JPH0821048B2 - Electronic voting device - Google Patents

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION The present invention allows only voters to vote anonymously once on an electronic network, without letting other voters know what they voted for. The present invention relates to an electronic voting device that can file an objection if it is not accepted for counting.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art The conventional electronic voting method is Ohta's method. This is JP-A-1-1771.
64 and 1988 IEICE Spring National Convention A
-294, "Electronic Voting with a Single Election Administrator". In this method, the voter obtains the signature of the center for the voting contents converted by random numbers, then creates the signature of the center for the original voting contents by removing the random number component on the voter side, and gives it to the center anonymously. The secret ballot is realized by sending it. Each voter confirms that his / her vote has been accepted and totaled in the list of voting contents announced by the center. With this method, you can get the signature of the center only for the vote contents that reflect your opinion, so if the center does not count the vote contents, you do not have to open your objection and open the objection. Don't

In order to solve this problem, even if an objection is made, in order for the voter to make an objection without disclosing the content of his / her vote, only the ballot form that does not depend on the content of the vote must be signed beforehand. Japanese Patent Application No. 4-108069 discloses a method of sending the contents of a vote that reflects one's opinion on a signed ballot to the center. As an example, a method is described in which each voter obtains a signed ballot consisting of a positive vote, a negative vote, and a voting tag in a registered manner, and one of the votes is cast anonymously along with the voting tag.

[0004]

Problems to be Solved by the Invention Japanese Patent Application No. 4-10806
In No. 9 and Ota's method, an objection will be filed after the results of aggregation are known. Therefore, there is a problem in that when a two-valued vote for or against is held, it is inferred that the opponent has cast a vote opposite to the total result. The present invention proposes an electronic voting device that invalidates such voting.

Further, in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 4-108069, since the election management center can easily forge the pros and cons corresponding to the voting tags, the following problems occur. For example, voter A voted for v ₁ , voted for v _0, and vote tag v
_{It is} assumed that the signature of _t is obtained, and the vote v ₁ for approval and the vote tag v _t are sent anonymously. At this time, the center forges the counter vote v ′ ₀ and announces that it and the tag v _t are accepted. Voter difference
At the time of discussions complaint, voter v _1, v _0, v _t can publish expose the fraud of the center, but the problem that has also been found in other voters at the same time that he voted in favor of point is there. This is because I am arguing against the negative vote using vt as a tag. The present invention proposes an electronic voting device that solves this problem as well.

[0006]

In the first electronic voting apparatus of the present invention, the voter side creates a ballot sheet that does not depend on the content of the ballot, and a voter that converts the ballot sheet using a random number. It has a paper conversion means and a registered name transmission means for notifying the converted ballot sheet and transmitting it to the election manager side, and the election manager side, for the converted ballot sheet of the legitimate voter by the name A signature means for creating a signature text,
Having a transmitting means for returning the signature text to the voter side, the voter side, receiving means for receiving the signature text returned from the election manager side, the returned signature text and the before conversion The election manager side has voting text encryption means for generating a signed voting text depending on the content of the voting from the voting paper and encrypting it, and anonymous delivery means for sending the encrypted cryptographic voting text anonymously. The vote disclosure means for exposing all the received cipher ballot text as it is, the verification means for the voter side to verify whether or not the cipher ballot text sent by the voter is open, and the result of the verification is that the cipher ballot text is if it is not published, and an appeal means for performing a protest by to create and signed ballot public from the ballot before the conversion and the signed statement, side election administrator, opposition <br / > Not stand up For example, the election manager has a totaling means for decrypting all the cryptographic voting texts and totaling the signed voting texts to which a valid signature text is added, and a publicizing means for publicizing the totalization result. To do.

