JP6448222B2 - Reactor facility protection system, reactor facility, and reactor facility protection method - Google Patents

Description

Embodiments of the present invention, atomic Ro施 set protection system using a surveillance radar, to reactor facilities protection method using the reactor facilities and surveillance radar.

  In order to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants and other facilities, countermeasures against aircraft collisions are necessary. For example, in Japan, it is obliged to complete measures against collisions of large aircraft by July 2018 for nuclear power facilities for practical power generation.

  Civil aircraft air traffic control is performed by communication and response between the aircraft and the ground station. In recent years, the aircraft model and location information are accurately grasped by communication with the response device mounted on the aircraft, called a transponder. It is becoming possible. However, when a signal or response from an aircraft is interrupted due to terrorism or an accident, it is very difficult to track the wake, as in the case of accidents so far. Therefore, it is necessary to take measures against such a situation.

  For the monitoring of approaching marine vehicles, land vehicles, and aerial vehicles, a laser radar device is used to monitor the object to be recognized with a wide angle of view, check against the collation list, In such a case, a technique for photographing a specific recognition target object and issuing a warning is known (Patent Document 1).

JP 2005-208011 A

  The technology using the laser radar device described above determines whether or not the captured object is heading toward a facility such as a nuclear power plant, and measures such as stopping the nuclear reactor before the predicted arrival time, for example. Can be performed.

  However, when communication with the aircraft or response from the aircraft is interrupted due to terrorism or an accident, it is difficult to track the flight route. Under such circumstances, it has been difficult to detect in advance and warn of an aircraft that abnormally approaches an important facility such as a nuclear power plant.

Embodiments of the present invention has been made to solve such problems, and an object thereof is to ensure the safety of RuHara child Ro施 set that against the aircraft crash.

  Here, the flying body includes, for example, a manned or unmanned aircraft or an airship.

In order to achieve the above object, a nuclear reactor facility protection system according to the present embodiment includes a radar antenna that transmits radio waves to an airspace around a nuclear reactor facility including a nuclear reactor and receives reflected waves, and the reception of the radar antenna. A vehicle monitoring signal processing unit for processing a signal and outputting a plurality of flight parameters representing a flight state of the vehicle flying in the airspace; and a threat of a collision of the aircraft with the reactor facility based on the flight parameters calculating the degree of the threat determination unit which determines the threat level, if the threat level has increased, the signal for the safety measures at the nuclear reactor facility for collision of the aircraft, the path of the signal via a release element which prevents automatic output by the operation of the provided time delay elements for delaying the operation to take a predetermined time until the signal is outputted operator Characterized in that it comprises a safety treatment portion to force the.

Further, the nuclear reactor facility protection system according to the present embodiment includes a radar antenna that transmits radio waves to and receives reflected waves in an airspace around the nuclear reactor facility including the nuclear reactor , and processes a reception signal of the radar antenna to process the airspace. A vehicle monitoring signal processing unit that outputs a plurality of flight parameters representing a flight state of a flying vehicle flying through the aircraft, and calculating the degree of threat of the collision of the flying vehicle to the reactor facility based on the flight parameters, A threat determination unit for determining a threat level; and when the threat level becomes high, a signal for safety treatment in the nuclear reactor facility against the collision of the flying object is output as a signal provided in the path of the signal and safety treatment portion which via a release element which prevents automatic output output by the operation of the time delay element and the operator for delaying the operation to take a predetermined time to be Characterized in that it comprises a.

Further, this embodiment includes a reactor having a reactor core, and the reactor facility protection system to ensure the safety of the nuclear reactor for the collision of the aircraft, in a nuclear reactor facility comprises a, the reactor facilities protection system , A radar antenna that transmits radio waves to the airspace around the reactor facility and receives reflected waves, and air vehicle monitoring that processes a reception signal of the radar antenna and outputs a plurality of flight parameters representing the flight state of the aircraft A signal processing unit, a threat determination unit for calculating a threat level to the reactor facility by the flying object based on the value of the flight parameter, and determining a threat level; and when the threat level becomes high in, a signal for safety measures in the nuclear reactor facility for collision of the aircraft takes a predetermined time until the signal provided in the path of the signal is output Safety treatment unit and, reactor shutdown system for performing control rod inserted by the signal from the safety measure unit for outputting via a release element which prevents automatic output by the operation of the time delay element for delaying the operation and operator in It is characterized by having.

