machine is turned on (step S401: No loop). When the power of the pachinko gaming machine is turned on (step S401: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a power-on command to peripheral parts such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 (step S402). ). When the power-on command is transmitted, the effect control unit 202 controls the lamp control unit 251, the sound control unit 252, and the symbol display unit 104 for effect control at the time of power-on (specifically, the lamp control unit 202). Control command to instruct the lighting of the LED, output of sound, display of the demonstration screen, etc.).

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the number of undrawn winning prizes is 0 with reference to the data of the undrawn winning prizes recorded in the ROM 212 or the RAM 213 (step S403). The number of undrawn winning prizes is a number obtained by subtracting the number of times a lottery corresponding to the winning ball has been made (number of already drawn lots) from the number of winning balls detected at the start winning opening (number of winning prizes). When the number of undrawn winning prizes is 0 (step S403: Yes), the main control unit 201 measures the time elapsed since the demonstration was started (step S404).

  When a predetermined time elapses after the demonstration is started (step S405: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a customer waiting demonstration command to the effect control unit 202 (step S406), and proceeds to step S407. If the predetermined time has not elapsed since the demonstration was started (step S405: No), the process proceeds to step S407 as it is. When the customer waiting demonstration command is transmitted in step S406, the effect control unit 202 transmits a control signal for the customer waiting demonstration to the lamp control unit 251, the voice control unit 252, and the symbol display unit 104. In step S403, when the number of undrawn winning prizes is not zero (step S403: No), the process proceeds to step S410.

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not a winning ball for the starting winning port is detected by the starting winning port detecting unit 221 (step S407). When a winning ball is detected at the start winning opening (step S407: Yes), the main control unit 201 clears the time that has been measured since the demonstration was started (step S408), and the number of undrawn winning prizes is reached. 1 is added (step S409). Subsequently, the main control unit 201 acquires a jackpot determination random number (step S410), subtracts 1 from the number of undrawn winning prizes (step S411), and proceeds to step S412 in FIG. If no winning ball for the start winning opening is detected in step S407 (step S407: No), the process returns to step S404 and the subsequent processing is continued.

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the jackpot determination random number acquired in step S410 is a predetermined jackpot random number (step S412). When the jackpot determination random number is a jackpot random number (step S412: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot reach command (symbol variation command) to the effect control unit 202 (step S413). The main control unit 201 waits until the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S414: No loop), and when the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S414: Yes), transmits a symbol stop command to the effect control unit 202 ( Step S415).

  Next, the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot start command to the effect control unit 202 (step S416), and then sequentially transmits commands corresponding to the rounds during the jackpot (jackpot command) (step S417). Then, when transmission of the jackpot command for all rounds is completed, the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot end command (step S418), and proceeds to step S422.

  On the other hand, if the jackpot determination random number is not a jackpot random number in step S412, the main control unit 201 transmits a shift reach command (design variation command) to the effect control unit 202 (step S419). . The main control unit 201 waits until the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S420: No loop), and when the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S420: Yes), transmits a symbol stop command to the effect control unit 202 ( Step S421).

  The main control unit 201 returns to step S403 in FIG. 4 and repeats the subsequent processing until the pachinko gaming machine is turned off (step S422: No). Then, when the power of the pachinko gaming machine is turned off (step S422: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits an end process command to the effect control unit 202 (step S423), and ends the process according to this flowchart. .

  FIG. 6 is a time chart showing the transmission timing of a jackpot related command (a jackpot reach command, a jackpot start command, a jackpot command, a jackpot end command). The jackpot reach command is transmitted more frequently and randomly than the actual jackpot occurs. The jackpot start command is transmitted only once when shifting to the jackpot state when a jackpot is actually generated. The jackpot command is continuously transmitted for each round after shifting to the jackpot state. The jackpot end command is transmitted only once when all rounds of the jackpot state are completed and the normal state is entered.

  Next, processing by the effect control unit 202 will be described. In the following, processing of the effect control unit 202 at the time of symbol variation (when a jackpot reach command (see step S413 in FIG. 5) or a loss reach command (see step S419 in FIG. 5) is received) and a jackpot time will be described. .

  FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the symbol variation process by the effect control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 7, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a jackpot reach command (see step S413 in FIG. 5) or a miss reach command (see step S419 in FIG. 5), which is a symbol variation command. (Step S701: No loop). When the symbol variation command is received (step S701: Yes), the effect control unit 202 acquires a random effect selection random number (step S702), and selects a variation effect type based on the acquired random number (step S703). ). Then, the effect control unit 202 transmits an effect start command for each variable effect to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S704).

  The effect control unit 202 determines whether or not the effect time of the variable effect has elapsed (step S705) and whether or not a symbol stop command (see steps S415 and S421 in FIG. 5) has been received from the main control unit 201. (Step S706). When the production time has elapsed (step S705: Yes), or when the symbol stop command has been received (step S706: Yes), the production control unit 202 sends a production stop command to the lamp control unit 251 and the audio control unit 252. Is transmitted (step S707). If the production time has not elapsed (step S705: No) and the symbol stop command has not been received (step S706: No), the process returns to step S705, and the subsequent processing is repeated.