Further, in the second electronic voting apparatus of the present invention, the voter side comprises a ballot sheet creating means for creating a ballot sheet that does not depend on the content of the vote, and a ballot sheet converting means for converting the ballot sheet using a random number. , Has a name transmission means for registering the converted ballot sheet and transmitting it to the election manager side, and the election manager side creates a signature sentence for the converted ballot sheet of a valid voter by the name. And a sending means for returning the signature text to the voter side, and the voter side
Receiving means for receiving the signature text returned from the election manager side, voting text creating means for creating a signed voting text depending on voting content from the returned signature text and the pre-conversion voting paper, Anonymous sending means for sending the signed voting text anonymously, a vote disclosure means for encrypting all the signed voting texts received by the election manager side and releasing the encrypted voting text, and the voter side Verification means for verifying whether an encrypted version of the sent signed voting text is open to the public, and if the result of the verification is that the signed voting text is not open to the public, the signature text and the pre-conversion vote recovery and appeals means for performing a protest by to create a signed ballot public from the paper, election management's side is, if there is no objection, of all the election administrator side encryption vote sentence A collecting unit that aggregates legitimate signature statement appended the signed voting statement turned into, characterized in that it has a publication means for publishing the counting result.

[0008] In addition, a third of the electronic voting apparatus of the present invention, before
A ballot will tell you about all voting options available.
Sign each voting option with the same signature key.
Bit string set and the signature verification key corresponding to the signature key
A bit string consisting of
Sign the voting content that is your choice of choice
And a signature verification key.
I do.

[0009]

EXAMPLES Examples of the first, second and third inventions will now be described with reference to FIGS.

As shown in FIG. 3, the electronic voting apparatus of the present invention is
m voter subsystems 101 (l) -101 (m)
And one election management center 100 are connected to each other through a secure communication channel (for example, a data line) 105, and a bulletin board that is writable only by the election management center 100 and is readable by all voter subsystems. An example of implementation in the anonymous electronic voting system when the bulletin board 102 exists will be described. For the sake of simplicity, the election management center will be called the center, and the voter subsystem will be called the voter.

Further, in the present embodiment, the voting content is binary for or against for the sake of simplicity, but it can be easily expanded to multivalue.

This voting system includes a preparation phase, a ballot form setting phase, a voting phase and a result announcement phase.

The first and second inventions relate to the voting phase and the result publication phase.

First, the preparation phase of the first invention will be described with reference to FIGS.

As a preparation for implementing this anonymous electronic voting system, the center 100 sets a constant for signature,
The verification constants are posted on the electronic bulletin board 102. For example, assume that the RSA cryptosystem is used as the signature system. Therefore,
n _1, n _0, n ₂ respectively and two prime numbers p _1, q ₁ and p _0, q ₀ and the product of _{p 2, q 2, e 1} , e 0, e
₂ and d ₀ , d ₁ and d ₂ are represented by e _i · d _i = 1 mod (p _i −
1) An integer that satisfies (q _i −1) (i = 1, 0, 2). At this time, the center sets e _i , n _i (i = 1, 0, 2) as a verification constant (step 11). These constants are written in the electronic bulletin board 102 (step 12). Since the verification constants e _i , n _i (i = 1, 0, 2) are frequently used in the future, the constant holding means 201 can be easily accessed for writing (step 13). On the other hand, d ₁ , d ₀ and d ₂ are their own secret information holding means 202.
(Step 14).

Next, the center 100 defines rules regarding voting. First, the agenda to be voted on is clarified, and the voting format for a set of approval / disagreement votes and tag votes is determined.
For example, consider the following voting format. The n _j (j = 1, 0, 2) set in step 11 are 512 bits each, and n ₁ <n ₂ . Agree when exclusive OR of upper 1st bit to 8th bit is 1, 0
The opposite is true. Next, if an arbitrary integer is inserted from the 9th bit to the 249th bit, and the next 192 bits are the DES encryption key from the 1st bit to the 56th bit, and the plaintext from the 57th bit to the 249th bit. The format is the ciphertext of. The 512-bit number thus set is made smaller than n ₁ . Also, in the tag form, all the upper 1st bit to the 8th bit are set to 0, and an arbitrary integer is put in the 9th bit to the 249th bit,
The next 192 bits are the first bit to the 56th bit D
The format of the ES encryption key is the ciphertext when bits 57 to 249 are regarded as plaintext. The 512-bit number thus set is made smaller than n ₀ (step 15).