Further, the reactor facility protection method according to the present embodiment processes a received signal of a radar antenna that receives a reflected wave of a radio wave transmitted to an airspace around the reactor facility, and performs a plurality of flights of the flying object flying in the airspace. A radar use monitoring step for outputting a parameter, a threat determination step for calculating a threat level to the reactor facility by the flying object based on the flight parameter and determining a threat level, and a higher threat level. In the event of a collision, the signal for safety treatment at the nuclear reactor facility against the collision of the aircraft is delayed so that a predetermined time is required until the signal provided in the signal path is output. And a safety treatment step for outputting via a time delay element and a release element for preventing automatic output by the operation of the operator .

According to the embodiment of the present invention, the safety of a nuclear reactor facility against a vehicle collision can be ensured.

It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the facility protection system which concerns on 1st Embodiment. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the threat determination part of the facility protection system which concerns on 1st Embodiment. 1 is a conceptual side view showing a relationship between a facility protection system according to a first embodiment and an aircraft. 1 is a conceptual plan view showing a relationship between a facility protection system and an aircraft according to a first embodiment. It is a conceptual block diagram which shows the example of the interlock of the safety measure of the threat determination part of the facility protection system which concerns on 1st Embodiment, (a) is a low threat level, (b) is a threat level. Indicates the case where is high. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the facility protection method which concerns on 1st Embodiment. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the threat determination step of the facility protection method which concerns on 1st Embodiment. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the facility protection system which concerns on 2nd Embodiment. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the facility protection system which concerns on 3rd Embodiment.

  Hereinafter, a facility protection system and a facility protection method according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings, taking as an example a case where the facility is a nuclear reactor facility. Here, the same or similar parts are denoted by common reference numerals, and redundant description is omitted.

[First Embodiment]
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a nuclear reactor facility protection system 100 using a monitoring radar according to the first embodiment. A reactor facility protection system 100 using a monitoring radar includes a radar device 10, a threat determination unit 20, and a safety treatment unit 30. The reactor facility protection system 100 using a monitoring radar is a system for ensuring the safety of the reactor facility 200 against a collision of an aircraft with the reactor facility 200 (FIGS. 3 and 4). Hereinafter, a case where the flying object is an aircraft will be described as an example. As described above, each embodiment can be applied not only to the nuclear reactor facility 200 but also to other important facilities.

  The radar apparatus 10 includes a radar antenna 11, a radar control unit 12, an aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13, and a storage unit 15. The radar antenna 11 transmits radio waves to the airspace around the nuclear reactor facility 200 and receives reflected waves. The radar control unit 12 controls the direction of the radar antenna 11, the direction and angle of radio waves to be transmitted and received, the intensity of radio waves, and the like. The aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13 processes the reception signal of the radar antenna 11 and outputs each flight parameter of the aircraft. The flight parameter is an item indicating the flight state of the aircraft. The storage unit 15 stores information such as flight parameters and radar video. The radar apparatus 10 may be a search radar, for example.

  As will be described later, the threat determination unit 20 calculates the threat level of the collision of the aircraft with the reactor facility based on the flight parameters, and determines the threat level.

  The safety treatment unit 30 includes an alarm output unit 31, a display unit 32, a reactor shutdown signal transmission unit 35, and a reactor building ventilation system closure signal transmission unit 36. The alarm output unit 31 outputs an alarm signal to, for example, the central control panel when there is a threat. The display unit 32 displays information related to the threat. The reactor shutdown signal transmitter 35 outputs a reactor shutdown signal to the reactor shutdown system 201. The reactor building ventilation system closing signal transmitter 36 outputs a closing signal to the reactor building ventilation system 202. The safety treatment unit 30 outputs a signal for performing safety treatment in the nuclear reactor facility including the treatment leading to the shutdown of the nuclear reactor according to the threat level determined by the threat determination unit 20. In addition, when this embodiment is applied to an important facility other than a nuclear facility, the safety treatment unit 30 provides an evacuation instruction to a person in the facility in addition to the ventilation system closing signal and the warning signal as described above. It can be configured to output a signal.

  FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of the threat determination unit 20 of the reactor facility protection system 100 using the monitoring radar according to the first embodiment. The threat determination unit 20 includes an initial setting unit 20a, each comparison unit that compares each flight parameter with a reference range, a TL value calculation unit 28, and a threat level determination unit 29. The initial setting unit 20a resets the value of each flight parameter corresponding to each comparison unit described later to an initial value such as 0, for example.

  Each comparison unit includes an altitude comparison unit 21, a descent rate comparison unit 22, a course comparison unit 23, a speed comparison unit 24, a course direction acceleration comparison unit 25, and a turning direction acceleration comparison unit 26, each of which is a flight parameter. The descent rate, the course, the speed, the course direction acceleration, and the turning direction acceleration are compared with the reference range.

  Here, FIG. 3 is a conceptual side view showing the relationship between the nuclear reactor facility protection system 100 and the aircraft. FIG. 4 is a conceptual plan view. The radar antenna 11 is installed on the roof of the building. If the surrounding airspace can be seen, the radar antenna 11 may be provided on the ground or on a hill.

  The altitude comparison unit 21 compares the altitude of the flight parameters with the reference region. The reference area is an area of a predetermined altitude H1 [m] or higher as indicated by A1 in FIG. 3, for example. If it is less than H1, it is considered to have deviated from the reference area.

  The descent rate comparison unit 22 compares the descent rate of the flight parameters with the reference region. The reference area is an area where the descent rate is within Δh2 [m / min], for example, as indicated by A2 in FIG. When the rate of descent exceeds Δh2 [m / min], it is considered that the vehicle has deviated from the reference region.

  The course comparison unit 23 compares the course of the flight parameters with the reference area. The reference region is a region that does not include the nuclear reactor facility 200 within a predetermined range [deg] from the center in the course direction, for example, as indicated by A3 for the course of the aircraft F2 in FIG. When the nuclear reactor facility 200 is included within a predetermined range [deg] from the center in the course direction, it is regarded as deviating from the reference range.

  The speed comparison unit 24 compares the speed of the flight parameters with the reference area. The reference region is that the speed [m / sec] in the course direction is within a predetermined range. When the speed [m / sec] in the course direction is not within the predetermined range, it is regarded as deviating from the reference range.

The heading direction acceleration comparison unit 25 compares the heading direction acceleration of the flight parameters with the reference region. The reference region is that the acceleration [m / sec ² ] in the course direction is within a predetermined range, for example, as indicated by A4 for the acceleration of the aircraft F4 in FIG. When the acceleration [m / sec ² ] in the course direction is not within the predetermined range, it is regarded as deviating from the reference range.

The turning direction acceleration comparison unit 26 compares the heading direction acceleration among the flight parameters with the reference region. The reference area is that the acceleration [m / sec ² ] in the turning direction is within a predetermined range, for example, as indicated by A5 for the acceleration of the aircraft F3 in FIG. When the acceleration [m / sec ² ] in the turning direction is not within the predetermined range, it is regarded as deviating from the reference range.

  In each comparison unit, a value set in advance according to the degree of deviation from the reference range obtained for each flight parameter is used as a determination variable corresponding to each flight parameter, Ah, Af, Ac, Av, Aac, and Grant to Aat. For example, when the flight parameter is a course, a larger value is assigned to Ac as the center direction of the course is closer to the reactor facility 200.

The TL value calculation unit 28 calculates a threat level determination index TL based on each determination variable obtained by each comparison unit. Specifically, the threat level determination index TL is calculated by the following equation (1).
TL = KhAh + KfAf + KcAc + KvAv + KacAac + KatAat
... (1)
Here, Ah, Af, Ac, Av, Aac, and Aat are weighting factors for Ah, Af, Ac, Av, Aac, and Aat, respectively. The weighting coefficient is set in consideration of the degree of contribution of flight parameters having different characteristics with respect to the threat to the nuclear facility 200 of the flying object.