  Next, the processing for the big hit of the effect control unit 202 will be described. FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the big hit processing by the effect control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 8, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a jackpot start command (see step S416 in FIG. 5) is received from the main control unit 201 (step S801: No loop). When the jackpot start command is received (step S801: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a jackpot start processing command to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S802).

  Next, the effect control unit 202 waits until receiving a round jackpot command (see step S417 in FIG. 5) from the main control unit 201 (step S803: No loop). When the jackpot command is received (step S803: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a round processing command corresponding to the received round jackpot command to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S804). ).

  Subsequently, the effect control unit 202 waits until a jackpot end command (see step S418 in FIG. 5) is received from the main control unit 201 (step S805: No loop). When the jackpot end command is received (step S805: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a jackpot end processing command to the lamp control unit 251 and the audio control unit 252 (step S806), and ends the processing according to this flowchart. To do.

  Subsequently, a lamp control process by the lamp control unit 251 will be described. Here, processing when a symbol variation command is received from the effect control unit 202 (during symbol variation) will be described. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the lamp control process when the symbol is changed by the lamp control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 9, the lamp control unit 251 first waits until an effect start command is received from the effect control unit 202 (step S901: No loop).

  When an effect start command is received from the effect control unit 202 (step S901: Yes), the lamp control unit 251 reads data prepared for each command (step S902) and executes a selection routine for each command (step S903). ), Ramp data is set (step S904). Then, the lamp control unit 251 outputs lamp data to the lamp 261 (step S905). Based on the lamp data output from the lamp control unit 251, the lamp 261 is turned on or off.

  Until the lamp control unit 251 receives an effect stop command from the effect control unit 202 (step S906: No), the lamp control unit 251 returns to step S905 and continues outputting the lamp data. When the production stop command is received (step S906: Yes), the lamp control unit 251 stops the output of the lamp data (step S907) and ends the processing according to this flowchart.

  Note that although the processing of the lamp control unit 251 is shown in FIG. 9, the sound control by the sound control unit 252 is almost the same as the processing of FIG. In the sound control process by the sound control unit 252, “ramp data” in steps S <b> 904, S <b> 905, and S <b> 907 in the process of FIG.

  As described above, peripheral units such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 perform various processes based on the control commands output by the main control unit 201. On the other hand, when the output source of the control command is not the regular main control unit 201, for example, when an unauthorized control board is connected between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit (see FIG. 16), The peripheral portion performs an illegal operation by an illegal control command output from an unauthorized control board.

  In order to prevent this, in the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment, an authentication process is performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit. More specifically, authentication processing is performed with the peripheral unit as the authenticator and the main control unit 201 as the person to be authenticated, and the validity of the control signal transmitted from the main control unit 201 is authenticated. The authentication data used for this authentication process is generated based on data obtained by arbitrarily dividing the program data recorded in the main control unit 201. This authentication process detects fraud such as the main control unit 201 being replaced with an unauthorized control board or an unauthorized control board being attached between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral part. Fraud can be prevented.

  In the present embodiment, authentication data is added to control command data and transmitted. By adding the authentication data to the control command data, it is possible to suppress an increase in communication load between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit as compared with the case where the authentication data is transmitted alone. Further, by adding the authentication data to the control command data, it is possible to reduce the possibility that the authentication data is extracted from the communication data and analyzed as compared with the case where the authentication data is transmitted alone. The format of a control signal including authentication data and control command data will be described below.

(Control signal data format)
Next, the data format of the control signal output from the main control unit 201 to the peripheral board will be described. FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram schematically showing a data format of a control signal output from the main control unit. As shown in FIG. 10, the normal control signal 1010 output from the main control unit 201 includes control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002. The control command data 1001 is data unique to each command such as a jackpot reach command, a jackpot start command, and a round command. The accompanying data 1002 is data accompanying the control command data 1001, and is data necessary for processing based on the control command data 1001, such as the number of winning game balls.

  In addition to the control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002, the main control unit 201 outputs an authentication data-added control signal 1020 or a correction data-added control signal 1030 including authentication data 1003 or correction data 1004 to the peripheral board. For example, when the control command data 1001 is a predetermined command, the main control unit 201 outputs a control signal including the correction data 1004 to the peripheral board, and then transmits a control signal including the authentication data 1003 to the peripheral board. Output.

  As described above, by including the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 in the control signal, the communication load between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit is reduced as compared with the case of transmitting the authentication data alone or the correction data alone. be able to. Further, by including the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 in the control signal, the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 is extracted from the communication data as compared with the case where the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 is transmitted alone, The possibility of being analyzed can be reduced.