Next, the names of subsystems (hereinafter referred to as voters) who have the right to vote are listed (step 16). Set and announce the deadline for ballot creation and voting (step 17) and signal the start of the ballot creation phase (step 18).

The above is the preparation phase.

Next, the voting sheet preparation phase and the voting phase will be described. Both of them are in the election management center 1
00 follows the same procedure for each voter, so the description will be continued by taking the procedure for a specific voter subsystem 101 (i) as an example.

As shown in FIG. 1, in the anonymous electronic voting system, the center 100 writes a fixed number and voting rules in the electronic bulletin board 102, a secure communication channel 103, and a voter 101.
(I) is composed of a safe communication channel 104 (i) for reading the contents written on the electronic bulletin board 102 and a safe communication channel 105 (i) for communicating between the voter and the center.

First, referring to FIG. 1, the voter 101
The ballot form creation phase of (i) will be described.

The voter 101 (i) uses the bulletin board reading means 301 to read the contents written on the bulletin board 102 and stores the constants e _j , n _j (j = 1, 0, 2) in the constant holding means 302. On the other hand, the ballot sheet creating means 310 uses the ballot sheet V consisting of the votes v _{1 and 1 for the} vote v _{1 and 0 for the} vote and the tags v _{0 and 0 for the} vote so that the format is read out.
(I) is generated. This is represented as V (i) = (v _{1, 1} , v _{1, 0} , v _{0, 0} ). In addition, the random number component required for the format when creating each vote for and against each vote and the vote tag is the random number generator 30.
The output of 3 is used.

Next, the voting paper converter 304 outputs the outputs r _{b, j} of the random number generator 303 and the constants e _b , n _b (b = 1, b = 1.
0)

[0024]

[Equation 1]

(B, j) = (1,0), (1,1),
A vector S (i) = (s _{1, 1} , s _{1, 0} , composed of s _{b, j is} calculated for each of (0, 0).
s _{0, 0} ) is output. In addition, the random number generator 3 at this time
The output r _{b, j} of 03 is stored in the random number holder 309. S
In (i), the named communication means 305 is used as the safety channel 105.
It is transmitted to the center 100 through (i).

The center 100 receives the S (i) from the legitimate voters received by the ballot paper receiving means 206. The blind signature generator 204 uses d _b and n _b read from the secret holding means 201 and the constant holding means 202,

[0027]

[Equation 2]

Where (b, j) = (1,0), (1,
1) and (0,0) are calculated and output. The blind signature transmitting means 205 uses D (i) = (D _{1, 0} , D
_{1, 1} , D _{0, 0} ) is transmitted to the voter 101 (i).

The center declares that it will shift to the voting phase if the signatures are sent to all the voters who have created the ballot. The above is the ballot form setting phase.

Next, the voting phase will be described.

The signature verification means 306 receives D (i) received from the center 100 by the blind signature reception means 311.
And using e _b and n _b read from the constant holding means 302

[0032]

(Equation 3)

Where (b, j) = (1,0), (1,
It is verified whether 1) or (0, 0) holds.

If it can be confirmed, the voting encryption unit 307 responds to its opinion B (B is 0 or 1) by the random number holder 309.
Using the integers r _{1, B} , r _{0, 0} read out from n and n ₁ , n ₀ , e ₂ read out from the constant holding means 302, t _{1, B} = ((d _{1, B} / r _{1, B} ) Mod n ₁ ) ^{e 2} mod n ₂ t _{0, 0} = d _{0, 0} / r _{0, 0} mod n ₀ , and the anonymous transmission means 308 calculates T (i) = (t.
_{1, B} , t _{0, 0} ) without adding sender name
Send to 0.

