JP7775619B2 - Certificate, certificate issuing system, and method for verifying the authenticity of a certificate - Google Patents

Description

The present invention relates to various certificates and other documents that are effective in preventing counterfeiting and tampering, a certificate issuing system, and a method for verifying the authenticity of certificates.

In recent years, consideration has been given to attaching IC tags with built-in IC chips to various documents and reading the IC tags electronically to improve the efficiency of the verification process and prevent counterfeiting and tampering. In this case, the information printed and recorded on the document is stored in the IC chip of the IC tag, and the information printed on the document is compared with the information stored in the IC chip to verify that it is not a counterfeit.

For example, Patent Document 1 discloses an admission ticket with a contactless IC attached, in which information printed on the front of the ticket, such as the attendee's name and admission ticket control number, is written to the IC's information storage unit, and by reading this information electronically, it can be used to manage entrance and exit to venues and the provision of various services. However, this system remains vulnerable to methods such as tampering with the printing or replacing the contactless IC, and improvements were needed.

In addition to this, various other techniques have been proposed to prevent the counterfeiting of media that have predetermined information printed on them, such as certificates and cards. For example, one method involves printing the details of a security on the surface of a credit card-sized card, writing the same information as the details onto an IC chip, and verifying that the two are identical, thereby detecting counterfeits. This method, however, has the same vulnerabilities as the example above, and is difficult to apply to general certificates due to the size constraints of cards.

Further proposals have included encrypting some or all of the information printed on the surface and printing it separately on the surface while also writing it to an IC chip, or preparing separate verification data, encrypting it, and writing it to the IC chip. However, these have presented problems such as the need to store the encryption key in the encryption device, requiring a separate verification device for decryption, and the risk of the key being leaked when encryption is performed outside of the IC chip.

Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 11-277963

The present invention aims to provide a certificate, a certificate issuing system, and a method for verifying the authenticity of a certificate that can prevent counterfeiting or tampering by rewriting the print data on the certificate or replacing the IC chip, and that allows for offline verification and validation to confirm authenticity without connecting to an external device such as a server, since all the data necessary to verify the IC chip data and print data is stored in the IC chip.

In order to solve the above problems, the present invention provides:
A certificate having an information printing section on which predetermined information is printed,
An IC tag sticker is attached to the surface, and the IC tag sticker has a support body that is sealed with an IC chip that can electrically read and write data and stores an encryption key therein, and an antenna connected to the IC chip for communicating with the outside, and the support body seals the IC chip.
data including information printed on the information printing unit;
A HASH value generated from a part or all of the data of the information printed on the information printing unit is encrypted with an encryption key stored in the IC chip, and the signature data is signed;
is written in the memory of the IC chip.

In the above document,
The document may have a code printing portion in which the signature data is printed on the surface of the document in the form of a QR code (registered trademark), a barcode, or converted alphanumeric characters.

In the above document,
The encryption key may be signed with a private key of a public key cryptosystem held by the certificate issuing organization and may be usable after being decrypted with the corresponding public key.

Another aspect of the present invention is
A certificate issuing system that issues a certificate having predetermined information printed on its surface,
It includes a control PC and a printer with a read/write function for the IC chip,
The IC tag sticker is attached to the surface of a sheet of paper, which has an IC chip that can electrically read and write data and stores an encryption key inside, and an antenna connected to the IC chip for communicating with the outside sealed in a support,
The printer stores data containing the same information as that to be printed on the surface of the paper in an IC chip, and prints the information to be printed on the surface of the paper;
A HASH value generated from a part or all of the printed data is encrypted with an encryption key stored in the IC chip and signed;
The document issuing system is characterized in that the signature data is written into the memory of the IC chip.

In the above certificate issuing system,
The signature data may further be printed on the surface of the document in the form of a QR code, a barcode or converted alphanumeric characters.

In the above certificate issuing system,
The encryption key may be signed with a private key of a public key cryptosystem held by the certificate issuing organization and may be usable after being decrypted with the corresponding public key.