  The authentication data 1003 is data for the peripheral unit to authenticate that the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 are output from the regular main control unit 201. Specifically, the authentication data 1003 is a value generated as follows.

(Method for generating authentication data (inspection value))
FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram schematically showing a method of generating authentication data (inspection value) in the main control unit. The authentication data 1003 is generated using data recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 or the like. More specifically, after dividing a predetermined area of the ROM 212 by an arbitrary number of divisions, a binary operation (semigroup operation) that satisfies the combining law is performed on the data stored in each of the divided areas, and the inspection value is obtained. Is calculated. Examples of the semi-group operation include addition and exclusive OR operation. Then, a value obtained by performing a predetermined operation (for example, encryption processing) on the inspection value is set as authentication data. Whether or not to inspect the inspection value is arbitrary, but it is desirable to encrypt it from the viewpoint of fraud prevention.

  The type of data used for calculating the inspection value is arbitrary, but for example, program data (instruction code or fixed data) recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 can be used. By using the program data recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, it is possible to detect unauthorized rewriting of the program data, unauthorized replacement of the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, and the like.

  For example, 12 data (0x01 to 0x09, 0x0A to 0x0C) are stored in the program data storage unit 1100 shown in FIG. When the division number is 3, the program data storage unit 1100 can be divided into, for example, a first block 1100a including four data, a second block 1100b including three data, and a third block 1100c including five data. The main control unit 201 calculates a test value by performing a semi-group operation on the data stored in each block. The number of data in the block described above is an example. The number of data in the divided blocks may be a fixed value or may be determined randomly.

  For example, if the method of using addition as a semi-group operation is method A, four data 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, and 0x04 stored in the first block 1100a are added to obtain a first inspection value 0x0A. Similarly, the three data 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 stored in the second block 1100b are added to obtain the second inspection value 0x12 as the five data 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C stored in the third block 1100c. Are added to obtain the third inspection value 0x32.

  For example, if the method using the exclusive OR operation as the semi-group operation is method B, the exclusive OR operation is performed on the four pieces of data 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, and 0x04 stored in the first block 1100a. An inspection value of 0x04 is obtained. Similarly, exclusive OR operation is performed on the three pieces of data 0x05, 0x06, and 0x07 stored in the second block 1100b, and the second check value 0x04 is stored in the five pieces of data 0x08, 0x09, and 0x0A stored in the third block 1100c. , 0x0B, 0x0C are subjected to exclusive OR operation to obtain third check values 0x0C, respectively.

  Then, the obtained inspection value is encrypted to obtain authentication data. At the time of this encryption processing, the encryption processing may be performed including the inspection value and data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 that are transmitted at the same time. The data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 includes the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 itself, operations on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 using a hash function, a parity check, and a cyclic redundancy check (Cyclic Redundancy Check). : CRC), a value obtained by performing an operation such as a checksum.

  In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. For this reason, if the authentication data 1003 is generated using the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002, even if the authentication data 1003 is reused by an unauthorized control board, the authentication data 1003 matches the control command. Unable to detect fraud.

  On the other hand, the peripheral part as the authenticator holds the value obtained by performing the semi-group operation on the entire data stored in the program data storage part 1100 as an expected value. For example, the expected value in the case of method A is 0x4E, which is the sum of 0x01 to 0x0C. In addition, the expected value in the case of method B is 0x0C, which is an exclusive OR of 0x01 to 0x0C.

  The peripheral part extracts the inspection value from the received control signal with authentication data 1020 and collates the value obtained by performing the semigroup operation on the inspection value with the expected value. Since the test values are generated using a half-group operation, if the same half-group operation is performed on all the test values generated from the divided program data, the expectation that the half-group operation was performed on the entire program data Should match the value. When the value obtained by performing the half-group operation on the inspection value matches the expected value, the peripheral unit authenticates the main control unit 201.

  Note that the semi-group calculation process in the peripheral portion corresponds to a process of combining the inspection values generated from the divided data, and is therefore referred to as “joining process”. In addition, the number of inspection values used for the combining process when authentication is established is referred to as “number of connections”. The number of connections in the peripheral part and the number of divisions in the main control unit 201 are the same.

  Returning to the description of FIG. 10, the correction data 1004 is a value for correcting the expected value of the authentication data 1003 held by the peripheral portion. As described above, the authentication data 1003 is a value generated using data held by the main control unit 201. There are a plurality of generation methods, and authentication data corresponding to each generation method is stored. Exists. Further, when the main control unit 201 is replaced with another board by a legitimate user, the data used for generating the authentication data 1003 is different, and thus the value of the authentication data 1003 is different. The correction data 1004 is data for correcting the expected value of the authentication data 1003 held in the peripheral part in such a case.

  The correction data 1004 is, for example, difference data between the expected value of the authentication data 1003 before the change and the expected value of the authentication data 1003 after the change. Since the correction data 1004 is not the expected value itself after the change but the difference data from the expected value before the change, for example, even if the control signal is stolen by an unauthorized analyst, the expected value is not deciphered. Strength can be improved.

