JP7567326B2 - Secure component, sensor unit, device, computer program, and information processing method - Google Patents

Description

The present invention relates to a secure component, a sensor unit, a device , a computer program, and an information processing method.

In recent years, businesses that use the IoT (Internet of Things) have spread to various industries, including the automotive, home appliance, health equipment, and manufacturing industries. To provide services in these industries, it will become necessary to send and receive large amounts of information related to people, things, and other things over the network more than ever before.

On the other hand, when information related to humans (for example, health-related sensor information such as heart rate and body temperature, location information, etc.) is linked to an individual, it becomes personal information, and so not only confidentiality but also integrity (prevention of tampering) becomes important.

Non-Patent Document 1 describes security measures for the Global Positioning System (GPS), which is the most widely used form of location information, such as improving antennas, using multiple positioning methods in combination, and encrypting positioning signals to counter attack methods such as jamming and spoofing.

Takeyasu Sakai, Security of GPS, Journal of the Japan Society of Reliability Engineering, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2017

However, none of the countermeasures described in Non-Patent Document 1 are practical. For example, encryption of positioning signals is difficult to implement in practice because GPS specifications are published and shared worldwide. If sensor information, including location information, becomes an important part of social infrastructure, it is expected that attacks on and exploitation of such information will intensify due to the increasing economic effects. For this reason, it is necessary to prevent tampering with sensor information.

The present invention has been made in consideration of the above circumstances, and has an object to provide a secure component, a sensor unit, a device , a computer program, and an information processing method that are capable of protecting sensor information.

The secure component according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a sensor information acquisition unit that acquires sensor information detected by a sensor unit, an encryption unit that encrypts the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit, and an output unit that outputs the sensor information encrypted by the encryption unit to the outside.

The sensor unit according to the embodiment of the present invention includes the above-mentioned secure component.

A device according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the above-mentioned secure component and the above-mentioned sensor unit, and transmits encrypted sensor information detected by the sensor unit to an external device.

The information processing device according to the embodiment of the present invention includes a receiving unit that receives encrypted sensor information sent by the device, a decoding unit that decodes the sensor information received by the receiving unit, and a detection unit that detects the state of the device based on the sensor information decoded by the decoding unit.

A computer program according to an embodiment of the present invention causes a computer to execute a process of acquiring sensor information detected by a sensor unit, encrypting the acquired sensor information, and outputting the encrypted sensor information to the outside.

In an information processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention, a secure component encrypts sensor information detected by a sensor unit, and a device equipped with the sensor unit and secure component transmits the sensor information encrypted by the secure component to an information processing device, which decrypts the encrypted sensor information and detects the state of the device based on the decrypted sensor information.

According to the present invention, sensor information can be protected.

1 is a schematic diagram showing a first example of a configuration of an information processing system according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the configuration of a position information database and a key information database. FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process flow relating to encrypted output and management of position information. FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram showing an example of reflection of location information in a location information database. FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process flow for handling pre-encrypted location information. FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process flow regarding plain text output to a device when performing user authentication. FIG. 13 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a processing flow regarding plain text output to a device when a setting is changed from the system side. FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of a processing flow regarding updating of a key via a secure communication channel. FIG. 13 is a schematic diagram showing an example of reflection in a key information database. FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing a second example of the configuration of the information processing system according to the present embodiment.

The present invention will now be described with reference to the drawings showing an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing a first example of the configuration of an information processing system according to this embodiment. The information processing system includes a positioning unit 10, a secure component 30, a device 50, and a location information management system 100. The positioning unit 10 and the secure component 30 are each formed, for example, from individual semiconductor chips, and are connected via a secret communication path 15 (secure channel). Note that, in the following, the positioning unit 10 will be taken as an example of a sensor unit, and location information will be described as an example of sensor information, but sensor information is not limited to location information.

The positioning unit 10 is a device that measures the position information of the device 50 based on external environmental information. The positioning unit 10 can use at least one of the following positioning methods: GPS (Global Positioning System), short-range wireless (e.g., beacons, Wi-Fi, RFID, etc.), mobile communication networks, geomagnetism, and sound waves. This makes it possible to obtain position information using a positioning method appropriate for the application. The positioning unit 10 has a position information calculation function 12, a secure channel function 13, and an output function 14, and is connected to an antenna 11.

The position information calculation function 12 calculates its own position information from external environment information (e.g., radio waves, geomagnetism, etc.). As shown in FIG. 1, if the positioning unit 10 does not have a built-in secure component 30, the secure channel function 13 opens a secure channel for sending and receiving information with the secure component 30. The output function 14 outputs the position information calculated by the position information calculation function 12 to the outside (to the secure component 30 in the example shown in the figure).

The specific content of the location information calculated by the location information calculation function 12 varies depending on the technology used in the positioning unit 10, but it can basically be output as plain text, such as the NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) format used in GPS. However, depending on the positioning unit 10, it may also be possible to output encrypted location information.

The output function 14 may be a normal chip-to-chip interface such as a universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) used in GPS modules, but may also have a function for establishing a secure channel when establishing a secret communication path with the secure component 30. The secure channel may be any suitable method such as GP SCP03 (Global Platform Secure Channel Protocol 03) or TLS (Transport Layer Security).

The secure component 30 is a secure execution environment having a memory that is logically or physically isolated from the device 50 and the positioning unit 10. In this embodiment, the secure component 30 is a secure element, but it may also be a trusted execution environment (TEE) or the like. The secure element is a tamper-resistant security chip that has an internal CPU, NVM (Non-volatile memory), and secure non-volatile memory.

The secure component 30 includes a positioning means communication function 31, a secure channel function 32, a positioning means decryption function 33, a device communication function 34, a secret communication function 35, a key update function 36, an encryption function 37, a signature generation function 38, and a user authentication function 39. The secure component 30 also holds an encryption flag, a signature generation flag, a PIN, a positioning means decryption key, a secret communication key, a location information encryption key, a signature generation key, and a SEID.

