JP7435007B2 - Authenticity determination terminal and program - Google Patents

Description

The present invention relates to an authentication terminal used to determine the authenticity of an IC card and a program therefor.

In recent years, the shortage of the working population due to the declining birthrate and aging of the population has become more serious, and the number of foreign workers is increasing to compensate for the shortage. For example, a large number of foreigners work in convenience stores in the city center.

In order for foreigners to work, they must have a specified work qualification, and in order to prove their work qualification, the government issues a residence card and requires them to carry it with them at all times. Employers request the presentation of a residence card to confirm whether or not they have the specified work qualifications, but recently there has been an increase in the number of cases of residence cards being forged, so a system that can be used to determine the authenticity of residence cards is needed. is desired.

For example, a residence card is an IC card that has an IC chip inside, and counterfeit cards often do not have an IC chip or have a dummy IC chip, so the IC chip is used to determine the authenticity of a residence card. It is effective to read the

Additionally, counterfeiting of ticket information is also common, such as printing fake ticket information using an inkjet printer or the like and pasting it onto a residence card. Therefore, it is also effective to detect counterfeiting of the face of a residence card using an image of the face of the card, and Patent Document 1 discloses an example of detecting forgery of the face of an IC card using a scanned image of the face of an IC card. .

Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2017-208767

If you bend the IC card near the IC chip or apply a strong impact to the IC card, the IC chip may be destroyed, and in this case, the IC chip cannot be read even if it is a legitimate residence card.

Therefore, if the authenticity is determined based on the IC chip reading results as described above, such a legitimate residence card will be considered fake, and there is a possibility that foreign workers with regular employment status will be excluded. be. Even when the authenticity is determined using an image of the face of the card, if the face of the card is stained or the like, a legitimate residence card may be considered a fake, and there is a problem similar to the above.

The present invention has been made in view of the above problems, and an object of the present invention is to provide an authentication terminal etc. that is useful for suitably determining the authenticity of an IC card.

A first invention for solving the above-mentioned problems is an authentication terminal used for determining the authenticity of an IC card having an IC chip, in which a reading section of the authentication terminal reads predetermined information from the IC chip. the IC card is a residence card; , Obtain a residence number by performing OCR processing on the captured image of the IC card, and send this as a PIN to the IC chip to receive the face image of the IC card stored in the IC chip. Then, the character information at a predetermined position obtained by performing OCR processing on both the photographed image of the IC card and the face image of the IC card stored in the IC chip is compared and verified to determine whether they are different. The authentication terminal is characterized in that when a forgery is detected, the face of the IC card is determined to be false .

The object of authenticity determination by the authenticity determination terminal of the present invention is a residence card, and the use of a forged residence card can be prevented.

It is preferable that the authentication terminal is a mobile terminal.
In the present invention, the above-mentioned processing can be realized by downloading an application to a mobile terminal such as a smartphone, and the present invention can be introduced without making a large capital investment, making it highly popular.

Preferably, the predetermined information is information that can be read from the IC chip without a password. The predetermined information is, for example, an application identifier stored in the IC chip.
Processing can be easily performed by using information that can be read from the IC chip without a password to determine the reading result. An example of this information is an AID (Application Identifier). For example, if someone forges a residence card by pasting it on a driver's license, the AID will not correspond to the residence card. (corresponding to a driver's license) can detect forgery.

The authenticity of the face of the IC card can be obtained, for example, from the result of forgery detection using the resolution of the print on the face of the IC card. Alternatively, it may be obtained from the result of forgery detection using the style of characters in the pre-printed portion of the IC card, or it may be obtained from the result of forgery detection based on the presence or absence of contradiction in character information on the face of the IC card. It is also possible to obtain the result of forgery detection by comparing character information on the face of the IC card with data in the IC chip.
By using these forgery detection methods, for example, when a forgery is carried out by pasting an object with fake information printed on it on top of an IC card, it is possible to suitably detect the forgery of the ticket using a photographed image of the IC card. .