The threat level determination index TL is not limited to a linear sum of determination constants as in Expression (1). For example, the threat level determination index TL is calculated as the magnitude of a vector sum of vectors obtained by considering each determination constant as an independent vector value and multiplying each determination constant by a weight coefficient as in the following equation (2). Good.
TL = √ (KhAh ² + KfAf ² + KcAc ²
+ KvAv ² + KacAac ² + KatAat ² ) (2)
Alternatively, the threat level determination index TL may be calculated using another function.

  The threat level determination unit 29 determines the threat level based on the value of the threat level determination index TL. In the present embodiment, two threat levels are shown, but three or more threat levels may be used.

  FIG. 5 is a conceptual block diagram illustrating an example of the safety measure interlock of the threat determination unit 20, where (a) illustrates a case where the threat level is low and (b) illustrates a case where the threat level is high. . That is, a case where the threat level determined by the threat level determination unit 29 is divided into two categories, high and low.

  As shown in FIG. 5A, when the threat level is determined to be low by the threat level determination unit 29, monitoring information from the radar apparatus 10 is displayed on the display unit 32, and an alarm is issued from a central control panel (not shown), for example. Output an alarm signal to emit. The operator of the nuclear reactor facility 200 continuously monitors the status of the target aircraft when an alarm is issued from the central control panel.

  As the threat level increases, the operator can manually shut down the reactor by operating the reactor stop button on the surface of the central control panel. Further, in order to prevent the fuel scattered from the aircraft from flowing into the reactor building from outside the reactor building (not shown) and causing a fire, the reactor building ventilation system closing signal transmitter 36 is operated to An isolation part such as a damper of the reactor building ventilation system 202 (FIG. 1) that allows communication between the air inside and outside the building can be closed. Alternatively, an operation for shifting the nuclear reactor to the safe shutdown state can be performed.

  A search radar can usually detect a flying object at a distance of about 100 km. For example, when the speed of the flying object is 200 km / h, the arrival time is 0.5 hours (= 100/200), that is, 30 minutes, assuming that the flying distance is straight. Further, the circumferential turning period of the search radar can be appropriately set to a time of usually several seconds or longer. For example, when the search radar has a circumferential turning period of 4 seconds, the number of turns is 15 times per minute, and a sufficiently long time is secured for data processing in the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13. The time interval can be sufficiently short to track. In addition, the time required for performing a human operation is short, and further, in the case of automatic signal transmission when it is determined that the threat level described later is high, the time required is about 15 times / minute. The number of turns is sufficiently shorter than the number of turns required for tracking.

  As described above, when the threat level determination unit 29 determines that the threat level is low, outputting the alarm signal to the central control panel results in the reactor shutdown through human operation. In other words, a safety measure of manual segmentation is performed.

  As shown in FIG. 5 (b), when the threat level determination unit 29 determines that the threat level is high, the signal that the threat level output from the threat determination unit 20 is high indicates that the reactor shutdown system and Emitted to the reactor building ventilation system. However, a time delay element and a release element are provided in the signal path.

  The time delay element is an element that delays the operation so that it takes a predetermined time until the signal is output to the reactor shutdown system 201 (FIG. 1) after the signal that the threat level is high is input. is there. When the operator of the nuclear reactor facility operates the reactor shutdown release element of the central control panel, the release element prevents automatic output to the reactor shutdown, and the atomic level due to the high threat level even after a predetermined time has elapsed. No furnace shutdown signal is issued.

  FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the nuclear reactor facility protection method. As a very general procedure, radar use monitoring using the radar apparatus 10 is performed (step S100), then threat determination is performed by the threat determination unit 20 (step S200), and safety measures are performed based on the result of the threat determination. The safety treatment of automatic classification for the safety of the reactor facility 200 is performed by the unit 30 (step S300).

  In the radar use monitoring step (step S100), first, transmission / reception by the radar antenna 11 is performed (step S110). Next, the aircraft signal obtained in step S110 is signal-processed to obtain flight parameters (step S120). Next, the obtained flight parameters are stored and stored (step S130).