The positioning means communication function 31 has a function for communicating with the positioning unit 10. The positioning means communication function 31 receives the position information sent from the positioning unit 10. The secure channel function 32 opens a secure channel with the positioning unit and performs secret communication. If the position information sent from the positioning unit is encrypted, the positioning means decryption function 33 decrypts it and returns it to plaintext position information.

The encryption function 37 encrypts the location information sent from the positioning unit 10. The encryption function 37 re-encrypts the decrypted location information. The signature generation function 38 adds a signature to the location information. The device communication function 34 has a function for communicating with a device 50 that has a built-in secure component 30.

The user authentication function 39 has a function of accepting authentication of the device owner, determining whether or not the authentication is possible, and maintaining the authentication status. The secret communication function 35 has a function of opening a secret communication path between the location information management system 100 and the secure component 30. The key update function 36 has a function of updating the key in the secure component 30.

The PIN is a data string used by the user authentication function 39 to verify that the user is a legitimate user. The SEID is an ID that is individually assigned to each secure component 30, and allows individual identification from the location information management system 100 side.

Next, we will explain the keys held by the secure component 30.

The positioning means decryption key is a decryption key used when the location information obtained from the positioning unit 10 is encrypted, and can be set in advance to match the positioning unit 10 being used. There is no key that corresponds to the positioning means decryption key.

The location information encryption key is a key used to encrypt location information when the secure component 30 outputs the location information. The location information management system 100 has the corresponding key (location information decryption key) and can decrypt the encrypted location information.

The signature generation key is a key that the secure component 30 uses to sign the location information. The device 50 or the location information management system 100 has an opposing key (signature verification key) and can verify the validity of the location information.

The secret communication key is a key for the secure component 30 and the external system to perform secret communication. The external system also has an opposing key (secret communication key).

Whether to use a symmetric key or an asymmetric key as the key in the secure component 30 can be determined appropriately. In this embodiment, the key form is as follows, but is not limited to this.

To encrypt the positioning unit 10, an asymmetric key cryptosystem can be used, with the positioning means decryption key being a public key. This is because, when providing location information to an unspecified number of people, as with GPS, it is difficult for the recipient to individualize and hold a private key.

Symmetric key cryptography is used to encrypt and decrypt location information, and the same key can be used to encrypt and decrypt the location information. Asymmetric cryptography may also be used, but if location information is acquired frequently, a symmetric key with high calculation speed is preferable.

For signature generation and verification, asymmetric key cryptography can be used, with the signature generation key being a private key and the signature verification key being a public key. This is because the authenticity of a signature cannot be verified unless it is generated with a private key. Also, there are use cases in which the signature verification key is stored on a device 50 that is not adequately protected.

For secret communication with the secure component 30, a symmetric key cryptosystem is used, and the secret communication key is the same key. Although an asymmetric cryptosystem may be used, the symmetric key is advantageous in terms of calculation speed because it is stored in the secure component 30 and the location information management system 100.

The device 50 includes a positioning unit 10, a secure component 30, a signature verification function 51, a network communication function 52, and a secure component communication function 53. The device 50 also includes a signature verification key and a keypad for accepting a PIN input from the user.

The secure component communication function 53 has a function for communicating with the secure component 30 built into the device 50. The signature verification function 51 has a function for verifying the signature generated by the secure component 30. A signature verification key is used for verifying the signature. The signature verification key can be obtained in advance from the location information management system 100. The network communication function 52 has a function for communicating with the location information management system 100.

Device 50 includes all devices that use location information by some means, whether temporary or permanent, and also includes IoT devices that refer to location information. Device 50 includes, for example, smartphones and tablet terminals, as well as means of transportation such as bicycles, motorbikes, automobiles, trains, ships, and airplanes, and includes IoT devices that use location information such as weather observation devices.

The location information management system 100 includes a location information management server 110 and a key management server 120. Note that, in the example shown in the figure, the location information management system 100 is configured with two servers, but this is not limited to this and may be configured with one server or three or more servers. Also, in the example shown in the figure, one device 50 is shown, but multiple devices 50 may be provided.

The location information management server 110 is a server that manages and keeps track of the location information of each device 50 (secure component 30). The location information management server 110 includes a location information database 111, a location information management function 112, and a network communication function 113.

The location information management function 112 accesses the location information database 111 to update and reference the location information. The network communication function 113 has a function for communicating with other servers. Details of the location information database 111 will be described later.

The key management server 120 includes a key information database 121, a decryption function 122, a network communication function 123, a signature verification function 124, a key update (generation) function 125, and a secret communication function 126.

The decryption function 122 has a function of decrypting encrypted location information received from the device 50. The signature verification function 124 has a function of verifying the signature added to the location information received from the device 50. The secret communication function 126 has a function of establishing a secret communication path with the secure component 30. The key management server 120 can remotely manage the secure component 30 via the secret communication path. The key update (generation) function 125 has a function of generating a new key when updating a key and reflecting it on the key information database 121 side. The network communication function 123 has a function of communicating with other servers. The key information database 121 will be described in detail later.

In this embodiment, the device 50 first transmits the location information to the key management server 120, and the key management server 120 performs decryption and signature verification. The location information management server 110 does not communicate directly with the device 50, but receives the information in plain text from the key management server 120. Communication between the location information management server 110 and the key management server 120 can be performed while ensuring confidentiality, for example, by using secret communication such as TLS.

Figure 2 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the configuration of the location information database 111 and the key information database 121. The location information database 111 has columns for, for example, SEID, latitude, and longitude, and stores location information for each secure component 30 (or the positioning unit 10 or device 50 linked to the secure component 30). The key information database 121 has columns for SEID, location information decryption key, signature verification key, and secret communication key, and stores the location information decryption key, signature verification key, and secret communication key corresponding to each secure component 30.

Next, we will explain the specific processing of the information processing system of this embodiment.