A second invention is an authenticity determination terminal that uses a computer terminal to determine the authenticity of an IC card having an IC chip, and determines whether predetermined information can be read from the IC chip by a reading section of the authenticity determination terminal. and an acquisition means for acquiring the authenticity of the face of the IC card using a photographed image of the IC card , the IC card being a residence card, and the acquisition means The resident number is obtained by performing OCR processing on the photographed image, and this is sent to the IC chip as a PIN to receive the face image of the IC card stored in the IC chip. Compare and match the character information at predetermined positions obtained by performing OCR processing on both the photographed image of the card and the face image of the IC card stored in the IC chip, and if they are different, it will be counterfeited. This is a program for functioning as an authentication terminal that detects the IC card and deems the face of the IC card to be false .

According to the present invention, it is possible to provide an authentication terminal and the like useful for suitably determining the authenticity of an IC card.

The figure which shows the terminal 1 for authenticity determination. The figure which shows the hardware configuration of the terminal 1 for authenticity determination. The figure which shows the functional structure of the terminal 1 for authenticity determination. FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an IC card 10. FIG. 1 is a flowchart showing a process executed by the authenticity determination terminal 1. An example of a shooting screen of the IC card 10. FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating detection of forgery on the face of the IC card 10. FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating detection of forgery on the face of the IC card 10.

Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail based on the drawings.

(1. Authenticity determination terminal 1)
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an authentication terminal 1 according to an embodiment of the present invention. The authentication terminal 1 is a mobile terminal such as a smartphone or a tablet terminal, and reads the IC chip 20 of the IC card 10, and also acquires the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10 using a photographed image of the face of the IC card 10. The results can be used to determine the authenticity of the IC card 10.

FIG. 2 is a diagram showing the hardware configuration of the authentication terminal 1. As shown in FIG. 2, the authentication terminal 1 includes a control unit 101, a storage unit 102, a display unit 103, an input unit 104, a communication unit 105, a camera 106, an audio input/output unit 107, a reading unit 108, etc. This can be realized by computer terminals connected to each other. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and various configurations can be adopted as appropriate.

The control unit 101 is composed of a CPU, ROM, RAM, etc. The CPU calls a program related to processing of the authentication terminal 1 stored in the storage unit 102 or a storage medium such as ROM into a work area on the RAM and executes the program. ROM is a nonvolatile memory that permanently stores programs such as the boot program and BIOS, as well as data. The RAM is a volatile memory that temporarily holds programs and data loaded from the storage unit 102, ROM, etc., and also includes a work area used by the control unit 101 to perform various processes.

The storage unit 102 is a flash memory or the like, and stores programs to be executed by the authentication terminal 1 during processing to be described later, data necessary for program execution, an OS, and the like. These programs and data are read and executed by the control unit 101 as necessary. The storage unit 102 stores a dedicated application program for executing processing described later with reference to FIG. 5.

The display unit 103 has a display device such as a liquid crystal panel, and a touch panel is provided as an input unit 104 for inputting to the authentication terminal 1.

The communication unit 105 is a communication interface that mediates communication via a network, and communicates with an external server or the like.

The camera 106 is a high-resolution area camera that includes an optical lens, an image sensor such as a CCD (Charge Coupled Device) or a CMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor), an A/D (Analog/Digital) converter, and the like. The camera 106 photoelectrically converts a subject image input through an optical lens using an image sensor, and generates an analog image signal. The analog image signal is then converted into digital image data by the A/D converter.

The audio input/output unit 107 includes a microphone used for inputting audio and a speaker for outputting audio.

The reading unit 108 communicates with the IC chip 20 of the IC card 10 using near field communication technology such as NFC (Near Field Communication), thereby reading various information stored in the IC chip 20 into the IC. It is received from the chip 20 and read. In this embodiment, the IC chip 20 is built into the IC card 10, and non-contact communication is performed with the reading unit 108.

(2. Functions of the authentication terminal 1)
FIG. 3 is a diagram showing the functional configuration of the authentication terminal 1. The authenticity determination terminal 1 includes a determination means 111, an acquisition means 112, and the like.

The determining means 111 determines whether the control unit 101 of the authentication terminal 1 has been able to read predetermined information from the IC chip 20 of the IC card 10 using the reading unit 108. This information will be described later.

The acquisition means 112 is for the control unit 101 of the authentication terminal 1 to acquire the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10 using a photographed image of the face of the IC card 10 taken by the camera 106.