Another aspect of the present invention is
The method of claim 1 further comprises: optically reading the printed data of the information printing section of the certificate; generating a HASH value from a part or all of the information; transmitting the HASH value to the IC tag; encrypting the HASH value with an encryption key stored in the IC chip of the IC tag; and signing the HASH value;
Verifying whether the signature is identical to the signature stored in the memory of the IC chip using the IC chip;
This is a method for verifying the authenticity of a certificate, characterized in that if the two are identical, the certificate is deemed to be authentic.

Another aspect of the present invention is
The method of claim 2 further comprises: optically reading the printed data of the information printing section of the certificate; generating a HASH value from a part or all of the information; transmitting the HASH value to the IC tag; encrypting the HASH value with an encryption key stored in the IC chip of the IC tag; and signing the HASH value;
The IC chip is used to verify whether the signature, the signature read from the code printed portion of the document, and the signature stored in the memory of the IC chip are the same;
This is a method for verifying the authenticity of a certificate, characterized in that the certificate is deemed to be authentic when the two are identical.

In the method for verifying the authenticity of the above documents,
The encryption key may be a key that is signed with a private key held by the certificate issuing organization and can be used after decryption with the corresponding public key.

According to the present invention, even if a certificate's print data is tampered with or the IC chip is replaced to create a forged document or to be tampered with, all of the data necessary to compare the IC chip data with the print data is stored in the IC chip, resulting in a certificate, certificate issuance system, and certificate authenticity confirmation method that enable offline comparison and verification without connecting to an external device such as a server.

1 is a schematic diagram of one form of the document of the present invention; 1 is a schematic configuration diagram of one embodiment of a certificate issuing system of the present invention. 1 is a flowchart showing an example of a certificate issuance flow of the present invention. FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of the configuration of a document verification system. 1 is a flowchart showing an example of a verification flow of a certificate according to the present invention. 10 is a flowchart showing another example of the certificate issuance flow of the present invention. 10 is a flowchart showing another example of the verification flow of a certificate according to the present invention.

Embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described below. Furthermore, while the embodiments described below have technically preferable limitations for implementing the invention, these limitations are not essential requirements of the present invention. Furthermore, "signature" in this specification and drawings refers to an electronic signature unless otherwise specified.

<Documents with IC tags>
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of one form of the certificate of the present invention, specifically a certificate with an IC tag affixed. The certificate is a document for which authenticity is important and which is susceptible to counterfeiting, such as, but not limited to, securities, vehicle inspection certificates, and various official certificates. The certificate of this embodiment is constructed by affixing an IC tag to a sheet-like certificate body, such as paper or a plastic sheet, which is equipped with an IC chip and antenna storing an encryption key, sealed with a sealant, and capable of contactless communication with the outside. For this reason, the IC tag is in the form of an IC tag sticker, with an adhesive layer provided on one surface of the IC tag.

Specified text information is printed in the information printing section on the front of the certificate, and information including the printed text information is written as data to the IC chip. In addition to the specified text information, the information printing section may also be printed with ruled lines, item name columns, decorations, etc. as needed, for example to create a table. Furthermore, to improve the usability of the certificate, the hash value of the specified text information to be printed may be taken, encrypted with an encryption key stored in the IC chip, converted into a QR code (registered trademark), and printed in the code printing section, although printing a QR code (registered trademark) is not required.

The above configuration will be explained in more detail. The configuration involves affixing a contactless IC tag sticker to the certificate body, which is a large paper sheet such as A5 or A4 size. Using a large paper sheet allows for a great deal of freedom in the content printed on the information printing section. However, the use of an IC tag sticker raises the risk of forgery, such as by replacing the IC tag sticker or attaching an IC chip to counterfeit paper. Therefore, an issuance system will be configured that ensures consistency between the printed content and the data stored on the IC chip.

<Certificate Issuance System>
2 is a schematic diagram of one embodiment of the certificate issuance system of the present invention. The issuance data server and the certificate issuance system are connected via the Internet or a dedicated line. The certificate issuance system is composed of a certificate printer equipped with a reader/writer that has the function of communicating with IC tags, and a PC for issuance operations that is connected to the Internet or the dedicated line.