Figure 3 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a processing flow relating to the encrypted output and management of location information. Each process in the diagram will be explained below as #1 to #13. The processing flow shown in Figure 3 encrypts the location information obtained from the positioning unit 10 and reflects the location information in the location information database 111 of the location information management system 100.

#1 (Establishing a secure channel): The positioning unit 10 and the secure component 30 establish a secure channel between each other before transmitting and receiving location information. Note that, as described below, if the secure component 30 is built into the positioning unit 10, this procedure can be omitted.

#2 (Acquisition of environmental information): The positioning unit 10 acquires the environmental information (radio waves, geomagnetism, etc.) necessary for the positioning unit 10 to calculate its own position information. In this embodiment, if the positioning unit 10 is a GPS, it receives radio waves output from satellites.

#3 (Calculation of location information): The positioning unit 10 calculates location information based on the acquired environmental information.

#4 (Output of location information): The positioning unit 10 outputs the calculated location information to the secure component 30. In this case, the location information can be safely output to the secure component 30 using protection provided by a secure channel.

#5 (Encryption of location information): The secure component 30 encrypts the location information using the encryption function 37. Here, the encryption function 37 refers to the encryption flag, and after confirming that the encryption flag indicates a state in which "encryption is to be performed," it can encrypt the location information using the location information encryption key.

#6 (Assignment of signature): The secure component 30 assigns a signature to the encrypted location information using the signature generation function 38. Here, the signature generation function 38 refers to the signature generation flag, and after confirming that the signature generation flag indicates a state in which "signature assignment is performed," it can assign the SEID of the secure component 30 and assign a signature using the signature generation key.

#7 (output to device 50): The secure component 30 outputs the location information after encryption and signing to the device 50.

#8 (Transmission to location information management system 100): Using the network communication function 52, the device 50 transmits the location information obtained from the secure component 30 to the key management server 120 of the location information management system 100.

#9 (Signature verification): The location information management system 100 verifies the signature attached to the location information using the signature verification function 124 of the key management server 120. The signature verification function 124 identifies a corresponding signature verification key from among the signature verification keys stored in the key information database 121 based on the SEID (in this case, SEID: 00000001) attached to the location information, and can verify the signature using the identified signature verification key. If the signature verification fails, the location information is treated as invalid data (e.g., discarded), and no further processing is performed.

#10 (Decryption of location information): If the signature verification is successful, the location information management system 100 uses the decryption function 122 of the key management server 120 to decrypt the location information. The decryption function 122 identifies the corresponding location information decryption key based on the SEID (in this case, SEID: 00000001) added to the location information, and can decrypt the location information using the identified location information decryption key.

#11 (Transmission to location information management server 110): The key management server 120 transmits the decrypted location information to the location information management server 110.

#12 (Notification to location information management function 112): The location information management server 110 notifies the location information management function 112 of the received location information.

#13 (reflecting in location information database 111): The location information management function 112 overwrites the location information in the location information database 111 with the received location information, using the SEID (in this case, SEID: 00000001) added to the received location information as a key.

Figure 4 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the reflection of location information in the location information database 111. In the example of Figure 4, the latitude corresponding to SEID: 00000001 has been changed from 35.695855 to 35.795855, and the longitude has been changed from 139.730134 to 139.630134. Note that the latitude and longitude values are given as an example, and the numbers themselves do not have any special meaning.

When signature verification fails on the location information management system 100 side and the location information is treated as invalid data, various operations can be adopted for processing, such as disabling the device 50 or discarding all data from the secure component 30 of the SEID.

As described above, location information is not output in plain text, but is encrypted when it is sent outside the secure component 30, which prevents tampering with or leakage of the output location information. It also prevents unauthorized tracing of location information.

As described above, by having only the location information management system 100 hold a key that is opposite to the key used for encryption by the secure component 30, it is possible to prevent tampering with the location information on the device 50 side while enabling individual decryption of the location information (identification of the secure component 30).

In addition, when encrypting the location information, a signature for the location information is generated, concatenated, and output, so that the authenticity of the positioning unit 10 and the secure component 30 can be confirmed on the device 50 that acquired the location information and on the location information management system 100 side.

It is expected that the number of cases in which location information obtained from the positioning unit 10 is encrypted in advance based on measures against spoofing, etc. will increase in the future. When providing positioning information to an unspecified number of people, as with GPS, the positioning information is shared by an unspecified number of people, so it is difficult to encrypt it individually for each recipient, and as a rule, encryption must be performed using a common key. The following describes how the positioning unit 10 processes the location information that has been encrypted in advance.

Figure 5 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process flow for handling pre-encrypted location information. Each process in the diagram will be explained below as #1 to #14.

#1 (Establishing a secure channel): The positioning unit 10 and the secure component 30 establish a secure channel between each other before transmitting and receiving location information. Note that, as described below, if the secure component 30 is built into the positioning unit 10, this procedure can be omitted.

#2 (Acquisition of environmental information): The positioning unit 10 acquires environmental information (radio waves, geomagnetism, etc.) necessary for the positioning unit 10 to calculate its own position information. In this embodiment, if the positioning unit 10 is a GPS, it receives radio waves output from satellites.

#3 (Calculation of location information): The positioning unit 10 calculates location information based on the acquired environmental information. At this time, the location information is assumed to be encrypted at the time of calculation.

#4 (Output of location information): The positioning unit 10 outputs the calculated location information to the secure component 30. In this case, the location information can be safely output to the secure component 30 using protection provided by a secure channel.

#5 (Decryption of location information): The secure component 30 passes the acquired location information to the positioning means decryption function 33, which decrypts the location information by removing the encryption that has been applied to the location information in advance. For decryption, a positioning means decryption key that is held in advance can be used.

#6 (re-encryption of location information): The secure component 30 encrypts the location information using the encryption function 37. Here, the encryption function 37 refers to the encryption flag, and after confirming that the encryption flag indicates a state in which "encryption is to be performed," it can encrypt the location information using the location information encryption key.