  The transmission timing of the correction data 1004 is determined by the number of divisions used for generating the authentication data 1003 described above. For example, when the number of divisions at the time of generating the authentication data 1003 is 2, the correction data 1004 is transmitted after the second authentication process is established after the authentication process using the authentication data. Transmission timing information (correction timing information) of the correction data 1004 is stored in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, for example. Note that the above-described relationship between the number of divisions and the correction timing is merely an example, and an arbitrary agreement may be made between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit.

  Further, the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004 may include data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 transmitted together with the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004. The data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 can be obtained by performing an operation using the error detection method as described above on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 itself, or the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002. Value.

  In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. If the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004 are generated using the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 transmitted together with the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004 are reused by an unauthorized control board. Even in this case, the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 and the control command data 1001 cannot be matched, and fraud can be detected.

  When the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 includes the data related to the control command data 1001 or the accompanying data 1002, the main control unit 201 encrypts the data related to the control command data 1001 or the accompanying data 1002 and the inspection value, and authenticates them. Data 1003 and correction data 1004 are generated.

  The arrangement of the control command data 1001, the accompanying data 1002, the authentication data 1003, or the correction data 1004 is not limited to the order shown in FIG. 10, and for example, the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 is set to the head of the control signal, or the control command data Authentication data 1003 or correction data 1004 may be inserted between 1001 and accompanying data 1002. Further, the authentication data 1003 may be output separately from the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002. For example, after transmitting a control signal including a predetermined command, correction data 1004 may be added when the first control signal is transmitted, and authentication data 1003 may be added when the third control signal is transmitted.

  Further, dummy data (not shown) having the same size as the correction data 1004 and the authentication data 1003 may be added to the normal control signal 1010 that does not include the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004. Here, the dummy data is data that is not used for the correction process or the authentication process. By doing in this way, the data size of the normal control signal 1010 can be made comparable with the control signal with authentication data 1020 and the control signal with correction data 1030. For this reason, it is possible to prevent a third party from seeing through the control signal to which the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 is added due to a difference in data size.

(Control signal transmission / reception processing)
Subsequently, a control signal transmission / reception process performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit will be described. FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure of control signal transmission processing by the main control unit 201. FIG. 12 shows a process in the case where the number of divisions at the time of generating the authentication data is N, and the correction data is transmitted after generating and transmitting the Nth authentication data after transmitting the authentication data.

  First, the main control unit 201 waits until the power is turned on (step S1201: No loop). When the power is turned on (step S1201: Yes), it is determined whether or not the correction data transmission timing is reached. Judgment is made (step S1202). Specifically, the main control unit 201 refers to the correction timing information storage area in the ROM 212 and determines whether or not the value of the correction timing information is zero. In the case of the correction data transmission timing (step S1202: Yes), the correction data is generated (step S1203), and the control signal with correction data is transmitted to the peripheral portion (step S1204). Then, the correction timing information in the ROM 212 is cleared (step S1205), and the process proceeds to step S1216.

  If it is not the correction data transmission timing in step S1202 (step S1202: No), the main control unit 201 determines whether it is the authentication data transmission timing (step S1206). In the case of the authentication data transmission timing (step S1206: Yes), the main control unit 201 determines the number of divisions of the program data (step S1207), divides the program data by the determined number of divisions, and a half group for each. An inspection value is calculated by performing an operation (step S1208). Then, the verification value is encrypted to generate authentication data (step S1209). The method for determining the number of divisions is arbitrary. The number of divisions may be determined before the transmission timing of authentication data.

  Next, the main control unit 201 sequentially transmits authentication data-attached control signals for the number of divisions including the generated authentication data (step S1210). The control signal with authentication data may be transmitted continuously, or may be mixed with a normal control signal and transmitted. Further, the transmission order of the authentication data is also arbitrary. The main control unit 201 returns to step S1210 and continues to transmit the control signal with authentication data until all the authentication data generated in step S1209 is transmitted (step S1211: No).

  When all the authentication data is transmitted (step S1211: Yes), the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the next correction timing is determined (step S1212). Whether or not the next correction timing has been determined specifically means whether or not a value is stored in the correction timing information storage area in the ROM 212. When the next correction timing has been determined (step S1212: Yes), the main control unit 201 decrements the correction timing information by 1 (step S1213), and proceeds to step S1216.

  On the other hand, when the next correction timing is not determined in step S1212 (step S1212: No), the main control unit 201 determines the correction timing based on the number of divisions (step S1214). Specifically, the number of divisions is stored in the correction timing information storage area in the ROM 212 on the assumption that the correction data is transmitted after the authentication processing for the number of divisions from the next time is established.