  Next, as will be described later, the threat determination unit 20 performs threat determination (step S200). In the safety measure step S300 after the threat determination step S200, it is first confirmed whether or not the threat level is high (step S310). If the threat level is high (step S310: YES), automatic classification safety measures are taken (step S330). On the other hand, if the threat level is not high (NO in step S310), that is, if the threat level is low, the safety action of manual classification is performed (step S320).

  FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the threat determination step. First, all determination variables, that is, Ah, Af, Ac, Av, Aac, and Aat are set to initial values such as 0 (step S201). Next, the value of the determination variable is determined by comparing with the reference range of each flight parameter, that is, the range in which the flight state can be regarded as normal as follows.

  First, it is determined whether the altitude of the aircraft exceeds the altitude reference value, and if it exceeds (YES in step S211), the process proceeds to the next. If not exceeded (NO in step S211), a value set in advance according to the degree of deviation from the reference range, for example, P1 is assigned as the value of the determination variable Ah.

  Next, it is determined whether the descent rate of the aircraft is less than the descent rate reference value. If it is less (YES in step S221), the process proceeds to the next. When the value is equal to or larger than the reference value (NO in step S221), a value set in advance, for example, P2 is assigned to the value of the determination variable Af according to the degree of deviation from the reference range.

  Next, it is determined whether the course of the aircraft is out of the course reference range toward the nuclear reactor facility 200, and if it is outside (YES in step S231), the process proceeds to the next. In the case where it is within the course reference range toward the nuclear reactor facility 200 (NO in step S231), a value set in advance, for example, P3 is given according to the degree to which the value of the determination variable Ac approaches the center of the reference range.

  Next, it is determined whether the speed of the aircraft is within the reference range of speed. If it is within the reference range (step S241 YES), the process proceeds to the next. When it deviates from the reference range (step S241 NO), a value set in advance, for example, P4 is assigned to the value of the determination variable Av according to the degree of deviation from the reference range.

  Next, it is determined whether the acceleration in the course of the aircraft is within the reference range. If the acceleration is within the reference range (YES in step S251), the process proceeds to the next. When it deviates from the reference range (step S251 NO), a value set in advance, for example, P5 is assigned to the value of the determination variable Aac according to the degree of deviation from the reference range.

  Next, it is determined whether the acceleration in the turning direction of the aircraft is within the reference range. If the acceleration is within the reference range (step S261 YES), the process proceeds to the next. When the value deviates from the reference range (NO in step S261), a value set in advance, for example, P6 is assigned to the value of the determination variable Aat according to the degree of deviation from the reference range.

  The order from step S211 to step S261 does not matter. That is, the values of the respective decision variables can be determined independently of each other.

  Next, the threat level determination index TL is calculated in the TL value calculation unit 28 based on the determination variable regarding each flight parameter (step S270). If all flight parameters are within the reference range, the initial value of each determination variable is set to 0, for example, the value of the threat level determination index TL remains 0.

  Next, the threat level determination unit 29 determines the threat level based on the value of the threat level determination index TL (step S280).

  As described above, according to the present embodiment, by searching for an aircraft such as an aircraft at an early stage and continuously determining the threat level, it is possible to ensure the safety of the reactor facility against a collision according to the threat level. Can be treated. As a result, the safety of the nuclear reactor facility can be ensured against the collision of the flying object.

[Second Embodiment]
FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing a configuration of the nuclear reactor facility protection system 101 using the monitoring radar according to the second embodiment. This embodiment is a modification of the first embodiment. The reactor facility protection system 101 in the second embodiment has an external signal input unit 41. The threat determination unit 20p further includes a flight plan comparison unit 27.

  The external signal input unit 41 is information about the aircraft from facilities such as airports and landings, information from radar devices installed at other nuclear reactor facilities, or information from external systems such as weather data from weather stations and the Japan Meteorological Agency. As input. Examples of the external signal include information on the contents of flight plans such as flight plans for aircraft in the airspace around the nuclear reactor facility 200, information on flying objects detected by other radar facilities, and the like.