#7 (Assignment of signature): The secure component 30 assigns a signature to the encrypted location information using the signature generation function 38. Here, the signature generation function 38 refers to the signature generation flag, and after confirming that the signature generation flag indicates a state in which "signature assignment is performed," it can assign the SEID of the secure component 30 and assign a signature using the signature generation key.

#8 (output to device 50): The secure component 30 outputs the location information after encryption and signing to the device 50.

#9 (Transmission to location information management system 100): Using the network communication function 52, the device 50 transmits the location information obtained from the secure component 30 to the key management server 120 of the location information management system 100.

#10 (Signature verification): The location information management system 100 verifies the signature attached to the location information using the signature verification function 124 of the key management server 120. The signature verification function 124 identifies a corresponding signature verification key from among the signature verification keys stored in the key information database 121 based on the SEID (in this case, SEID: 00000001) attached to the location information, and can verify the signature using the identified signature verification key. If the signature verification fails, the location information is treated as invalid data (e.g., discarded), and no further processing is performed.

#11 (Decryption of location information): If the signature verification is successful, the location information management system 100 decrypts the location information using the decryption function 122 of the key management server 120. The decryption function 122 identifies the corresponding location information decryption key based on the SEID (in this case, SEID: 00000001) added to the location information, and can decrypt the location information using the identified location information decryption key.

#12 (Transmission to location information management server 110): The key management server 120 transmits the decrypted location information to the location information management server 110.

#13 (Notification to location information management function 112): The location information management server 110 notifies the location information management function 112 of the received location information.

#14 (Reflection to location information database 111): The location information management function 112 overwrites the location information in the location information database 111 with the received location information, using the SEID (in this case, SEID: 00000001) added to the received location information as a key.

As described above, if the output information of the positioning unit 10 is encrypted, it is decrypted once within the secure component 30, then re-encrypted with the key within the secure component 30 and output to the outside. Therefore, even if the encryption key of the positioning unit 10 is not individualized (can be decrypted by a third party), the security of the location information can be improved by re-encrypting it with the individual key of the secure component 30. In other words, even if the encryption key of the positioning unit 10 is not individualized, encryption can be performed with the individual key of the secure component 30, so the confidentiality and integrity of the sensor information acquired individually by the device 50 can be improved.

The algorithm for decrypting the location information in #5 and the algorithm for re-encrypting the location information in #6 described above do not necessarily need to be the same, and may be different. For example, the encrypted and distributed location information may use asymmetric key cryptography (e.g., RSA: Rivest Shamir Adleman cryptosystem), and the algorithm for re-encrypting the information within the secure component 30 may use symmetric key cryptography (e.g., AES: Advanced Encryption Standard).

In the process exemplified in FIG. 3 and FIG. 5, the location information can be decrypted on the location information management system 100 side to prevent tampering with the location information. However, in the following cases, a configuration can be made to allow plaintext output to the device 50 by providing user or system authentication. That is, (1) when the device 50 side alone is responsible for the use of location information, (2) when it is desired to reduce the processing time for encryption each time in order to obtain location information at high speed, and (3) when the usage of location information on the device 50 side is not critical and a certain risk of tampering can be tolerated. Below, we will first explain the case where plaintext output to the device 50 is performed by user authentication.

Figure 6 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process flow for plain text output to device 50 when performing user authentication. Each process in the diagram will be explained below as #1 to #13.

#1 (Establishing a secure channel): The positioning unit 10 and the secure component 30 establish a secure channel between each other before transmitting and receiving location information. Note that, as described below, if the secure component 30 is built into the positioning unit 10, this procedure can be omitted.

#2 (User inputs authentication information): If the user wants to use plaintext location information within the device 50, the user inputs user authentication information into the device 50. Here, the user can input a PIN.

#3 (Input of authentication information): The device 50 inputs the authentication information entered by the user to the secure component 30 and requests user authentication.

#4 (Performing authentication and changing encryption flag): Using the user authentication function 39, the secure component 30 verifies whether the entered authentication information belongs to a legitimate user. Here, a comparison is made to see whether the PIN value previously set in the secure component 30 matches the PIN value entered by the user, and if the two match, authentication is deemed successful. If authentication is successful, the user authentication function 39 changes the value of the encryption flag so that it changes from "perform encryption" to "do not perform encryption." If authentication fails, the secure component 30 does not change the encryption flag, leaving it in the "perform encryption" state, and does not allow plaintext output. In this case, no further processing is performed, and only normal encrypted output is performed.

#5 (Acquisition of environmental information): The positioning unit 10 acquires environmental information (radio waves, geomagnetism, etc.) necessary for the positioning unit 10 to calculate its own position information. In this embodiment, if the positioning unit 10 is a GPS, it receives radio waves output from satellites.

#6 (Calculation of location information): The positioning unit 10 calculates location information based on the acquired environmental information. At this time, the location information is assumed to be encrypted at the time of calculation.

#7 (Output of location information): The positioning unit 10 outputs the calculated location information to the secure component 30. In this case, the location information can be safely output to the secure component 30 using protection provided by a secure channel.

#8 (Decryption of location information): The secure component 30 passes the acquired location information to the positioning means decryption function 33, which decrypts the location information by removing the encryption that has been applied to the location information in advance. For decryption, a positioning means decryption key that is held in advance can be used.

#9 (Cancel encryption): The secure component 30 calls the encryption function 37. The encryption function 37 refers to the encryption flag, and upon confirming that "encryption is not to be performed," it proceeds to the next process without performing encryption.

#10 (signature assignment): The secure component 30 assigns a signature to the plaintext location information using the signature generation function 38. Here, the signature generation function 38 refers to the signature generation flag, and after confirming that the signature generation flag indicates a state in which "signature assignment is performed," it can assign the SEID of the secure component 30 and assign a signature using the signature generation key.

#11 (output to device 50): The secure component 30 outputs the plaintext location information for which a signature has been added to the device 50.