  In step S1206, when it is not the transmission timing of the authentication data (step S1206: No), the main control unit 201 transmits a normal control signal (step S1215). The main control unit 201 returns to step S1202 and continues the subsequent processes until the power is turned off (step S1216: No). When the power is turned off (step S1216: Yes), the processing according to this flowchart is terminated.

  Next, the reception process of the control signal by the peripheral part will be described. FIG. 13 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure of control signal reception processing by the peripheral unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 13, the peripheral unit waits until the power is turned on (step S1301: No loop). When the power is turned on (step S1301: Yes), a control signal is sent from the main control unit 201. Wait until it is received (step S1302: No loop). When a control signal is received from the main control unit 201 (step S1302: Yes), the peripheral unit determines whether additional data is included in the received control signal (step S1303). The additional data is authentication data or correction data as shown in FIG. The determination as to whether or not the additional data is included in the control signal is based on, for example, whether or not the data amount of the control signal is larger than that of the normal control signal and a flag indicating that the authentication data is included. This is done by judging whether or not it is set up.

  When the additional data is included in the control signal (step S1303: Yes), the peripheral unit determines whether or not the current timing is the correction timing (step S1304). Specifically, the peripheral unit refers to the correction timing information storage area in the ROM 242 or 282 and determines whether or not the value of the correction timing information is zero. In the case of the correction timing (step S1304: Yes), since the additional data in the control signal is correction data, the peripheral portion corrects the expected value using this correction data (step S1305). Then, the correction timing information is cleared (step S1306), and the process proceeds to step S1320.

  On the other hand, when it is not the correction timing in step S1304 (step S1304: No), since the additional data in the control signal is authentication data, the peripheral part performs a decoding process on the authentication data to obtain a test value (step S1304). S1307). The peripheral unit stores the acquired inspection value in the inspection value memory (step S1308), and performs a semi-group operation (joining process) on all inspection values in the inspection value memory (step S1309). If there is one inspection value in the inspection value memory, the process proceeds to step S1310 without performing the combining process.

  Then, the peripheral unit collates the operation result (combination result) with the expected value of the stored test value, and determines whether or not the combination result matches the expected value (step S1310). If the combined result matches the expected value (step S1310: Yes), the peripheral unit establishes authentication for the main control unit 201 (step S1311), and proceeds to step S1315.

  On the other hand, if the calculation result of the inspection value does not match the expected value in step S1310 (step S1310: No), the peripheral unit returns to step S1302 until a predetermined number or more of authentication data is received (step S1312: No). The subsequent processing is repeated. When the authentication data of a predetermined number or more is received (step S1312: Yes), the peripheral unit fails to authenticate the main control unit 201 (step S1313). Although the predetermined number is an arbitrary number, for example, it can be the number of data that can be stored in the program data storage unit 1100 (maximum number of divisions). If the authentication is not established, the peripheral unit discards the control command data and the accompanying data, and outputs a notification signal from, for example, the speaker 262 (see FIG. 2) (step S1314), and ends the process according to this flowchart. .

  When authentication with respect to the main control unit 201 is established in step S1311, the peripheral unit erases data in the verification value memory (step S1315) and determines whether or not the next correction timing is determined (step S1311). S1316). Whether the next correction timing is determined specifically means whether or not a value is stored in the correction timing information storage area in the ROM 242 or 282. When the next correction timing has been determined (step S1316: Yes), the main control unit 201 decrements the correction timing information by 1 (step S1317), and proceeds to step S1320.

  On the other hand, when the next correction timing is not determined in step S1316 (step S1316: No), the main control unit 201 determines the correction timing based on the number of connections (step S1318). Specifically, the number of couplings is stored in the correction timing information storage area in the ROM 242 or 282, assuming that the expected value is corrected after the authentication processing for the number of divisions is performed after the next time.

  If no additional data is included in the control signal in step S1303 (step S1303: No), the peripheral unit performs the process based on the control command data and the accompanying data as it is without performing the authentication process (step S1319). . Until the power is turned off (step S1320: No), the peripheral portion returns to step S1302, and the subsequent processing is continued. When the power is turned off (step S1320: Yes), the processing according to this flowchart is terminated.

(Specific example of expected value correction processing)
Subsequently, a specific example of expected value correction processing among the processing shown in FIGS. 12 and 13 will be described. FIG. 14 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of a data flow between control units. In FIG. 14, as in FIGS. 12 and 13, when the number of divisions at the time of generating authentication data is N, the correction data is transmitted after performing authentication processing of the Nth authentication data after transmitting the authentication data. Shows the process.

  First, the main control unit 201 determines the number of divisions used for the current authentication process by an arbitrary method. For example, assuming that the number of divisions at this time = 2 (step S1401), the main control unit 201 divides the data stored in the program data storage unit 1100 into two blocks, and uses the data contained in each block to 2 One inspection value is calculated, and further encryption processing is performed to generate two authentication data (step S1402). Then, two control signals with authentication data including the respective authentication data are transmitted to the peripheral part (step S1403).