(3. IC card 10)
The IC card 10 is a card medium whose authenticity is to be determined in this embodiment, and an IC chip 20 is provided therein. In this embodiment, the IC card 10 is a residence card, but the present invention is not limited to this. As long as it has the IC chip 20, it may be a driver's license, my number card, special permanent resident card, or the like.

FIG. 4 is a diagram schematically showing the IC card 10 (residence card), and is schematically shown with some of the face information of the IC card 10 omitted.

Various face information is printed on the IC card 10. For example, for a residence card, the card issuance country 11, residence number 12, date of birth of the card holder 13, facial image 14, status of residence 15, and work restrictions. Examples of the card face information include presence/absence 16, card issue date 17, and expiration date 18.

Among these, residence number 12, date of birth 13, face image 14, status of residence 15, presence or absence of work restrictions 16, date of issue 17, expiration date 18, etc. are on-demand information that differs depending on the individual IC card 10.

On the other hand, the fields for residence number 12, date of birth 13, status of residence 15, presence or absence of work restrictions 16, date of issue 17, and expiration date 18 are "Number", "Date of Birth", "Status of Residence", and "Work Restrictions". Characters such as "Issuance date", "Issuance date", "This card is...", card issuing country 11 ("Japanese government"), etc. are commonly used for each IC card 10. These characters are preformed in fixed positions on the card substrate before printing the on-demand information and are called pre-printed portions.

The IC card 10 is manufactured by printing the above-mentioned on-demand information on a card base material on which the above-mentioned pre-printed portion is formed in advance. The structure of the on-demand information and pre-printed portions differs depending on the type of IC card 10, such as a residence card, driver's license, My Number card, or special permanent resident card.

(4. Processing of authentication terminal 1)
FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing the processing executed by the authentication terminal 1. Each step in FIG. 5 is executed by the control unit 101 of the authentication terminal 1 controlling each part of the authentication terminal 1.

In this embodiment, the user first operates the authentication terminal 1 to launch a dedicated application program stored in the storage unit 102 . Then, the authentication terminal 1 displays a menu screen (not shown) on the display section 103, activates the reading section 108 according to the user's selection on the menu screen, and reads the information stored in the IC chip 20 of the IC card 10. Read predetermined information (S1).

Various types of information are stored in the IC chip 20, but highly confidential information such as information about the card holder requires a PIN number to read. On the other hand, the IC chip 20 also stores information that can be read without a PIN code, and in this embodiment, from the viewpoint of ease of processing, the above-mentioned predetermined information is stored that can be read without a PIN code. Use information. One example is the AID (application identifier) of the IC chip 20. The AID varies depending on the type of IC card 10, and is transmitted from the IC chip 20 to the reader 108 when communication is established between the reader 108 and the IC chip 20.

The authenticity determination terminal 1 determines whether or not a predetermined AID corresponding to the residence card could be read from the IC chip 20 as a reading result of the IC chip 20 (S2), and displays the determination result on the display unit 103. Display (S3).

The determination results include whether or not the predetermined AID could be read from the IC chip 20, and if the predetermined AID could not be read from the IC chip 20, it is determined whether or not the AID was read from the IC chip 20 itself. It is also possible to determine and display whether the AID was not read from the IC chip 20 or whether the AID read from the IC chip 20 was not the predetermined AID. In the former case, there may be reasons such as the IC chip 20 is broken or the IC chip 20 does not exist, and in the latter case, the IC chip 20 may be compatible with a type of IC card other than a residence card such as a driver's license. It is possible that it exists.

Next, the authentication terminal 1 prompts the user to take a picture of the face of the IC card 10 by displaying instructions on the display unit 103 or the like. The authentication terminal 1 activates the camera 106 in response to the user's operation and photographs the face of the IC card 10 (S4).

FIG. 6 is an example of the photographic screen of the IC card 10 at this time. In this embodiment, the user is prompted to place the IC card 10 within a predetermined frame 1031 displayed on the display unit 103 using the above-mentioned instructions, and then the IC card 10 is photographed.

When the authentication terminal 1 photographs the IC card 10, it detects forgery on the face of the IC card 10 using the photographed image of the IC card 10 (S5), thereby acquiring the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10. (S6), and displays the authenticity of the face on the display section 103 (S7). The forgery detection in S5 will be described later.