#12 (signature verification by device 50): Using the signature verification key and signature verification function 51 held by the device 50, the device 50 verifies the signature attached to the plaintext location information. If the signature verification is successful, the location information is treated as valid and not tampered with. If the signature verification fails, the location information is treated as invalid information, and the process ends here.

#13 (Use of location information by device 50): After successful signature verification, device 50 uses the valid location information internally as accurate location information obtained from positioning unit 10.

As described above, by performing user authentication such as a PIN on the secure component 30, location information is output directly without encryption, making it possible to obtain location information quickly in real-time applications completed within the device 50, where there is no risk of tampering or leakage (or where the risk is extremely low and tolerable).

In the above example, the authentication information entered by the user is not limited to a PIN. For example, authentication may be performed by entering biometric information or the like, or possession authentication such as a digital key may be performed. Furthermore, the timing of signature verification on the device 50 side is not limited to each time location information is acquired, and signature verification may be performed only upon initial reception according to the security policy, or the timing of signature verification may be changed. Furthermore, when operating under a security policy that does not require signature verification on the device 50 side, the addition of a signature within the secure component 30 may be omitted. That is, in #4 of FIG. 6 (performing authentication and changing the encryption flag), the signature generation flag is changed along with the encryption flag, and a message is written to the secure component 30 indicating that the implementation of the signature is not required, so that signature generation can be omitted.

Next, we will explain an example of setting up plaintext output or unsigned output via a secret communication channel from the system side.

Figure 7 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process flow for plain text output to device 50 when changing settings from the system side. Each process in the diagram will be explained below as #1 to #13.

#1 (Establishing a secure channel): The positioning unit 10 and the secure component 30 establish a secure channel between each other before transmitting and receiving location information. Note that, as described below, if the secure component 30 is built into the positioning unit 10, this procedure can be omitted.

#2 (Establishment of a secret communication path): The location information management system 100 and the secure component 30 establish an end-to-end secret communication path between them using the network communication function 123 of the key management server 120, the network communication function 52 and the secure component communication function 53 of the device 50, and the secret communication function 35 of the secure component 30. Note that TLS, etc. may also be used.

#3 (Flag update instruction): The location information management system 100 sends an instruction to update the encryption flag to the secure component 30 over the secret communication channel.

#4 (changing encryption flag): The secure component 30 receives an instruction to update the encryption flag using the secret communication function 35. Based on the received update instruction, the secure component 30 changes the value of the encryption flag and writes that encryption will not be performed.

#5 (Acquisition of environmental information): The positioning unit 10 acquires environmental information (radio waves, geomagnetism, etc.) necessary for the positioning unit 10 to calculate its own position information. In this embodiment, if the positioning unit 10 is a GPS, it receives radio waves output from satellites.

#6 (Calculation of location information): The positioning unit 10 calculates location information based on the acquired environmental information. At this time, the location information is assumed to be encrypted at the time of calculation.

#7 (Output of location information): The positioning unit 10 outputs the calculated location information to the secure component 30. In this case, the location information can be safely output to the secure component 30 using protection provided by a secure channel.

#8 (Decryption of location information): The secure component 30 passes the acquired location information to the positioning means decryption function 33, which decrypts the location information by removing the encryption that has been applied to the location information in advance. For decryption, a positioning means decryption key that is held in advance can be used.

#9 (Cancel encryption): The secure component 30 calls the encryption function 37. The encryption function 37 refers to the encryption flag, and upon confirming that "encryption is not to be performed," it proceeds to the next process without performing encryption.

#10 (signature assignment): The secure component 30 assigns a signature to the plaintext location information using the signature generation function 38. Here, the signature generation function 38 refers to the signature generation flag, and after confirming that the signature generation flag indicates a state in which "signature assignment is performed," it can assign the SEID of the secure component 30 and assign a signature using the signature generation key.

#11 (output to device 50): The secure component 30 outputs the plaintext location information for which a signature has been added to the device 50.

#12 (signature verification by device 50): Using the signature verification key and signature verification function 51 held by the device 50, the device 50 verifies the signature attached to the plaintext location information. If the signature verification is successful, the location information is treated as valid and not tampered with. If the signature verification fails, the location information is treated as invalid information, and the process ends here.

#13 (Use of location information by device 50): After successful signature verification, device 50 uses the valid location information internally as accurate location information obtained from positioning unit 10.

As described above, by issuing instructions to the secure component 30 via a secret communication channel, the location information is output directly without encryption, making it possible to obtain location information quickly in real-time applications completed within the device 50, where there is no risk of tampering or leakage (or where the risk is extremely low and tolerable).

In the process shown in FIG. 7, as in the case of user authentication in FIG. 6, the timing of signature verification on the device 50 side and signature assignment by updating the signature generation flag can be omitted.

According to this embodiment, location information can be individually protected based on an individual key, but by updating the key used here individually for each secure component 30, it is possible to prepare for key obsolescence or leakage. The following describes key updating.

Figure 8 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process flow for updating a key via a secret communication channel. Below, each process in the diagram will be explained as #1 to #10.

#1 (Establishment of a secret communication path): The location information management system 100 and the secure component 30 establish an end-to-end secret communication path between them using the network communication function 123 of the key management server 120, the network communication function 52 and the secure component communication function 53 of the device 50, and the secret communication function 35 of the secure component 30. Note that TLS, etc. may also be used.

#2 (Key generation): The key management server 120 generates new keys using its own key update (generation) function 125. In this embodiment, the new keys generated are a location information encryption key, a location information decryption key, a signature generation key, and a signature verification key. The generated keys are all version 1.1.

#3 (sending a key update instruction): The key management server 120 obtains new keys (location information encryption key, signature generation key) for the secure component 30 from among the keys generated by the key update (generation) function 125, and transmits a key update instruction to the secure component 30 together with the obtained new keys via a secret communication channel.

#4 (receiving a key update instruction): The secure component 30 receives a key update instruction via a secret communication channel.