  Of the external signals received by the external signal input unit 41, information on the flying object detected by another radar facility is input to the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13. The aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13 performs flight of the aircraft in the adjacent airspace based on the information of the aircraft in the adjacent airspace outside the selfairspace centered on the radar antenna 11 that can be detected by the radar antenna 11 and adjacent to the self airspace. The parameter is also output.

  Of the external signal received by the external signal input unit 41, information related to the flight plan of the aircraft is input to the threat determination unit 20p. In the flight plan comparison unit 27 of the threat determination unit 20p, the range that is not considered abnormal even if it deviates normally around the route based on the flight plan is compared with the route of the aircraft as a reference range. When the route of the aircraft is within the reference range, the value of the determination variable Ap is kept at 0. If the route of the aircraft is not within the reference range, that is, if the route deviates from the route based on the flight plan, the greater the degree of departure, the greater the value given to the determination variable Ap.

  The TL value calculation unit 28 of the threat determination unit 20p calculates a threat level determination index TL including a value obtained by multiplying Ap by a weighting coefficient Kp. When deviating from the route based on the flight plan, it cannot be said that the flight is normal. Therefore, by setting the weighting factor to a large value, the threat level can be increased and the monitoring can be strengthened.

  As described above, according to the present embodiment, it is possible to widen the monitoring airspace, focus on the aircraft deviating from the flight plan, and appropriately perform the treatment in the safety treatment unit 30.

[Third Embodiment]
FIG. 9 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a reactor facility protection system 102 using a monitoring radar according to the third embodiment. This embodiment is a modification of the first embodiment. The nuclear reactor facility protection system 102 in this embodiment includes radar devices 10 a, 10 b, and 10 c instead of the radar device 10. Moreover, it has the display part 53 and the memory | storage part 54 of the process result of the process part 52 for weather observation mentioned later.

  The radar apparatus 10a includes a radar antenna 11a and a radar control unit 12a. The radar apparatus 10b includes a radar antenna 11b and a radar control unit 12b. The radar device 10a and the radar device 10b are devices having the same configuration, and have a relationship of being a use machine and a standby machine with respect to aircraft monitoring.

  The radar apparatus 10 c includes a switching unit 51, an aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13, and a weather observation processing unit 52. The aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13 processes a signal from a selected one of the radar device 10a or the radar device 10b using a signal of an aircraft or the like as a target signal. The meteorological observation processing unit 52 processes a signal from a selected one of the radar device 10a or the radar device 10b using a cloud-related signal or the like as a target signal.

  The switching unit 51 selects the radar device 10a and the radar device 10b for aircraft monitoring. The selection is switched periodically. The switching unit 51 transmits the signal selected for aircraft monitoring to the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13. Further, the signal not selected for aircraft monitoring is transmitted to the weather observation processing unit 52.

  In this embodiment configured as described above, by providing two radar antennas 11a and 11b and radar control units 12a and 12b that can be backed up with each other, the reliability of the monitoring function is ensured, and Can be used effectively for weather observation.

  In the present embodiment, when a flying object that poses a threat to the reactor facility 200 is specified, the radar antenna 11a or 11b used for weather observation is dedicated to tracking the specified flying object. It can also be set as the structure switched so that it may be used. In this case, the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13 is configured to be able to process signals from both the two radar devices 10a and 10b at the same time, and the weather observation processing unit 52 may be either the radar device 10a or the radar device 10b. A signal from either one can be processed. That is, the switching unit 51 always inputs at least one of the two radar devices 10a and 10b as a received signal to the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13, and the weather observation processing unit 52 when the threat level increases. The input of the reception signal to is stopped, and both the two radar devices 10a and 10b are input to the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13 as reception signals. By doing in this way, when the threat level with respect to the nuclear reactor facility is increased, it is possible to perform a search and threat determination at a short time interval using both the two radar devices 10a and 10b.