The center 100 receives t (i) from the received T (i).
Read _{0, 0}

[0036]

[Equation 4]

Calculate α is if not a fraud voters, equal to v _{0, 0.} If α is a predetermined tag format, verify whether the same tag has been used before. If it is not used, t _{1 and B} are used as an acceptance vote, and α is recorded as a used tag. t _{1, B} , and α are acceptance sheet holding means 211
To be stored. If the same tag is used, it will not be accepted as an invalid vote.

The above is the voting phase. When everyone has voted, the center moves to the result publication phase.

Next, the result announcement phase will be described with reference to FIG.

The center 100 publishes a list of all the received receipts and their tags by the acceptance slip issuing means 208. Each voter 101 (i) reads the list of acceptance votes and voting tags by the acceptance vote list reading means 311 and confirms that his vote is included in the vote and tags in the verification means 312. If it cannot be confirmed, an objection is made using the objection means 313. This will be described in detail later. If there is no objection from any voter, the center uses the decryption key d ₂ to decrypt all acceptance slips and e ₁ to verify the signature. That is,

[0041]

(Equation 5)

Make sure that is a valid vote according to the defined format. If confirmed, the total is calculated based on the value of this vote. If it cannot be confirmed, the vote will be invalid.

When all the votes can be added up, the result of the addition is announced together with the decryption key. Each voter can verify that the published aggregation result will be obtained by decrypting the acceptance vote with the decryption key.

On the other hand, if the verification means 312 has not accepted its vote, the objection means 313 takes the following steps.

D (i) received by the blind signature reception means 311 and verified by the signature verification means 306,
Using e _b and n _b read from the constant holding means 302 and r _{b and j} read from the random number holding means 309 _, γ _{b, j} = s _{b, j} / r _{b, j} mod n _b (b, j) ) = (1,0), (1,1), (0,0) are calculated and announced at the time of opposition.

[0046]

(Equation 6)

If it is confirmed that neither the acceptance vote of j = 0 or 1 nor the tag of γ _{0, 0} is published, it is processed that the vote of the opponent is not accepted.

By protesting in this way, it is possible to prove that one's vote was not accepted, without revealing which vote the contestant actually voted for. Furthermore, since the entire voting result remains encrypted when the objection is made, it is distinguished from the objection to the voting result, and the objector is not dissatisfied with the voting result as in the conventional method. Will be revealed.

When the present invention is applied to the case where there is no illegal voter who votes both for and against, the same effect can be obtained without using any voting tag.

Next, an embodiment of the second invention will be described with reference to FIGS.

In the second invention, like the first invention, before the disclosure of the counting result, the encrypted acceptance vote is disclosed and it is checked whether or not one's vote is counted. In the first invention, the voter encrypted his vote contents with the public key of the center, but in the second invention, the center with a large processing capability decides to encrypt the vote received with the public key and announce it. To do. This will reduce the burden on voters.

Embodiment of the First Invention and Preparation Phase
The voting ballot creation phase is the same, but the voting
Voting sentence generator 500 in
Since the acceptance slip encryption means 501 is different, only the difference is explained.
Reveal In the voting sentence generator 500, my opinion B (B is 0
Or 1), an integer read from the random number holder 309
r_{1, B}, R_{0, 0}And read from the constant holding means 302
Done n₁, N₀Using t_{1, B}= (D_{1, B}/ R_{1, B}) Mod n₁  t_{0, 0}= D_{0, 0}/ R_{0, 0}mod n₀ And the anonymous transmission means 308 calculates T (i) = (t
_{1, B}, T_{0, 0}) Center 10 without adding sender name
Send to 0.

If the center can verify the validity of the information by the acceptance slip verification means 207, the center stores it in the acceptance slip holding means 211.

The above is the voting phase.

In the publication phase, the center encrypts the acceptance slip stored in the acceptance slip holding means 211 by using the public keys e ₂ and n ₂ which have been made public beforehand, and publishes the encrypted acceptance slip. . The verification means 312 of each voter compares his / her vote with the one encrypted with the public keys e ₂ and n ₂ to check whether his / her vote has been accepted.

Next, an embodiment of the third invention will be described with reference to FIGS. The third invention mainly relates to the ballot setting phase.