The PC receives the issuance data from the issuance data server and begins the issuance process. First, it writes the specified printing content data for the information printing unit into the IC chip's memory, and then prints the same content. In this case, the printing data obtained from the certificate issuance data server can be used as is to write it into the IC chip's memory and print it in the information printing unit, but if greater reliability is required, it is better to read out the content that was previously written into the IC chip's memory and print it in the information printing unit.

Next, a hash value is calculated using part or all of the printed data. Since the hash value cannot be decrypted, this is not encryption in the strict sense. The hash value is sent to the IC chip via the reader/writer, where it is encrypted using the IC chip's encryption key and returned. Alternatively, the hash value can be encrypted on the PC side without using the IC chip's encryption function. To encrypt on the PC side, for example, the encryption key signed with the private key and the public key stored on the IC chip can be read, the encryption key signed with the public key can be decrypted within the PC, and the resulting encryption key can be used to encrypt the data. The encrypted hash value data is written to the IC chip's memory. As mentioned above, the encrypted hash value data can also be converted into a barcode such as a QR Code (registered trademark) and printed in the code printing section.

<Issuance flow>
Figure 3 shows an example of a flowchart for issuing a certificate. It shows the flow when the HASH value is encrypted in an IC chip. The steps after the issuance process starts are as follows:
S101: Issuance data including print data is acquired from an issuance data server.
S102: The certificate paper is set in the certificate printer.
S103: The encryption key is stored in the IC chip of the IC tag on the certificate paper by the PC via the reader/writer.
Set.
S104: Similarly, the issuing data is written.
S105: The issued data is read again from the IC chip.
S106: Print the information printing section on the certificate printer using the print data in the read issuance data.
conduct.
S107: Calculate a hash value from the print data.
S108: The calculated HASH value is transmitted to the IC chip via the reader/writer.
The data is encrypted and signed using the chip's encryption key and sent back to the PC.
S109: The signed HASH value is stored in the collation area of the memory of the IC chip.
S110: The signed HASH value is converted into a QR code (registered trademark) and printed on the code printing unit.
S111: The printed certificate paper is taken out.
If a QR code (registered trademark) is not to be printed, step S110 is omitted.
Through the above procedure, a certificate is issued in which the print data and the encrypted HASH value are stored in the memory of the IC chip of the IC tag.

<Verifying the authenticity of documents>
To verify the authenticity of an issued certificate, the information printed on the certificate is optically read using an OCR, a HASH value is calculated from some or all of that information, and the calculated value is sent to the IC chip in the IC tag via a reader/writer. The IC chip then encrypts and signs the received HASH value and returns it to the reader/writer. The signed HASH value returned from the IC chip is then sent back to the IC chip, where it is compared within the IC chip with the signed HASH value recorded in the verification area of the IC chip's memory, thereby verifying that the IC chip has not been swapped or counterfeited.

Also, if a QR code (registered trademark), for example, is printed in the code printing section, first, as described above, the information printed on the certificate is optically read using OCR, and a HASH value is calculated from some or all of that information and sent to the IC chip in the IC tag via a reader/writer. The IC chip encrypts and signs the received HASH value and returns it to the reader/writer. The QR code (registered trademark) printed in the code printing section is read using a QR code (registered trademark) scanner or similar to restore the signed HASH value, which is then compared with the signed HASH value returned from the IC chip and confirmed to be identical, thereby verifying authenticity. The signed HASH value received from the IC chip can also be sent back to the IC chip and compared within the IC chip with the signed HASH value recorded in the verification area of the IC chip's memory to verify that the IC chip has not been swapped or counterfeited.

<Verification system>
Figure 4 shows a schematic diagram of an example of the configuration of a verification system that verifies the authenticity of a certificate. A verification system that verifies the authenticity of a certificate can be configured offline, independent of the aforementioned issuing system or the Internet. It can be configured with at least a PC, a contactless IC reader/writer, and a scanner (for OCR). If there is a scanner that reads QR Codes (registered trademark), reading can be made easier, but an OCR scanner can also be used instead. The verification procedure is explained in the following verification flow.