#5 (calling key update function 36): The secure component 30 passes the received key update instruction to the key update function 36.

#6 (Key update): The key update function 36 extracts the new key included in the key update instruction and updates the keys by setting the location information encryption key as the key to be used by the encryption function 37 and the signature generation key as the key to be used by the signature generation function 38. In the example shown in the figure, the location information encryption key and signature generation key have been updated to 1.1 and 1.1.

#7 (Sending update process completion notification): When the above-mentioned key update is completed, the secure component 30 sends a key update completion notification to the key management server 120 via the secret communication channel.

#8 (Receiving update process completion notification): The key management server 120 receives a key update completion notification from the secure component 30 via the secret communication channel.

#9 (Reflection to key information database 121): The key management server 120 reflects the new server-side keys (location information decryption key, signature verification key) in the key information database 121.

Figure 9 is a schematic diagram showing an example of reflection in the key information database 121. In the example shown, the location information decryption key and signature verification key of the old version have been changed to the location information decryption key and signature verification key of the new version 1.1.

#10 (update of device-side signature verification key): The device 50 receives a new version of the signature verification key from the key management server 120 and updates its own signature verification key.

Note that in the above example, the updating of the positioning means decryption key is not explicitly stated, but the positioning means decryption key can also be updated via a secret communication channel in a similar manner.

As described above, a secret communication path is established with the secure component 30 as the endpoint with the outside world, and the internal individual keys are updated remotely, so that keys within the secure component 30 can be prevented from becoming obsolete.

In the first example illustrated in FIG. 1, the positioning unit 10 and the secure component 30 are configured to be connected via a secret communication path. That is, in the first example, the positioning unit 10 is configured in a semiconductor chip separate from the semiconductor chip having the secure component 30, and is connected to the secure component 30 via a secret communication path. This makes it possible to realize a positioning unit 10 that can perform a series of operations in cooperation with the secure component 30.

Figure 10 is a schematic diagram showing a second example of the configuration of the information processing system of this embodiment. The second example differs from the first example described above in that the positioning unit 10 is configured with a secure component 30. In this case, the positioning unit 10 may be configured (physically integrated) within a semiconductor chip having the secure component 30, and physically connected to the secure component 30. The positioning unit 10 (output function 14) is physically connected to the secure component 30 via wiring 16. This makes it possible to realize a positioning unit 10 that can perform a series of operations in coordination with the secure component 30.

In addition, in either the configuration of FIG. 1 or FIG. 10, the location information obtained from the positioning unit 10 is quickly imported into the secure component 30, so there is no opportunity to tamper with the location information imported from the positioning unit 10.

This embodiment can also be applied to MaaS (Mobility as a Service), which is characterized by using ICT to cloud-ify transportation and seamlessly connect all modes of transportation as a single service. For example, as the concept of MaaS becomes more widespread in society, it will be possible to use it for various services such as (1) vehicle dispatch using autonomous driving, (2) optimal selection of transportation modes using location information of residents, and (3) collecting the individual locations of people, trains, buses, etc. and analyzing them as big data to understand trends.

In the above embodiment, a positioning unit is given as an example of a sensor unit, and location information is given as an example of sensor information. However, the sensor unit is not limited to a positioning unit, and the information is not limited to location information. For example, in the home appliance industry, the usage status of electrical appliances such as air conditioners can be grasped, and the information can be applied to automatic control, operation control, optimization of power consumption, and the like. In the health equipment industry, for example, vital data of a user (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, etc.) and data on the user's posture and movement can be collected from clothing or wearable terminals, and the data can be applied to services that estimate health management, stress, walking status, and the like. In the manufacturing industry, for example, data on the operating status and power consumption of each production facility in a factory can be collected, and the data can be applied to services such as notifications for facility maintenance and preventive replacement. In these cases, a known sensor can be appropriately used as the sensor for detecting the data depending on the detection target.

The secure component of this embodiment includes a sensor information acquisition unit that acquires sensor information detected by the sensor unit, an encryption unit that encrypts the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit, and an output unit that outputs the sensor information encrypted by the encryption unit to the outside.

The computer program of this embodiment causes the computer to execute a process of acquiring sensor information detected by the sensor unit, encrypting the acquired sensor information, and outputting the encrypted sensor information to the outside.

The secure component acquires the sensor information detected by the sensor unit and encrypts the acquired sensor information. The sensor information obtained from the sensor unit is quickly imported into the secure component and the imported sensor information is encrypted, preventing an opportunity for tampering with the sensor information and protecting the sensor information. In addition, the secure component outputs the encrypted sensor information to the outside, preventing tampering with or leakage of the output sensor information and protecting the sensor information.

The secure component in this embodiment comprises either a secure element or a trusted execution environment.

Since a secure component has either a secure element or a trusted execution environment, it is possible to protect information inside the secure component.

The secure component of this embodiment includes a decryption unit that decrypts the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit if the sensor information is encrypted, and the encryption unit re-encrypts the sensor information decrypted by the decryption unit with a key held by the secure component itself.

If the acquired sensor information is encrypted, the secure component decrypts the sensor information and re-encrypts the decrypted sensor information with a key held by the secure component itself. If the sensor information output by the sensor unit is encrypted, it can be decrypted once within the secure component, re-encrypted with a key within the secure component, and then output to the outside. As a result, even if the encryption key of the sensor unit is not individualized (can be decrypted by a third party), the security of the sensor information can be improved by re-encrypting it with the individual key of the secure component. In other words, even if the encryption key of the sensor unit is not individualized, encryption with the individual key of the secure component can be performed, thereby improving the confidentiality and integrity of the sensor information acquired individually by the device.

The secure component of this embodiment includes a signature generation unit that generates a signature for the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit or the sensor information encrypted by the encryption unit, and the output unit adds the signature to the unencrypted sensor information or the encrypted sensor information and outputs it to the outside.