First, referring to FIG . 4, the preparation process of the third invention is performed.
Will be described.

As a preparation for implementing this anonymous electronic voting system, the center 100 sets a constant for signature,
The verification constants are posted on the electronic bulletin board 102. For example, assume that the RSA cryptosystem is used as the signature system. Therefore,
n _1, n _0, n ₂ respectively and two prime numbers p _1, p ₁ and p _0, p ₀ and the product of _{p 2, p 2, e 1} , e 0, e
₂ and d _1, d _0, d ₂ a _{e i · d i = 1mol (} p i -
1) An integer that satisfies (q _i −1) (i = 1, 0, 2). At this time, the center sets e _i , n _i (i = 1, 0, 2) as a verification constant (step 11). These constants are written in the electronic bulletin board 102 (step 12).
Since the verification constants e _i , n _i (i = 1, 0, 2) are frequently used in the future, the constant holding means 621 can be easily accessed for writing (step 13).
On the other hand, d ₁ , d ₀ and d ₂ are their own secret information holding means 62.
2 (step 14).

Next, the center 100 defines rules regarding voting. First, the agenda to be voted on is clarified, and the voting format for a set of approval / disagreement votes and tag votes is determined.
For example, consider the following voting format. If n ₁ set in step 11 is 512 bits, and the exclusive OR of the upper 1st bit to the 8th bit is 1, it is agreed, and when 0, it is opposed. Then from the 9th bit to the 2nd
An arbitrary integer is put in 49 bits, and the following 192 bits have a format in which the first bit to the 56th bit are the key of the DES encryption and the 57th bit to the 249th bit are ciphertexts when they are regarded as plaintexts. . The 512-bit number thus set is made smaller than n ₁ (step 15).

Next, the names of subsystems (hereinafter referred to as voters) who have the right to vote are listed (step 16). Set and announce the deadline for ballot creation and voting (step 17) and signal the start of the ballot creation phase (step 18).

The above is the preparation phase.

Next, the ballot form preparation phase and the voting phase will be described. Both phases are in the election management center 1
00 follows the same procedure for each voter, so the description will be continued by taking the procedure for a specific voter subsystem 101 (i) as an example.

As shown in FIG. 6, in the anonymous electronic voting system, the center 100 writes a fixed number and voting rules in the electronic bulletin board 102, a secure communication channel 103, and a voter 101.
(I) is composed of a safe communication channel 104 (i) for reading the contents written on the electronic bulletin board 102 and a safe communication channel 105 (i) for communicating between the voter and the center.

The voting sheet preparation phase of the voter 101 (i) will be described with reference to FIG.

The voter 101 (i) reads the contents written on the bulletin board 102 using the bulletin board reading means 601 and stores the constants e _j , n _j (j = 1, 0, 2) in the constant holding means 602. To do.

Next, the ballot forming means 610 performs the following. The output of the random number generator 603 is used to set a constant for signature. Here, the RSA signature is used, and the signature key d and the verification keys e and n are determined. Here, n is smaller than n ₁ and the combination of e and n is smaller than n ₀ . For example, n is 520 bits, e is 10 bits, n
_{The value 0} may be 530 bits or the like, and the center may determine it in advance in the preparation phase.

Next, in accordance with the format, the approval votes u _{1, 1} and the opposite votes u _{1, 0} smaller than n are determined, and their signatures are written.

[0068]

(Equation 7)

Find Vote tag u _{0, 0} is set to the concatenation e, the n. These three sets are used as ballot paper V (i) and are expressed as V (i) = (v _{1, 1} , v _{1, 0} , v _{0, 0} ). Next, the voting paper converter 604 uses the random number generator 6
Using the output r _{b, j of} 03 and the constants e _b , n _b (b = 1, 0),

[0070]

(Equation 8)