<Verification flow>
The verification procedure will be explained along the verification flow shown in Figure 5. After the verification starts,
S201: The print data of the information printing section on the printing surface of the certificate is read by a scanner.
If a QR code (registered trademark) or the like is printed on the card, it is also read using a scanner or a QR code (registered trademark) scanner.
S202: A HASH value is calculated from the print data of the read information print section.
S203: The HASH value is transmitted to the IC chip of the IC tag by the contactless IC reader/writer.
The signature is encrypted using an IC chip.
S204: Convert the QR code (registered trademark) printed on the code into signature data, encrypt it in the IC chip, and
Compare with the signed HASH value.
S205: If both are identical, proceed to S206. If they are not identical, a verification error occurs.
If a QR code (registered trademark) or the like is not printed in the code printing section, steps S204 and S205 are omitted.
S206: The signed HASH value stored in the verification area of the memory of the IC chip
and is compared with the HASH value that is generated from the print data, encrypted, and signed.
S207: If both are identical, proceed to S208. If they are not identical, a verification error occurs.
S208: The certificate is deemed to be valid and the verification is completed.
In this manner, the certificate is verified.

<Signature generation using public key cryptography>
The method described above is a method that can be implemented without any problems even if the signature key set in the IC card is a key of a common key cryptosystem such as DES or AES. If the common key is properly managed through strict management and periodic key updating procedures, there will be few problems, but it is also possible to adopt a more secure method in consideration of unforeseen circumstances such as key leakage.

Generally, it is more secure to use a cryptographic key for generating a signature that has been verified using a key pair based on public key cryptography held by a third party, primarily another organization known as a CA. This makes it more difficult for the cryptographic key to be leaked, and prevents the key itself from being counterfeited. To utilize this, the IC chip must also have functionality compatible with public key cryptography, which may require a specialized IC chip. However, an embodiment that employs public key cryptography to further improve security will be described below. The device configurations of the issuing system and verification system can be similar to those of the previously described embodiment, so a description thereof will be omitted.

<Issuance flow when using public key cryptography>
The basic flow is the same as that described above except that the encryption key is a key pair of the public key cryptosystem, so the issuing procedure will be explained using the flowchart in FIG.
S301: Issuance data including print data is acquired from an issuance data server.
S302: The certificate paper is set in the certificate printer.
S303: The CA signs the IC chip of the IC tag on the certificate via the reader/writer.
The encryption key and the public key of the CA are set together.
S304: Similarly, the issuing data is written.
S305: The issued data is read again from the IC chip.
S306: Print the information printing section on the certificate printer using the print data in the read issuance data.
conduct.
S307: Calculate a HASH value from the print data.
S308: The encryption key signed by the CA station and the public key of the CA station are sent to the IC chip and encrypted.
The key is decrypted and made available within the IC chip.
S309: The calculated HASH value is sent to the IC chip via the reader/writer and is made available for use.
The data is encrypted with the encryption key and sent back to the PC.
S310: The encrypted HASH value is stored in the collation area of the memory of the IC chip.
S311: The encrypted HASH value is converted into a QR code (registered trademark) and printed on the code printing unit.
S312: The printed certificate paper is taken out.
If the QR code (registered trademark) is not printed, step S311 is omitted.
Through the above procedure, a certificate is issued in which print data and signature data are stored in the memory of the IC chip of the IC tag.

<Verification flow when using public key cryptography>
The verification procedure when using the public key cryptosystem will be described along the verification flow shown in FIG.
After the verification begins,
S401: The print data of the information printing section on the printing surface of the certificate is read by a scanner.
If a QR code (registered trademark) or similar is printed on the card, it is also read using a scanner or a QR code (registered trademark) scanner.
S402: A HASH value is calculated from the print data of the read information print section.
S403: The encryption key signed by the CA station and the public key of the CA station are extracted from the IC chip. S404: The signed encryption key and the CA public key are sent to the IC chip, and the encryption key is decrypted.
It can be used within the chip.
S405: The HASH value calculated in S402 is read by the contactless IC reader/writer from the IC tag's IC
The data is sent to the chip and encrypted using the encryption key of the IC chip.
S406: The QR code (registered trademark) on the code printing section is converted into signature data, and compared with the HASH value encrypted and signed by the IC chip in the previous stage.
S407: If both are identical, proceed to S408. If they are not identical, a verification error occurs.
If a QR code (registered trademark) or the like is not printed in the code printing section, steps S406 and S407 are omitted.
S408: The encrypted and signed HA stored in the verification area of the memory of the IC chip
The SH value is compared with the HASH value that was encrypted and signed with the print data.
S409: If both are identical, proceed to S410. If they are not identical, a verification error occurs.
S410: The certificate is deemed to be valid and the verification is completed.
In this manner, the certificate is verified.