The secure component generates a signature for the acquired sensor information or the encrypted sensor information, and outputs the unencrypted or encrypted sensor information with the signature attached to it. By attaching the signature, it is possible to provide information for verifying the legitimacy of the sensor unit or the secure component to external devices or information processing devices.

The secure component of this embodiment includes an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires authentication information entered by a user, and an authentication unit that authenticates the authentication information, and the output unit does not assign the signature if the authentication information is successfully authenticated.

The secure component acquires the authentication information entered by the user, authenticates the acquired authentication information, and does not assign a signature if authentication of the authentication information is successful. In real-time applications where the use of sensor information is completed on the device side equipped with the secure component alone and there is no risk of tampering or leakage of the sensor information, it is possible to reduce the signature processing time and enable high-speed acquisition of sensor information, provided that the authentication information entered by the user is authenticated.

The secure component of this embodiment includes an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires authentication information input by a user, and an authentication unit that authenticates the authentication information. If the authentication of the authentication information is successful, the output unit outputs the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit to the outside without encrypting it.

The secure component includes an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires authentication information input by the user, and an authentication unit that authenticates the authentication information. If the authentication of the authentication information input by the user is successful, the acquired sensor information is output to the outside without encryption. In a real-time application in which the use of sensor information is completed on the device side equipped with the secure component alone, and there is no risk of tampering or leakage of the sensor information, a configuration can be realized that allows plaintext output of the sensor information, provided that the authentication information input by the user is authenticated, thereby reducing the encryption processing time and enabling high-speed acquisition of sensor information.

In the secure component of this embodiment, if the authentication of the authentication information is successful, the output unit does not assign the signature.

If the authentication information entered by the user is successful, the secure component can output the acquired sensor information to the outside without encrypting it or adding a signature.

The secure component of this embodiment includes a first holding unit that holds a predetermined key, a first opening unit that opens a secret communication path with a first external server, and a first updating unit that updates the key held in the first holding unit with a key obtained from the first external server via the secret communication path.

The secure component holds a specific key and updates the key it holds with a key obtained from the first external server via a secret communication path established between the secure component and the first external server. This makes it possible to prevent keys in the secure component from becoming stale.

The secure component of this embodiment includes a second storage unit that stores configuration information for internal processing including at least one of encryption processing and signature generation processing, a second establishment unit that establishes a secret communication path with a second external server, and a second update unit that updates the configuration information based on an instruction from the second external server via the secret communication path.

The secure component holds configuration information for internal processing including at least one of encryption processing and signature generation processing, and updates the configuration information based on instructions from the second external server via a secret communication path established with the second external server. The configuration information is, for example, information for setting whether or not to perform encryption processing or whether or not to perform signature generation processing. This allows operation to be performed in accordance with the security policy on the device side.

The sensor unit of this embodiment is equipped with the aforementioned secure component.

The sensor unit includes a secure component. For example, the secure component can be stored inside the sensor unit. This makes it possible to realize a sensor unit that can perform a series of operations in coordination with the secure component.

The sensor unit of this embodiment is configured in a semiconductor chip separate from the semiconductor chip that has the secure component, and is connected to the secure component via a secret communication path.

The sensor unit is configured in a semiconductor chip separate from the semiconductor chip that has the secure component, and is connected to the secure component via a secret communication path. This makes it possible to realize a sensor unit that can perform a series of operations in coordination with the secure component.

The sensor unit of this embodiment is configured in a semiconductor chip that has a secure component and is physically connected to the secure component.

The sensor unit is configured in a semiconductor chip that has a secure component and is physically connected to the secure component. This makes it possible to realize a sensor unit that can perform a series of operations in coordination with the secure component.

The sensor unit of this embodiment is equipped with a positioning sensor that measures position information as the sensor information.

The sensor unit is equipped with a positioning sensor and can measure position information as sensor information. The secure component, which cooperates with the sensor unit, acquires the position information detected by the sensor unit and encrypts the acquired position information. The position information obtained from the sensor unit is quickly imported into the secure component and the imported position information is encrypted, preventing an opportunity to tamper with the position information and protecting the position information. In addition, the secure component outputs the encrypted position information to the outside, preventing tampering with or leakage of the output position information and protecting the position information.

In the sensor unit of this embodiment, the positioning sensor uses at least one of the following positioning methods: GPS, short-range radio, mobile communication network, geomagnetism, and sound waves.

The positioning sensor included in the sensor unit uses at least one of the following positioning methods: GPS, short-range wireless, mobile communication network, geomagnetism, and sound waves. This allows location information to be obtained using a positioning method appropriate for the application.

The device of this embodiment includes the above-mentioned secure component and the above-mentioned sensor unit, and transmits encrypted sensor information detected by the sensor unit to an external device.

The device includes a secure component and a sensor unit, and transmits encrypted sensor information detected by the sensor unit to an external device. Because the device transmits sensor information encrypted within the secure component to an external device, it is possible to prevent tampering with or leakage of the sensor information acquired from the sensor unit.

The device of this embodiment includes a verification unit that verifies the signature if a signature is attached to the sensor information output by the secure component.

If a signature is attached to the sensor information output by the secure component, the device verifies the signature. This makes it possible to verify whether the sensor information is legitimate, and if it is fraudulent, it can discard the fraudulent sensor information without using it.

The information processing device of this embodiment includes a receiving unit that receives encrypted sensor information sent by the device, a decoding unit that decodes the sensor information received by the receiving unit, and a detection unit that detects the state of the device based on the sensor information decoded by the decoding unit.

The information processing device receives encrypted sensor information sent by the device, decrypts the received sensor information, and detects the state of the device based on the decrypted sensor information. This makes it possible to prevent tampering of the sensor information (including, for example, location information) on the device side while enabling individual decryption of the sensor information based on the identification of the secure component. The state of the device can be the security state of the device, and for example, it can be detected whether or not the device is in an appropriate state from a security perspective. Furthermore, if the sensor information is location information, the location of the device can be detected.