  Thereafter, the main control unit 201 determines the transmission timing of the correction data based on the number of divisions because there is no value (cleared) in the correction timing information (step S1404). In this case, since the number of divisions is 2, the correction data is transmitted after the authentication data authentication process is performed twice after the transmission of the control signal with authentication data this time. That is, correction timing information = 2.

  Next, processing in the peripheral part will be described. The peripheral unit receives the control signal with authentication data transmitted from the main control unit 201 (step S1405). Then, the authentication data in the control signal with authentication data is decrypted to obtain the inspection value, and the combining process is performed (step S1406). If the combined result matches the expected value, the peripheral unit establishes authentication for the main control unit 201 (step S1407). In this case, when the joining process is performed using two inspection values, it should match the expected value (number of joins = 2).

  Thereafter, the peripheral portion has no value (cleared) in the correction timing information, and therefore determines the correction timing of the expected value based on the number of connections (step S1408). In this case, since the number of connections is 2, the expected value is corrected using data received after two authentication processes have been established after the current authentication process. That is, correction timing information = 2.

  Moving on to the description of the second authentication process, the main control unit 201 again determines the number of divisions by an arbitrary method. For example, assuming that the current number of divisions = 5 (step S1409), the main control unit 201 divides the data stored in the program data storage unit 1100 into five blocks, and uses the data included in each block to generate 5 units. One inspection value is calculated, and further encryption processing is performed to generate five authentication data (step S1410). Then, five control signals with authentication data including the respective authentication data are transmitted to the peripheral part (step S1411). When the transmission of the authentication data is completed, the main control unit 201 sets the correction timing information to 1 (2-1 = 1).

  Subsequently, the peripheral unit receives the control signal with authentication data transmitted from the main control unit 201 (step S1412), decodes the authentication data in the control signal with authentication data, obtains the inspection value, and performs the combining process. Perform (step S1413). When the combined result matches the expected value, the peripheral unit establishes authentication for the main control unit 201 (step S1414). When authentication is established, the peripheral portion sets the correction timing information to 1 (2-1 = 1).

  Turning to the description of the third authentication process, the main control unit 201 again determines the number of divisions by an arbitrary method. For example, if the current number of divisions = 3 (step S1415), the main control unit 201 divides the data stored in the program data storage unit 1100 into five blocks, and uses the data contained in each block to obtain 3 One inspection value is calculated, and further encryption processing is performed to generate three authentication data (step S1416). Then, three control signals with authentication data including the respective authentication data are transmitted to the peripheral part (step S1417). When the transmission of the authentication data is completed, the main control unit 201 sets the correction timing information to 0 (1-1 = 0).

  Subsequently, the peripheral unit receives the control signal with authentication data transmitted from the main control unit 201 (step S1418), decodes the authentication data in the control signal with authentication data, obtains the inspection value, and performs the combining process. Perform (step S1419). When the combined result matches the expected value, the peripheral unit establishes authentication for the main control unit 201 (step S1420). When authentication is established, the peripheral portion sets the correction timing information to 0 (1-0 = 0).

  As described above, when two authentication processes are established after the first authentication process, the main control unit 201 generates correction data because the correction timing information = 0 (step S1421), and the peripheral unit A control signal with correction data is transmitted (step S1422). It should be noted that the control signal with correction data and the control signal with authentication data cannot be distinguished apparently. Thereafter, the main control unit 201 clears the correction timing information (step S1423).

  When the peripheral portion receives the control signal with correction data (step S1424), the correction timing information = 0, so that the expected value is corrected using the correction data included in the received control signal (step S1425). Thereafter, the peripheral portion clears the correction timing information (step S1426).

  Moving on to the description of the fourth authentication process, the main control unit 201 again determines the number of divisions by an arbitrary method. For example, assuming that the current number of divisions = 6 (step S1427), the main control unit 201 divides the data stored in the program data storage unit 1100 into six blocks, and uses the data included in each block to obtain six. One inspection value is calculated, and further encryption processing is performed to generate six authentication data (step S1428). Then, six control signals with authentication data including the respective authentication data are transmitted to the peripheral part (step S1429).

  Thereafter, since the correction timing information has no value (cleared), the main control unit 201 determines the correction data transmission timing based on the number of divisions (step S1430). In this case, since the number of divisions is 6, after transmitting the control signal with authentication data this time, the control signal with correction data is transmitted after transmitting the control signal with authentication data for six authentication processes. That is, correction timing information = 6.

  Subsequently, the peripheral unit receives the control signal with authentication data transmitted from the main control unit 201 (step S1431), decodes the authentication data in the control signal with authentication data, obtains the inspection value, and performs the combining process. Perform (step S1432). When the combined result matches the expected value, the peripheral unit establishes authentication for the main control unit 201 (step S1433).