  Further, both the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13 and the meteorological observation processing unit 52 can be configured so that signals from both the radar device 10a and the radar device 10b can be processed simultaneously. In this case, the switching unit 5 receives the output from the radar antenna 11a and the radar antenna 11b of each of the radar device 10a and the radar device 10b as a received signal to at least one of the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13 and the weather observation processing unit 52. It can be switched to be input. With this configuration, when the importance of aircraft monitoring is high, such as when the threat level is high, both outputs from the radar antennas 11a and 11b of the two radar devices 10a and 10b are sent to the flying object monitoring signal processing unit 13. When a search is performed at a short time interval and a threat is determined, or when the threat level is low and there is a sudden change in weather conditions, the radar antennas 11a of the two radar devices 10a and 10b and It is also possible to perform weather observation with high accuracy by inputting both outputs from 11b to the weather observation processing unit 52 as received signals. During normal operation, one of the outputs from the radar antenna 11a and the radar antenna 11b of the radar apparatus 10a and the radar apparatus 10b is switched to the aircraft monitoring signal processing unit 13 and the other is input to the weather observation processing unit 52 as a received signal. Thus, it is possible to simultaneously perform aircraft monitoring and weather observation, and as described above, the reliability of the monitoring function can be ensured by the two radar antennas 11a and 11b and the radar control units 12a and 12b that can back up each other. it can.

[Other Embodiments]
As mentioned above, although some embodiment of this invention was described, these embodiment is shown as an example and is not intending limiting the range of invention.

  For example, as flight parameters, the altitude, the descent rate, the course, the course direction acceleration, and the turning direction acceleration are used in the first embodiment, and the course is further compared with the planned course in the second embodiment. Shown as an example. The flight parameters are not limited to this, and may include, for example, the state of equipment such as weapons from the viewpoint of threats to facilities.

  Also, with regard to safety measures, in the embodiment, the case where the reactor is shut down and the damper of the ventilation system of the reactor building is closed is shown as an example, but the present invention is not limited to this. There may be other actions to respond to threats to the reactor facility, such as isolation of the containment vessel, activation of engineering safety equipment, etc.

  Moreover, you may combine the characteristic of each embodiment. Furthermore, these embodiments can be implemented in various other forms, and various omissions, replacements, and changes can be made without departing from the scope of the invention.

  These embodiments and their modifications are included in the scope and gist of the invention, and are also included in the invention described in the claims and the equivalents thereof.

  DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10, 10a, 10b, 10c ... Radar apparatus, 11, 11a, 11b ... Radar antenna, 12, 12a, 12b ... Radar control part, 13 ... Aircraft monitoring signal processing part (flying object monitoring signal processing part), 15 ... Memory | storage part 20 ... Threat determination unit, 20a ... Initial setting unit, 20p ... Threat determination unit, 21 ... Altitude comparison unit, 22 ... Descent rate comparison unit, 23 ... Course comparison unit, 24 ... Speed comparison unit, 25 ... Course direction acceleration comparison , 26 ... Turning direction acceleration comparison unit, 27 ... Flight plan comparison unit, 28 ... TL value calculation unit, 29 ... Threat level determination unit, 30 ... Safety treatment unit, 31 ... Alarm output unit, 32 ... Display unit, 35 ... Reactor shutdown signal transmitter, 36 ... Reactor building ventilation system shutdown signal transmitter, 41 ... External signal input unit, 51 ... Switching unit, 52 ... Meteorological observation processing unit, 53 ... Display unit, 54 ... Storage unit, 100 , 101, 102 Nuclear reactor facility protection system, 200 ... nuclear reactor facility, 201 ... reactor shutdown system, 202 ... the reactor building ventilation system

Claims (10)