The information processing device of this embodiment includes a verification unit that verifies the signature when a signature is attached to the sensor information sent by the device.

If a signature is attached to the sensor information sent by the device, the information processing device verifies the signature. This makes it possible to verify whether the sensor information is legitimate, and if the sensor information is fraudulent, it can discard the fraudulent sensor information without using it.

In the information processing device of this embodiment, the sensor information includes location information, and the detection unit detects the location of the device.

The sensor information includes location information, and the information processing device detects the location of the device. This allows the information processing device to obtain legitimate location information while preventing tampering with the positioning signals that are the basis for calculating the location information and tampering with the location information on the device.

The information processing device of this embodiment includes an establishment unit that establishes a secret communication path between the secure component, and an output unit that outputs, via the secret communication path, an instruction to update at least one of a predetermined key held by the secure component and internal processing setting information by the secure component.

The information processing device opens a secret communication path with the secure component, and outputs, via the opened secret communication path, an instruction to update at least one of a specific key held by the secure component and internal processing setting information by the secure component. The specific keys include, for example, an encryption key for sensor information, a decryption key for encrypted sensor information, a signature generation key for generating a signature, a signature verification key for verifying a signature, and a key used for secret communication. This makes it possible to prevent keys from becoming obsolete or being leaked. The internal processing settings include, for example, setting information on whether or not to perform encryption processing, and setting information on whether or not to perform signature processing. This makes it possible to operate in accordance with the security policy on the device side.

In the information processing method of this embodiment, the secure component encrypts the sensor information detected by the sensor unit, and a device equipped with the sensor unit and the secure component transmits the sensor information encrypted by the secure component to an information processing device, which decrypts the encrypted sensor information and detects the state of the device based on the decrypted sensor information.

In the information processing method, the secure component encrypts sensor information detected by the sensor unit, and a device equipped with the sensor unit and secure component transmits the sensor information encrypted by the secure component to an information processing device, which decrypts the encrypted sensor information and detects the state of the device based on the decrypted sensor information. This allows the information processing device to obtain legitimate sensor information while preventing tampering with the signals that are the basis for calculating the sensor information and tampering with the sensor information in the device.

10 Positioning unit 11 Antenna 12 Position information calculation function 13 Secure channel function 14 Output function 15 Secret communication path 16 Wiring 30 Secure component 31 Positioning means communication function 32 Secure channel function 33 Positioning means decryption function 34 Device communication function 35 Secret communication function 36 Key update function 37 Encryption function 38 Signature generation function 39 User authentication function 50 Device 51 Signature verification function 52 Network communication function 53 Secure component communication function 100 Position information management system 110 Position information management server 111 Position information database 112 Position information management function 113 Network communication function 120 Key management server 121 Key information database 122 Decryption function 123 Network communication function 124 Signature verification function 125 Key update (generation) function 126 Secret communication function

Claims (15)

a sensor information acquisition unit that acquires sensor information detected by the sensor unit;
an encryption unit that encrypts the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit;
an output unit that outputs the sensor information encrypted by the encryption unit to an outside;
a decryption unit that decrypts the sensor information when the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit is encrypted,
The encryption unit includes:
the sensor information decrypted by the decryption unit is re-encrypted with a key held by the secure component itself;
Secure components. Equipped with either a secure element or a trusted execution environment;
The secure component of claim 1 . a signature generation unit that generates a signature for the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit or the sensor information encrypted by the encryption unit,
The output unit is
adding the signature to unencrypted or encrypted sensor information and outputting the information to an external device;
A secure component according to claim 1 or 2. an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires authentication information input by a user;
an authentication unit that authenticates the authentication information,
The output unit is
If the authentication of the authentication information is successful, the signature is not added.
A secure component as claimed in claim 3. an authentication information acquisition unit that acquires authentication information input by a user;
an authentication unit that authenticates the authentication information,
The output unit is
If the authentication of the authentication information is successful, the sensor information acquired by the sensor information acquisition unit is output to an outside without being encrypted.
A secure component as claimed in claim 3. The output unit is
If the authentication of the authentication information is successful, the signature is not added.
A secure component as claimed in claim 5. A first storage unit that stores a predetermined key;
a first establishment unit that establishes a secret communication path with a first external server;
a first updating unit that updates a key held in the first holding unit with a key acquired from the first external server via the secret communication path.
A secure component according to any one of claims 1 to 6. a second storage unit that stores setting information for internal processing including at least one of an encryption process and a signature generation process;
a second establishment unit that establishes a secret communication path with a second external server;
a second update unit that updates the setting information based on an instruction from the second external server via the secret communication path.
A secure component according to any one of claims 1 to 7. A secure component according to any one of claims 1 to 8,
Sensor unit. A positioning sensor is provided to measure position information as the sensor information.
The sensor unit according to claim 9 . The position measuring sensor includes:
At least one of GPS, short-distance radio, a mobile communication network, geomagnetism, and sound waves is used as a positioning method;
The sensor unit according to claim 10 . A secure component according to any one of claims 1 to 8;
The sensor unit according to claim 10 or 11 ,
Transmitting encrypted sensor information detected by the sensor unit to an external device.
device. a verification unit that verifies a signature when a signature is attached to the sensor information output by the secure component;
The device of claim 12 . On the computer,
Acquires sensor information detected by the sensor unit,
The acquired sensor information is encrypted,
The encrypted sensor information is output to the outside.
If the acquired sensor information is encrypted, decrypt the sensor information;
The decrypted sensor information is re-encrypted with a key held by the secure component itself.
A computer program that executes a process. The secure component encrypts the sensor information detected by the sensor unit,
a device including the sensor unit and a secure component, the device transmitting the sensor information encrypted by the secure component to an information processing device;
If the sensor information is encrypted, decrypting the sensor information;
The decrypted sensor information is re-encrypted with a key held by the secure component itself;
The information processing device decrypts the encrypted sensor information and detects a state of the device based on the decrypted sensor information.
Information processing methods.

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