The user can refer to the display contents in S3 and S7 and determine the authenticity of the IC card 10 by himself/herself. For example, even when a predetermined AID cannot be read from the IC chip 20, the IC card 10 is not determined to be false, but if the face of the IC card 10 is determined to be genuine, the IC card 10 is determined to be genuine. etc. are possible.

(5. Example of forgery detection in S5)
The specific method for detecting forgery in S5 is not particularly limited as long as it uses the photographed image of the IC card 10, but an example thereof will be described below.

(5-1. Forgery detection using the resolution of the print on the IC card 10)
In S5, forgery detection can be performed using the resolution of the print on the IC card 10. For example, if a predetermined part of the face of the genuine IC card 10 is thermally printed using the area gradation method, and the same part of a counterfeit card is inkjet printed using the area gradation method, the resolution of that part will be higher than that of the genuine IC card 10. It will also be quite expensive.

An example of a forgery detection method that utilizes this resolution is a method based on moire fringe detection disclosed in Japanese Patent Application Laid-open No. 2011-34535. In the case of the photographed image of the ticket surface taken by the camera 106, moiré fringes are caused by the difference between the pitch (resolution) of halftone dots in the printing of the ticket surface using the area gradation method and the pitch of the image sensor of the camera 106. Moire fringes occur when the face of the IC card 10 is printed using inkjet printing, which has a fairly high resolution. The authenticity determination terminal 1 determines that forgery has been detected when such moiré stripes are present in the captured image of the card surface, and can determine that the card surface of the IC card 10 is fake.

(5-2. Forgery detection using the character style of the pre-printed part of IC card 10)
Regarding the characters on the pre-printed part of the IC card 10 mentioned above, as shown in the example of card issuing country 11 ("Government of Japan") in Figure 7, the characters on the counterfeit card have a different style from the characters on the official IC card 10. (Form)

Therefore, the authenticity determination terminal 1 sets the characters used for forgery detection to predetermined characters from among the characters on the pre-printed part of the face of the IC card 10, and checks the characters of the predetermined characters cut out from the photographed image of the face of the IC card 10. Pattern matching is performed on the image using a predetermined character in a positive style as a template, and it is determined whether the style of the predetermined character cut out from the photographed image of the ticket face is correct. The authenticity determination terminal 1 determines that forgery is detected when the style of the predetermined characters is incorrect, and determines that the face of the IC card 10 is false.

Artificial intelligence (AI) can also be used to determine whether the character style is correct. In this case, for example, by preparing a predetermined character with a positive style and a large number of predetermined characters with different styles, and performing machine learning on these characters, a discriminator ( You can create a discriminant (discriminant) and use it to determine whether a style is correct or incorrect.

(5-3. Detection of forgery based on the presence or absence of contradictions in the character information on the face of the IC card 10)
In addition, the authentication terminal 1 reads the character information on the face of the IC card 10 from the photographed image of the face of the IC card 10 using known OCR (Optical Character Recognition) processing, and determines whether the content indicated by the character information is inconsistent. It is also possible to use it for forgery detection. Conflicts in text information can be broadly divided into cases where there is a conflict between the content of text information and the content of another text information, and cases where there is a conflict between the content of text information and the attributes of the text information. is possible.

In the former case, if the content of one character information is not within a predetermined value or range depending on the content of the other character information, it can be determined that there is a contradiction. As an example, there may be a predetermined relationship between text information determined from a legal perspective, and there may be a contradiction between the text information when viewed from the relationship. For example, there is a legal relationship between the status of residence 15 and the presence or absence of work restrictions 16 such that if the residence status 15 is "student", the presence or absence of work restrictions 16 is "not allowed to work". If the status of residence 15 obtained from the photographed image of the ticket is "Student" but the presence/absence of work restrictions 16 is "Able to work," these text information ("Student" and "Able to work") Since there is a contradiction, it is assumed that a forgery of the ticket face is detected, and the face of the IC card 10 is determined to be fake. In addition, if the age calculated from the date of birth 13 is too young compared to the date of issue 17 of the IC card 10, it can be determined that there is a contradiction.