A radar antenna that transmits radio waves to the airspace around the reactor facility equipped with the reactor and receives reflected waves;
A flying object monitoring signal processing unit that processes a reception signal of the radar antenna and outputs a plurality of flight parameters representing a flight state of a flying object flying in the airspace;
A threat determination unit for calculating a threat level to the reactor facility by the flying object based on the flight parameters, and determining a threat level;
When the threat level becomes high, it takes a predetermined time for a signal for safety treatment at the nuclear reactor facility against the collision of the aircraft to be output before the signal provided in the signal path is output. A safety treatment unit that outputs via a time delay element that delays the operation and a release element that prevents automatic output by the operation of the operator ,
A reactor facility protection system comprising: The reactor facility protection system according to claim 1, wherein the flight parameter item includes any one of altitude, descent rate, course, speed, course direction acceleration, and turning direction acceleration. The threat determination unit
Each of the flight parameters is included in the reference range set in advance or compared with the reference range, and a value set in advance according to the degree of deviation from the reference range is assigned to the determination variable corresponding to the flight parameter A comparison unit to
A TL value calculation unit that calculates a threat level determination index based on the value of each of the determination variables obtained by each of the comparison units;
A threat level determination unit for determining the threat level according to the value of the threat level determination index;
The reactor facility protection system according to claim 1, wherein the reactor facility protection system is provided. The reactor facility protection system according to claim 3, wherein the threat level determination index is a sum of values obtained by multiplying the values of the determination variables by weighting factors corresponding to the determination variables. 4. The nuclear reactor according to claim 3, wherein the threat level determination index is a square root of a sum of values obtained by multiplying a square of a value of each of the determination variables by a weighting factor corresponding to each flight parameter. 5. Facility protection system. Prior Symbol safe treatment unit, if the threat level is output, any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that outputs a warning to alert the operator of the nuclear reactor facility The reactor facility protection system according to one item. An external signal input unit for receiving external information including the route of the flying object in the airspace around the nuclear reactor facility from the outside of the nuclear reactor facility;
The reactor facility protection system according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the threat determination unit uses the external information for threat determination . A first radar antenna and a second radar antenna for searching for airspace around a nuclear reactor facility comprising a nuclear reactor;
A flying object monitoring signal processing unit configured to process at least one of the reception signals of the first radar antenna and the second radar antenna and output a flight parameter of the flying object;
A weather observation processing unit configured to process at least one of the reception signals of the first radar antenna and the second radar antenna and to output a weather condition parameter around the nuclear reactor facility;
A threat determination unit for calculating a threat level to the reactor facility by the flying object based on the flight parameters, and determining a threat level;
When the threat level becomes high, it takes a predetermined time for a signal for safety treatment at the nuclear reactor facility against the collision of the aircraft to be output before the signal provided in the signal path is output. A safety treatment section that outputs via a time delay element that delays the operation and a release element that blocks automatic output by the operation of the operator,
A switching unit configured to be able to input each output of the first radar antenna and the second radar antenna as a received signal to at least one of the flying object monitoring signal processing unit and the weather observation processing unit;
A reactor facility protection system comprising: A nuclear reactor having a core;
A reactor facility protection system for ensuring the safety of the reactor against a vehicle collision;
In a nuclear reactor facility comprising
The reactor facility protection system includes:
A radar antenna that transmits radio waves to the airspace around the reactor facility and receives reflected waves;
A vehicle monitoring signal processing unit that processes a reception signal of the radar antenna and outputs a plurality of flight parameters representing a flight state of the vehicle;
A threat determination unit for calculating a threat level to the reactor facility by the flying object based on the value of the flight parameter and determining a threat level;
When the threat level becomes high, it takes a predetermined time for a signal for safety treatment at the nuclear reactor facility against the collision of the aircraft to be output before the signal provided in the signal path is output. A safety treatment section that outputs via a time delay element that delays the operation and a release element that blocks automatic output by the operation of the operator ,
A reactor shutdown system that inserts a control rod according to the signal from the safety treatment section;
A nuclear reactor facility characterized by comprising: Radar usage monitoring step of outputting the flight parameters of multiple aircraft to fly the airspace processes the received signal of the radar antenna which receives a reflected wave of the radio wave sent to the airspace surrounding the nuclear reactor facility,
A threat determination step for calculating a threat level to the reactor facility by the flying object based on the flight parameters and determining a threat level;
When the threat level becomes high, it takes a predetermined time for a signal for safety treatment at the nuclear reactor facility against the collision of the aircraft to be output before the signal provided in the signal path is output. A safety action step that outputs via a time delay element that delays the operation and a release element that prevents automatic output by the operation of the operator ,
Reactor facility protection method characterized by comprising :

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