  Thereafter, the peripheral portion has no value (cleared) in the correction timing information, and therefore determines the correction timing of the expected value based on the number of connections (step S1434). In this case, since the number of connections is 6, it is assumed that the expected value is corrected using data received after 6 authentication processes have been established after the current authentication process. That is, correction timing information = 6.

  In the above-described embodiment, a single encryption method is used for encrypting the inspection value. However, a plurality of encryption methods may be switched in the same manner as the inspection value generation method. Thereby, possibility that authentication data will be analyzed by a fraud analyst can be reduced.

  As described above, the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment transmits correction data so as to satisfy the correction timing determined based on the number of divisions of the data in the storage means in the main control unit, In the unit, the expected value is corrected at a timing determined based on the number of authentication data (number of connections) subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values known only by the main control unit and the peripheral unit, the fraud analyst cannot know the transmission timing of the correction data used for correcting the expected value. As a result, the expected value held by the peripheral portion can be corrected without the unauthorized analyst knowing it. Further, when an unauthorized control unit is inserted between the main control unit and the peripheral unit, the unauthorized control unit cannot correct the expected value without knowing the transmission timing of the correction data. For this reason, it can be detected that an unauthorized control unit is inserted in the authentication process, and unauthorized processing by the unauthorized control unit can be prevented.

  Note that the control method and authentication method for the main control unit and the peripheral unit described in this embodiment can be realized by executing a program prepared in advance on a computer such as a personal computer or a workstation. This program is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium such as a hard disk, a flexible disk, a CD-ROM, an MO, and a DVD, and is executed by being read from the recording medium by the computer. The program may be a transmission medium that can be distributed via a network such as the Internet.

  As described above, the present invention is useful for an electronic device in which fraud to the control unit is concerned and a control board mounted on the electronic device, and in particular, a pachinko gaming machine, a slot gaming machine, and other various gaming machines. Suitable for

310 main control board 311 data storage unit 312 determination unit 313 authentication data generation unit 314 correction data generation unit 315 encryption unit 316 transmission unit 320 peripheral board 321 reception unit 322 decryption unit 323 authentication unit 324 correction unit

Claims (13)