In the latter case, if the content of the text information is not within a predetermined value or range depending on the attribute of the text information, it can be determined that there is a contradiction. For example, if date of birth 13 is an impossible date (such as ``1985,'' ``13,'' or ``April 31,'') Since it is inconsistent with the fact that it indicates month and day (attribute of character information), it is assumed that a forgery of the face of the IC card is detected, and the face of the IC card 10 is determined to be fake. The same applies to the issue date 17 of the IC card 10, etc., and the appropriate value range for the date (for example, Showa is from January to 1964, month is from January to December, April is from 1 to 30 days, etc.) is recorded in the storage unit 102 of the authentication terminal 1, and the presence or absence of a contradiction can be determined by referring to the range. In addition, if the expiration date 18 is earlier than the current date and time, it can also be determined that there is a contradiction.

(5-4. Detection of counterfeiting by comparing the character information on the ticket with the data in the IC chip 20)
In the case of a residence card, the IC chip 20 stores data of the face image of the IC card 10. This requires the input of a PIN number when reading it, but in the case of a residence card, the authentication terminal 1 performs OCR processing on the photographed image of the face of the IC card 10 to obtain the residence number 12. By transmitting this as a password to the IC chip 20, the face image of the IC card 10 stored in the IC chip 20 can be received and read.

Therefore, as shown in FIG. 8, the authentication terminal 1 can detect a predetermined position obtained by performing OCR processing on both the photographed image 100 of the face of the IC card 10 and the face image 200 stored in the IC chip 20. The character information of A (date of birth 13 in the example of FIG. 8) is compared and verified, and if they are different, forgery is detected, and the face of the IC card 10 can be determined to be fake. In this case, even if there is no contradiction in the character information on the face of the card as described in (5-3) above, if the character information on the face of the card is inconsistent with the face image stored in the IC chip 20, the face of the IC card 10 can be false.

In addition, the authenticity determination terminal 1 can also read data such as the date of birth of the card holder stored in the IC chip 20 by transmitting the residence number 12 as a PIN to the IC chip 20. It is also possible to compare and check with character information such as the date of birth 13 obtained by performing OCR processing on the photographed image 100 of the face of the IC card 10. Similarly to the above, if the two are different, the authentication terminal 1 determines that forgery has been detected and determines that the face of the IC card 10 is false.

With these methods, it is possible to detect forgery on the face of the IC card 10 using a photographed image of the face of the IC card 10, and to obtain the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10. Each method may be used alone, or a combination of multiple methods may be used. In the latter case, if a forgery on the face of the IC card 10 is detected in any one method, the face of the IC card 10 may be made false, and if a forgery on the face of the IC card 10 is detected in all the methods, the face of the IC card 10 may be made false. You can also use it as

Furthermore, detection of forgery on the face of the IC card 10 (S5) can be performed by an external server by transmitting a forgery detection request including a photographed image of the face and other data necessary for forgery detection to the external server. good. The server determines the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10 based on, for example, the result of detection of forgery on the face of the card, and the authentication terminal 1 receives and acquires the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10 from the server (S6).

As explained above, in the authentication terminal 1 of the present embodiment, in addition to determining the reading result of the IC chip 20, the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10 is obtained by using the photographed image of the IC card 10. , it becomes possible to perform multifaceted authentication of the IC card 10. For example, even if the IC chip 20 cannot be read correctly, instead of just identifying the IC card 10 as a fake, by also referring to the authenticity of the face of the card, a genuine IC card 10 with a broken IC chip 20 can be determined to be a fake. This helps in more accurate determination of authenticity. In addition, the user can use an integrated terminal such as a mobile terminal to determine the reading result of the IC chip 20 and obtain the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10, and use these results to easily determine the authenticity of the IC card 10. can be done.

Furthermore, in this embodiment, the processing described above with reference to FIG. 5 can be realized by downloading an application to a mobile terminal such as a smartphone, and can be introduced without making a large capital investment, making it highly popular.

Furthermore, in this embodiment, the process can be easily performed by using information that can be read from the IC chip 20 without a password for determining the reading result in S2. In this embodiment, by using this information as an AID (application identifier) corresponding to the type of IC card 10, for example, forgery can be carried out by pasting the printed face information of a residence card on top of a driver's license. In such cases, a forgery can be detected by knowing that the AID does not correspond to a residence card (corresponds to a driver's license). However, the information used to determine the reading result is not limited to AID.