(B, j) = (1,0), (1,1),
A vector S (i) = (s _{1, 1} , s _{1, 0} , composed of s _{b, j is} calculated for each of (0, 0).
s _{0, 0} ) is output. In addition, the random number generator 6 at this time
The output r _{b, j} of 03 is stored in the random number holder 609. s
In (i), the named communication means 605 is used by the safety channel 105.
It is transmitted to the center 100 through (i). Center 100
Receives the s (i) from the legitimate voters received by the ballot paper receiving means 626. The blind signature generator 624 has the secret holding means 621 and the constant holding means 622 d _b.
And n _b ,

[0072]

[Equation 9]

Where (b, j) = (1,0), (1,
1) and (0,0) are calculated and output. The blind signature transmitting means 625 uses D (i) = (s _{1, 1} , s
_{1, 0} , s _{0, 0} ) is transmitted to the voter 101 (i).

The center declares that it will shift to the voting phase if the signatures are sent to all the voters who have created the ballot form. The above is the ballot form setting phase.

Next, the voting phase will be described.

The signature verification unit 606 receives the D (i) received from the center 100 by the blind signature reception unit 611.
And using e _b and n _b read from the constant holding means 602,

[0077]

[Equation 10]

Is (b, j) = (1,0), (1,
It is verified whether 1) or (0, 0) holds.
If it is possible to confirm, the vote generator 607 determines that the opinion B (B
Is 0 or 1), using the integers r _{1, B} , r _{0, 0} read from the random number holder 609 and n ₁ , n ₀ read from the constant holding means 602, t _{1, B} = D _{1, B} / r _{1, B} mod n ₁ t _{0, 0} = D _{0, 0} / r _{0, 0} mod n ₀ , and the anonymous transmission means 608 calculates T (i) = (t
_{1, B} , t _{0, 0} ) without adding sender name
Send to 0.

[0079] center 100 reads out the t _{0, 0} among the received T (i)

[0080]

[Equation 11]

Calculate α is if not a fraud voters, equal to v _{0, 0.} Divide α to obtain the RSA verification key e · n, and check whether the same verification key has been used before. T _{1, B} if not used
Verify the legitimacy of. That is,

[0082]

(Equation 12)

Whether or not is a vote according to the correct format representing the opinion B, and if correct, it is totaled.
If the same verification key is used, it will not be accepted as an invalid vote.

The above is the voting phase. When everyone's vote is completed, the center moves to the result announcement phase, and publishes the aggregated result and all acceptance and tag votes.

Next, a fourth embodiment for carrying out both the first invention and the third invention will be described. In the voting sentence generator 607 according to the second embodiment of the present invention, t _{1, B} = (d _1, D _{1 is obtained} by using n ₁ , n ₂ and e ₂ read from t _{1 and B} from the constant holding means 602 _{. The} voting text may be encrypted as _B / r _{1, B} mod n ₁ ) ^{e 2} mod n ₂ t _{0, 0} = d _{0, 0} / r _{0, 0} mod n ₀ . In this case n ₁ is n
Should be less than ₂ . Alternatively, as a fifth embodiment for carrying out both the first invention and the third invention, in the voting sentence generator 607 of the above-mentioned embodiment of the second invention, t
N ₁ , which read _{1 and B} from the constant holding means 602,
Using n ₂ and e ₂ , t _{1, B} = d _{1, B} / r _{1, B} mod n ₁ t _{0, 0} = (d _{0, 0} / r _{0, 0} mod n ₀ ) ^{e 2} modn ₂ and , Voting tags may be encrypted. In this case, n ₀ is n ₂
It shall be smaller.

Since the subsequent steps are the same as those in the above embodiment, the description thereof will be omitted.

The second invention and the third invention can be simultaneously realized in the same manner.