An electronic device comprising: a main control unit; and a peripheral unit that performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit,
The main control unit
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining the number of divisions of the data stored in the data storage means (hereinafter referred to as “division number”);
Authentication that divides the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions and performs a binary operation satisfying a combining rule on all the data in the divided data group to generate authentication values for the number of divisions Value generation means;
Correction value generation means for generating a correction value for correcting an expected value that is held in the peripheral portion and used for verification of the authentication value transmitted from the main control unit;
Transmitting means for transmitting the correction value and the authentication values for the number of divisions to the peripheral part,
The peripheral portion is
Receiving means for receiving the correction value and the authentication values for the number of divisions;
Correction means for correcting the expected value using the correction value received by the receiving means;
Whether the calculation result obtained by performing the two-term calculation on the authentication values for the number of divisions received by the receiving unit matches the expected value before correction or the expected value after correction, Authentication that authenticates the main control unit by using the expected value before the correction using the expected value before the correction by the correction value, and by using the expected value after the correction after the correction by the correction value Means, and
The expected value is a value obtained by performing the binary operation on all the data in the data storage means,
The transmission means transmits the correction value when transmitting the authentication value for the number of divisions used for authentication of the main control unit after transmitting the authentication values for the number of divisions. ,
The correction means is configured to authenticate the main control unit a number of times based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the two-term operation at the time of authentication after the authentication of the main control unit by the authentication values for the number of divisions. The electronic apparatus is characterized in that the expected value is corrected when the operation is performed.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the transmission unit adds the authentication value and the correction value to the control command and transmits the control command to the peripheral part.   The electronic device according to claim 2, wherein the authentication value generation unit generates the authentication value using the control command to which the authentication value is added. The main control unit
An encryption means for encrypting the authentication value and the correction value by a predetermined encryption method;
The transmission means transmits the authentication value and the correction value encrypted by the encryption means to the peripheral part,
The peripheral portion is
A decrypting means for decrypting the authentication value and the correction value by a decryption method corresponding to the predetermined encryption method;
The authentication unit and the correction unit perform the authentication and the correction using the authentication value and the correction value decrypted by the decryption unit. Electronic equipment described in one. The encryption means changes the encryption method based on the division number,
Said decoding means, according to claim 4, characterized in that to change the decoding method based on the number of the authentication value and the authentication is the subject of the binary operation when satisfied with respect to the main control unit The electronic device as described in.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the data storage unit stores program data used in the main control unit.   The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the binary operation is addition or exclusive OR operation. Comprising the electronic device according to any one of claims 1 to 7,
A main control board transmits the authentication value, and a peripheral board authenticates the main control board using the authentication value transmitted by the main control board. A main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command to perform a predetermined process on a peripheral board,
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining the number of divisions of the data stored in the data storage means (hereinafter referred to as “division number”);
Authentication that divides the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions and performs a binary operation satisfying a combining rule on all the data in the divided data group to generate authentication values for the number of divisions Value generation means;
Correction value generation means for generating a correction value for correcting an expected value that is held in the peripheral board and used for collation of the authentication value transmitted from the main control board;
Transmitting means for transmitting the authentication value and the correction value for the number of divisions to the peripheral board,
The transmission means transmits the correction value when transmitting the authentication value for the authentication of the main control board for the number of times based on the division number after transmitting the authentication value for the division number. A main control board characterized by that. The number of data in the data storage means for generating the authentication value for authenticating the main control board (hereinafter referred to as “division number”) is determined, the data is divided into the division number, and the division number A peripheral board that performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control board that transmits a correction value for correcting an expected value so as to satisfy a correction timing determined based on:
Receiving means for receiving from the main control board an authentication value for authenticating the main control board and a correction value for correcting an expected value used for verification of the authentication value transmitted from the main control board;
Correction means for correcting the expected value using the correction value received by the receiving means;
Before the correction by the correction value, whether or not the calculation result obtained by performing the binomial calculation satisfying the binding law on the authentication values for the number of divisions received by the receiving means matches the expected value is determined. Is determined using the expected value before the correction, and is determined using the expected value after the correction after the correction by the correction value, and includes an authentication unit that authenticates the main control board,
The correction means is configured to authenticate the main control board a number of times based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the two-term operation at the time of authentication after the authentication of the main control board with the authentication values for the number of divisions. A peripheral substrate, wherein the expected value is corrected when the step is performed. An authentication method in an electronic device comprising a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit,
In the main control unit,
A division number determination step of determining a number (hereinafter referred to as “division number”) for dividing predetermined data stored in the main control unit;
An authentication value generation step of dividing the data into the number of divisions, generating binary values that satisfy a combining rule for all data in the divided data group, and generating authentication values for the number of divisions;
A correction value generating step for generating a correction value for correcting an expected value that is held in the peripheral portion and used for verification of the authentication value transmitted from the main control unit;
After transmitting the authentication values for the number of divisions, the timing at which the authentication values for the number of times used for authentication of the main control unit based on the number of divisions is transmitted is determined as the timing for transmitting the correction value. A transmission timing determination step;
Transmitting the correction value for the number of divisions to the peripheral part, and transmitting the correction value to the peripheral part at the timing determined in the transmission timing determination step,
In the periphery,
A receiving step of receiving the authentication value and the correction value for the number of divisions;
Whether the calculation result obtained by performing the two-term calculation on the authentication values for the number of divisions received in the reception step matches the expected value before correction or the expected value after correction, Authentication that authenticates the main control unit by using the expected value before the correction using the expected value before the correction by the correction value, and by using the expected value after the correction after the correction by the correction value Process,
Timing at which authentication of the main control unit is performed for the number of times based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the two-term operation at the time of authentication after the authentication of the main control unit with the authentication values for the number of divisions Correction timing determining step for determining the timing for correcting the expected value,
A correction step of correcting the expected value using the correction value at the timing determined in the correction timing determination step;
An authentication method comprising: A computer-executable authentication program for a main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command to perform a predetermined process on a peripheral board, the authentication program including:
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining the number of divisions of the data stored in the data storage means (hereinafter referred to as “division number”);
Authentication that divides the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions and performs a binary operation satisfying a combining rule on all the data in the divided data group to generate authentication values for the number of divisions Value generation means;
Correction value generation means for generating a correction value for correcting an expected value that is held in the peripheral board and used for collation of the authentication value transmitted from the main control board;
The transmitting unit that transmits the authentication value and the correction value for the number of divisions to the peripheral board,
The transmission means transmits the correction value when transmitting the authentication value for the number of divisions and used for authentication of the main control unit based on the number of divisions. An authentication program for the main control board. The number of data in the data storage means for generating the authentication value for authenticating the main control board (hereinafter referred to as “division number”) is determined, the data is divided into the division number, and the division number A computer-executable authentication program for a peripheral board that performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control board that transmits a correction value for correcting an expected value so as to satisfy a correction timing determined based on And the authentication program
Receiving means for receiving from the main control board an authentication value for authenticating the main control board and a correction value for correcting an expected value used for verification of the authentication value transmitted from the main control board;
Correction means for correcting the expected value using the correction value received by the receiving means;
Before the correction by the correction value, whether or not the calculation result obtained by performing the binomial calculation satisfying the binding law on the authentication values for the number of divisions received by the receiving means matches the expected value is determined. Is determined using the expected value before the correction, and after the correction by the correction value is determined using the expected value after the correction, and functions as an authentication unit that authenticates the main control board. ,
The correction means is configured to authenticate the main control unit a number of times based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the two-term operation at the time of authentication after the authentication of the main control unit by the authentication values for the number of divisions. A peripheral board authentication program that corrects the expected value when the process is performed.

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