Furthermore, in this embodiment, by using the forgery detection methods described in (5-1) to (5-4) above, for example, forgery such as pasting an object with fake face information printed on it on a residence card can be detected. In this case, counterfeiting of the ticket face can be suitably detected using a photographed image of the ticket face.

However, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. For example, the object of authenticity determination in this embodiment is a residence card, and the use of a forged residence card can be prevented, but the object of authenticity determination is not particularly limited as long as it is an IC card 10 having an IC chip 20.

Furthermore, in this embodiment, the user himself or herself determines the authenticity of the IC card 10 by referring to the display contents in S3 and S6, but the determination of the authenticity of the IC card 10 is realized by the application program described above. The authentication can also be automatically performed based on the reading result of the IC chip 20 and the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10 using the authentication means. It is also arbitrary how the combination of the reading result of the IC chip 20 and the authenticity of the face of the IC card 10 is associated with the authenticity of the IC card 10.

For example, when the authentication terminal 1 can read a predetermined AID from the IC chip 20, it determines that the IC card 10 is authentic and ends the process, whereas when the predetermined AID cannot be read from the IC chip 20, the authentication terminal 1 determines that the IC card 10 is authentic and ends the process. The process from S4 onward is executed, and if the face of the IC card 10 is found to be true, it is determined that the IC card 10 is genuine, and if the face of the IC card 10 is determined to be false, the IC card 10 is determined to be false. The authenticity determination terminal 1 displays these authenticity determination results on the display unit 103, and ends the process.

Although preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings, the present invention is not limited to such examples. It is clear that those skilled in the art can come up with various changes or modifications within the scope of the technical idea disclosed in this application, and these naturally fall within the technical scope of the present invention. Understood.

1: Authenticity determination terminal 10: IC card 20: IC chip 100: Photographed image 111: Determination means 112: Acquisition means 200: Ticket face image

Claims (8)

An authentication terminal used for determining the authenticity of an IC card having an IC chip,
a determining means for determining whether predetermined information can be read from the IC chip by a reading unit of the authentication terminal;
acquisition means for acquiring the authenticity of the face of the IC card using a photographed image of the IC card;
has
The IC card is a residence card,
The acquisition means acquires the residence number by performing OCR processing on the photographed image of the IC card, and transmits this as a PIN to the IC chip, thereby acquiring the residence number of the IC card stored in the IC chip. Receive a ticket face image, compare and match character information at predetermined positions obtained by performing OCR processing on both the photographed image of the IC card and the ticket face image of the IC card stored in the IC chip; An authentication terminal characterized in that, if they are different, forgery is detected and the face of the IC card is determined to be false . The authentication terminal according to claim 1, wherein the authentication terminal is a mobile terminal. 3. The authentication terminal according to claim 1, wherein the predetermined information is information that can be read from the IC chip without a password. 4. The authentication terminal according to claim 3 , wherein the predetermined information is an application identifier stored in the IC chip. Authenticity according to any one of claims 1 to 4 , characterized in that the authenticity of the face of the IC card is obtained from a result of forgery detection using the resolution of the face printing of the IC card. Judgment terminal. Any one of claims 1 to 5 , wherein the authenticity of the face of the IC card is obtained from a result of forgery detection using the style of characters in a pre-printed part of the IC card. Terminal for determining authenticity as described. 7. The authenticity of the face of the IC card is obtained from a result of forgery detection based on the presence or absence of a contradiction in character information on the face of the IC card, according to any one of claims 1 to 6 . Terminal for determining authenticity. computer terminal,
An authentication terminal used for determining the authenticity of an IC card having an IC chip,
a determining means for determining whether predetermined information can be read from the IC chip by a reading unit of the authentication terminal;
acquisition means for acquiring the authenticity of the face of the IC card using a photographed image of the IC card;
has
The IC card is a residence card,
The acquisition means acquires a residence number by performing OCR processing on the photographed image of the IC card, and transmits this as a PIN to the IC chip, thereby acquiring the residence number of the IC card stored in the IC chip. Receive a ticket face image, compare and match character information at predetermined positions obtained by performing OCR processing on both the photographed image of the IC card and the ticket face image of the IC card stored in the IC chip; A program for functioning as an authentication terminal that determines that the face of the IC card is false, assuming that a forgery is detected if they are different .

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