Referring to FIG. 5, the system described in each of the embodiments has a terminal unit (TMU) 401 such as a personal computer having a communication processing function, a read-only storage unit (ROM) 402, and a random number unit. An access storage device (RAM) 403, a random number generator (RNG) 404,
Signal processor (SP) 406, TMU 401,
ROM402, RAM403, RNG404 and SP
It is composed of a common bus 405 that connects 406 to each other. The RNG 404 generates a random number according to a command from SP 406. This is used when the center 100 sets a constant, and is also used as a random number generator for each voter 101 (i).
In the case of the center 100, the ROM 407 stores constants e _i and n _i.
(I = 1,0,2) and confidential information d _i (i = 1,0,2)
I remember. The d _i (i = 1, 0, 2) may be stored in the RAM each time the blind signature is created from the TUM. Voter subsystem 101 in ROM 407
In the case of (i), constants e _i and n _i (i = 1, 0, 2) are stored. The above operation is realized based on the program stored in the ROM. The RAM 403 is used to temporarily store the intermediate calculation result and the like during the execution of these steps.

The system 100, 101 (i) may be a data processing device such as a general-purpose computer or an IC card.

The present invention can be applied not only to elections and voting but also to anonymous electronic questionnaires and popularity surveys.

[0091]

As described above in detail, the use of the present invention makes it possible to realize a secret electronic voting system capable of making an objection while maintaining privacy.

[Brief description of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of an electronic voting device of the first invention.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of an electronic voting device of the first invention.

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an anonymous electronic voting system.

FIG. 4 is a diagram showing an example of a preparation phase.

FIG. 5: Center 100, voter subsystem 101 (i)
FIG.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of an electronic voting device of the second invention.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of an electronic voting device of the second invention.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of an electronic voting device of a third invention.

[Explanation of Codes] 100 Election Management Center 101 (i) Voter Subsystem 102 Electronic Bulletin Board

Claims (3)

[Claims] 1. A voter side creates a ballot form that does not depend on the content of the vote, a ballot form creating unit that converts the ballot form using a random number, and an election management that names the converted ballot form. And a signature sending means for sending the signature text to the converted ballot sheet of the valid voter by the name, and the voter sending the signature text to the voter. The voting side has a sending means for returning to the side, the voter side receives the signature text returned from the election manager side, and the voting text from the returned signature text and the pre-conversion ballot sheet. Voting text encryption means for generating and encrypting the dependent signed voting text, and bearer sending means for sending the encrypted cipher voting text anonymously, all the ciphers received by the election manager side Publish voting text as it is Public means, verification means for the voter side to verify whether or not the cryptographic voting text sent by him / herself is public, and if the cryptographic voting text of his / her own is not public as a result of the verification, the signature text and the pre-conversion It has a means of objection to make an objection by creating a signed ballot sheet from the ballot paper of and making it open to the public, and the election manager side, if there is no objection , the election manager side decrypts all the encrypted ballot texts. An electronic voting device, comprising: a totalizing unit that totalizes the signed voting texts that have been converted into valid signature texts, and a publishing unit that publishes the totalization result. 2. A voter side creates a ballot form that does not depend on the content of the vote, a ballot form creating unit that converts the ballot form by using a random number, and an election management that names the converted ballot form. And a signature sending means for sending the signature text to the converted ballot sheet of the valid voter by the name, and the voter sending the signature text to the voter. The voting side has a sending means for returning to the side, the voter side receives the signature text returned from the election manager side, and the voting text from the returned signature text and the pre-conversion ballot sheet. Voting text creating means for creating a dependent signed voting text, anonymous delivery means for sending the signed voting text anonymously, and all the signed voting texts received by the election manager side are encrypted and encrypted voting Vote to publish the sentence Opening means, verification means for verifying whether the voter side has encrypted the signed voting text sent by him, and as a result of the verification, the signed voting text of himself must be published. and the appeal means for performing the objection I say standing <br/> hand by which to create a signed ballot public from play the signature statement and the conversion before the ballot, election management's side is, if there is no objection, the election An electronic ballot having an aggregating means for aggregating the signed voting texts to which all the cryptographic voting texts are decrypted by the administrator side and a legitimate signature text is added, and a publishing means for announcing the aggregating result. apparatus. 3. A bit string composed of a bit string set in which each voting option is signed by the same signature key, and a signature verification key corresponding to the signature key, for all voting options that can be voted. 3. The claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the voting text includes a bit string that has signed the voting content, which is an option selected by the voter, and the signature verification key. Electronic voting device.