As explained above, according to the present invention, swapping, forgery, and alteration of data printed on an IC chip and paper can be reliably detected through verification. Furthermore, because all necessary information is stored on the IC chip during verification, verification can be performed offline without connecting to a server or the like. Furthermore, applying public key cryptography can further enhance security.

S101 to S111: Issuance flowchart S201 to S208: Verification flowchart S301 to S312: Issuance flowchart when public key cryptography is used S401 to S410: Verification flowchart when public key cryptography is used

Claims (9)

A certificate having an information printing section on which predetermined information is printed,
An IC tag sticker is attached to the surface, and the IC tag sticker has a support body that is sealed with an IC chip that can electrically read and write data and stores an encryption key therein, and an antenna connected to the IC chip for communicating with the outside, and the support body seals the IC chip.
data including information printed on the information printing unit;
A HASH value generated from a part or all of the data of the information printed on the information printing unit is encrypted with an encryption key stored in the IC chip, and the signature data is signed;
is written in the memory of the IC chip. The document according to claim 1, characterized in that it has a code printing section in which the signature data is printed on the surface of the document in the form of a QR code (registered trademark), a barcode, or converted alphanumeric characters. The certificate described in claim 1 or 2, characterized in that the encryption key is signed with a private key of a public key cryptosystem held by the certificate-issuing organization and can be used after being decrypted with the corresponding public key. A certificate issuing system that issues a certificate having predetermined information printed on its surface,
It includes a control PC and a printer with a read/write function for the IC chip,
The IC tag sticker is attached to the surface of a sheet of paper, which has an IC chip that can electrically read and write data and stores an encryption key inside, and an antenna connected to the IC chip for communicating with the outside sealed in a support,
The printer stores data containing the same information as that to be printed on the surface of the paper in an IC chip, and prints the information to be printed on the surface of the paper;
A HASH value generated from a part or all of the printed data is encrypted with an encryption key stored in the IC chip and signed;
The certificate issuing system is characterized in that the signature data is written into the memory of the IC chip. The document issuance system described in claim 4, characterized in that the signature data is further printed on the surface of the document in the form of a QR code (registered trademark), a barcode, or converted alphanumeric characters. A certificate issuance system as described in claim 4 or 5, characterized in that the encryption key is signed with a private key of a public key cryptosystem held by the certificate issuing organization and can be used after being decrypted with the corresponding public key. The method of claim 1 further comprises: optically reading the printed data of the information printing section of the certificate; generating a HASH value from a part or all of the information; transmitting the HASH value to the IC tag; encrypting the HASH value with an encryption key stored in the IC chip of the IC tag; and signing the HASH value;
Verifying whether the signature is identical to the signature stored in the memory of the IC chip using the IC chip;
A method for verifying the authenticity of a certificate, characterized in that the certificate is deemed to be authentic when the two are identical. The method of claim 2 further comprises: optically reading the printed data of the information printing section of the certificate; generating a HASH value from a part or all of the information; transmitting the HASH value to the IC tag; encrypting the HASH value with an encryption key stored in the IC chip of the IC tag; and signing the HASH value;
The IC chip is used to verify whether the signature, the signature read from the code printed portion of the document, and the signature stored in the memory of the IC chip are the same;
A method for verifying the authenticity of a certificate, characterized in that the certificate is deemed to be authentic when the two are identical. A method for verifying the authenticity of a certificate as described in claim 7 or 8, characterized in that the encryption key is signed with a private key held by the certificate issuing organization and can be used after being decrypted with the corresponding public key.